Harman v. Taurus Int'l Mfg., Inc.

661 F.Supp.3d 1123

Rita HARMAN, Individually and on, Behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TAURUS INTERNATIONAL MANUFACTURING, INC., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACT. NO. 3:21-cv-697-ECM

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division

Signed March 15, 2023

Michael Todd Wheeles, Morris, Haynes Hornsby Wheeles & Knowles, Birmingham, AL, David L. Selby, II, Bailey Glasser, LLP, Hoover, AL, for Plaintiff.

Austin Jared Hemmer, Pro Hac Vice, Colin Dang DeLaney, Pro Hac Vice, John F. Weeks, IV, Pro Hac Vice, Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, GA, John Patrick Marino, Pro Hac Vice, Kristen L. Wenger, Pro Hac Vice, Mark Andrew Krieger, IV, Pro Hac Vice, Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Jacksonville, FL, Reid Clark Carpenter, Lightfoot, Franklin & White, LLC, Birmingham, AL, Robert Jackson Sewell, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

EMILY C. MARKS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Rita Harman alleges her Taurus PT 738 TCP Pistol (hereinafter, "PT 738 pistol") malfunctioned due to a defect in the pistol's slide component. She brings this class action against defendants Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc. ("TIMI")—the manufacturer of the PT 738 pistol—and Taurus Holdings, Inc. ("Taurus Holdings")¹ (collectively, "Defendants"), on her behalf and all those similarly situated. In her second amended complaint (the operative "complaint"), Plaintiff asserts six claims: violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA") (Count I), violation of the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("ADTPA") (Count II), breach of express warranty (Count III), breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Count IV),² violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA") (Count V), and declaratory relief (Count VI).³

Now pending before the Court is the Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 80). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. After careful consideration, the Court concludes that the Defendants' motion is due to be GRANTED.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court has original subject matter jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction of the Plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested, and the Court concludes that venue properly lies in the Middle District of Alabama. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(A)(2). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). At this stage of the proceedings, "the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 478 n.3 (11th Cir. 2016).

The determination of "whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The plausibility standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Conclusory allegations that are merely "conceivable" and fail to rise "above the speculative level" are insufficient to meet the plausibility standard. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. This pleading standard "does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, "[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

IV. FACTS⁴

Plaintiff's husband, Chris Harman, purchased a Taurus PT 738 pistol from a retail store in Opelika, Alabama, on or about December 13, 2011, and gave it to his wife as a gift. Plaintiff's husband was seriously injured on November 27, 2020, at a firing range when the PT 738 pistol blew apart, causing metal pieces to strike him in the face and eye. Plaintiff alleges the pistol was designed, manufactured, assembled, and marketed by the Defendants in Florida.

The PT 738 pistol, according to Plaintiff, is defective and unreasonably dangerous because its design and manufacture suffer from a defect which renders the pistol subject to a dangerous weakening or fracturing of the pistol's components. The slide allegedly breaks in half at the ejection port and the pieces of the slide become dangerous projectiles which can strike the shooter or bystanders. Plaintiff's complaint further alleges that despite actual knowledge of the defect, the Defendants never remedied the defect, never issued an effective and complete warning to the public, and never recalled the PT 738 pistol. In fact, Plaintiff alleges that prior to placing the pistol's product line into the marketplace in 2009, the Defendants instructed their internal marketing and design teams not to warn the public about it.

Plaintiff alleges that in 2012, the slide on consumer Brian Aunkst's ("Aunkst") PT 738 pistol broke in an identical way to hers, causing the pistol to explode in his hand. According to the complaint, the Defendants failed to fully investigate what caused the slide to break apart. Despite knowing about and inspecting Aunkst's defective pistol, Plaintiff claims the Defendants again instructed their marketing teams to avoid mentioning the defect in advertising materials and continued to market PT 738 pistols as safe firearms.

According to Plaintiff, the Defendants provided four express warranties for the PT 738 pistol. First, any handgun manufactured by the Defendants carried with it a limited warranty "to be free from defects in material and workmanship." Second, the Defendants provided purchasers of their guns with an unlimited lifetime repair warranty. Third, Plaintiff claims that the Defendants publicized their "commit[ment] to the very highest standards of quality, dependability, and most of all, customer satisfaction," which constituted an express warranty that their guns were free from design and manufacturing defects. Finally, in the instruction manual for the PT 738 pistol, the Defendants reiterated their lifetime repair policy and limited warranty, and represented that their pistols "were manufactured to perform properly with the original parts as designed."

Plaintiff filed her original complaint in the Southern District of Florida on February 2, 2021, bringing claims for violation of FDUTPA; negligence; strict liability; breach of express warranty; breach of implied warranty of merchantability; violation of MMWA; negligent failure to disclose, failure to warn, concealment and misrepresentation; fraudulent concealment and intentional failure to warn; and seeking declaratory relief. (Doc. 1). On March 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint with the same claims. (Doc. 26). The case was then transferred to this Court on October 18, 2021, and consolidated for discovery purposes with Plaintiff's husband's private action against the Defendants (Civ. Act. No. 3:21-cv-98) for discovery purposes. (Doc. 43). In response to the Court's order granting in part and denying in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss or for a more definite statement (doc. 70), Plaintiff filed her complaint (doc. 71) on March 18, 2022, for which the Defendants bring this motion to dismiss (doc. 80).

V. DISCUSSION

The Defendants move to dismiss all counts against both Defendants. The Court will first address the warranty claim, and then the claims under the FDUTPA and ADTPA.

A. Express Warranty

Plaintiff claims that the Defendants violated an express warranty that the PT 738 pistol be free from both design and manufacturing defects. To determine whether she sufficiently pleaded such a claim, the Court must first determine what law applies. Because Plaintiff's case was transferred to this Court from Florida, Florida choice-of-law principles apply. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 65, 134 S.Ct. 568, 187 L.Ed.2d 487 (2013). Florida's choice-of-law rule applies the doctrine of lex loci contractus to contract actions and considers where the contract was executed. David v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 629 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1315-16 (S.D. Fla. 2009). In this case, the complaint alleges that the PT 738 pistol was purchased in Opelika, Alabama. Therefore, Alabama law applies to the warranty contract claims.

An express warranty, under Alabama law, is "[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise." ALA. CODE § 7-2-313(1)(a). The seller need not use the words "warrant" or "guarantee" to create an express warranty, "but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty." ALA. CODE § 7-2-313(2).

Plaintiff brings her claim for breach of express warranty as a third-party beneficiary. "[A] manufacturer's express warranty, like any contractual obligation, may run in favor of a third-party beneficiary." Lisk v. Lumber One Wood...