Harley v. City of Woodbury

RYAN D. HARLEY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WOODBURY, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 18-00170 (RBK/KMW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CAMDEN VICINAGE

March 18, 2020

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

KUGLER, United States District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Detective Andrew DiGiambatista's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 24). Defendant investigated Plaintiff Ryan D. Harley for an alleged robbery, leading to his arrest. However, Defendant failed to act when Plaintiff and other individuals presented him with an alibi, needlessly prolonging Plaintiff's detention. Nevertheless, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, and therefore his Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This matter arises out of Plaintiff's August 27, 2015 arrest in connection with an armed robbery that allegedly occurred on August 24, 2015. (Doc. No. 24-2 ("Def. SUMF") at 1). On that date, Robin Radziewicz informed Woodbury Police officers that she and Joshua Storms were robbed at gunpoint by three unidentified black males at 556 Salem Avenue in Woodbury, New Jersey. (Id. at ¶¶2-3.) Three other witnesses—Ryan Kendricks, Valeri Petti, and Matthew Heritage—were in the house at this time. (Id. at ¶ 3). After being assigned to investigate the case, Defendant took statements from these witnesses; Storms identified one of the men as "Ready" and another as "Daddy-O." (Id. at ¶ 9).

Defendant knew that Plaintiff went by the nickname "Ready," and knew that he had been involved in the sale of illegal narcotics. (Id. at ¶ 14). Storms, Kendricks, and Valeri participated in a photo line-up. (Id. at ¶ 15). During the photo line-up, Storms and Kendricks both stated that they were 70% sure that Plaintiff was one of the men who entered the house. (Id. at ¶ 15-18). Valeri was unable to identify Plaintiff from the lineup. (Id. at ¶ 17). Defendant then contacted the Assistant County Prosecutor and prepared a Complaint-Warrant for the arrest of Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-20). Municipal Court Judge Martin Whitcraft approved the warrant and set bail at $150,000.000. (Id. at ¶ 21).

On August 27, 2015, the Woodbury Police arrested Plaintiff during a vehicle stop. (Id. at ¶ 23). Plaintiff was the passenger in a vehicle operated by Brianna Garland. (Id.). After Plaintiff's arrest, Defendant interviewed him at the Woodbury Police Department. (Doc. No. 25 at 16-20 ("Pl. CSUMF") at ¶ 9).¹ Plaintiff informed Defendant that he was on probation in the Gloucester County Drug Court program, and that as part of the program he was required to attend weekly Intensive Outpatient Program ("IOP") meetings for substance abuse. (Id.). Further, Plaintiff told Defendant that he was at an IOP meeting at the time of the robbery, and provided Defendant with the name of his IOP counselor, James Kearney. (Id.).

On August 28, 2015, Garland went to the Woodbury Police Station and stated that she was with Plaintiff on the night of August 24. (Def. SUMF at ¶ 26). She further explained that Plaintiffhad been at an IOP meeting when the robbery occurred and supplied supporting documentation. (Pl. CSMF at ¶ 10). Later, Daniel Holmes, a friend of Plaintiff, informed Investigator Brian Boucher that he dropped Plaintiff off at his IOP meeting at 6:00 p.m. on the night of August 24. (Id. at ¶ 11).

On September 8, 2015, Kendricks and Radziewicz participated in a photo lineup and were unable to identify Plaintiff among the subjects. (Def. SUMF at ¶¶ 28-29). On September 10, 2015, a Gloucester County Assistant Prosecutor informed Defendant that she had been contacted by individuals at the Gloucester County Drug Court about Plaintiff's arrest, and that these individuals had told her that Plaintiff was at an IOP meeting at the time of the alleged robbery. (Id. at ¶ 30; Pl. CSMF at ¶ 14). After Defendant told the Assistant Prosecutor about the results of the September 8 photo line-up the Assistant Prosecutor then asked Defendant to release plaintiff "ROR" before his upcoming court hearing. (Def. SUMF at ¶ 30). However, Defendant took no action to have Plaintiff released at this time.

On September 15, 2015, Defendant went to the Center for Family Services and spoke with Plaintiff's drug counselor James Kearney, who confirmed that Plaintiff was at his meeting on August 24, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 31). Defendant had Storms come in for another photo line-up on September 15, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 32). Storms told Defendant that he did not think Plaintiff or "Daddy-O" were involved in the robbery. (Id.) Subsequently, Plaintiff was released from detention on September 17, 2020. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 3). Defendant DiGiambatista closed the case due to lack of evidence on October 30, 2015. (Def. SUMF at ¶ 33).

B. Procedural History

On July 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint in New Jersey Superior Court against Defendants City of Woodbury, Detective Sergeant Kelli Marro, Detective Andrew DiGiambatista, and Officer Nicholas E. Cacciola. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 1). Defendants were served on November 30, 2019, and they removed this case to this Court on January 5, 2018. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 3).² On December 11, 2018, the parties stipulated the dismissal all defendants except DiGiambatista with prejudice. (Doc. No. 9).

With the dismissal of the claims against the other defendants, Plaintiff's Complaint brings three claims against DiGiambatista. Count I alleges "deprivation of rights and privileges secured to plaintiff by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 4). Plaintiff also brings state law claims of negligence and gross negligence.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is "material" to the dispute if it could alter the outcome, and a dispute of a material fact is "genuine" if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Matsushida Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) ("Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" (quoting First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968))). In deciding whether there is any genuine issue for trial, the court is not to weighevidence or decide issues of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Because fact and credibility determinations are for the jury, the non-moving party's evidence is to be believed and ambiguities construed in his favor. Id. at 255; Matsushida, 475 U.S. at 587.

Although the movant bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-movant likewise must present more than mere allegations or denials to successfully oppose summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party must at least present probative evidence from which jury might return a verdict in his favor. Id. at 257. The movant is entitled to summary judgment where the non-moving party fails to "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim alleges that Defendant violated his Fourteenth Amendment protection against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. (Doc. No. 25 at 4). Plaintiff concedes that his arrest was supported by probable cause, (id. at 3), but asserts that his twenty-one-day detention was illegal because Defendant did not timely investigate his claim of being at an IOP meeting at the time of the robbery or disclose this potentially exculpatory information to the Gloucester County Prosecutor's Office. Defendant contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 is not "a source of substantive rights" but rather "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) a violation of a right under the Constitution and (2) that the violation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that "shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). However, qualified immunity will not shield from liability "'the official who knows or should know he is acting outside the law.'" Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 3d 208, 225 (D.N.J. 2015) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506-07 (1978)).

To overcome qualified immunity, the Court must decide that the facts alleged, taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, make out: (1) a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) that the constitutional right at issue was "clearly established" at the time of a defendant's alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). A right is clearly established if it would have been "clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. The issue is a question of law. Doughtery v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979 (3d Cir. 2014). When assessing whether a right was clearly established, this Court may rely on decisions from the Supreme Court, the Third...