Harman v. Taurus Int'l Mfg., Inc.

586 F.Supp.3d 1155

Christopher David HARMAN, Plaintiff,

v.TAURUS INTERNATIONAL MANUFACTURING, INC., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACT. NO. 3:21cv98-ECM

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division.

Signed February 16, 2022

David L. Selby, II, Bailey Glasser, LLP, Hoover, AL, Matthew Jason Ford, Bailey & Glasser, LLP, Matthew Gregory Garmon, Morris Haynes Wheeles Knowles & Nelson, Michael Todd Wheeles, Morris, Haynes Hornsby Wheeles & Knowles, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Benjamin E. Reed, Pro Hac Vice, Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP, John F. Weeks, IV, Pro Hac Vice, Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Reid Clark Carpenter, Robert Jackson Sewell, Lightfoot, Franklin & White, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

EMILY C. MARKS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Now pending before the Court are motions to dismiss or for more definite statement (3:21cv98, doc. 29 & 3:21cv697, doc. 45),¹ filed by Taurus Holdings, Inc. and Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc. ("Taurus") in two cases which have been consolidated for discovery proceedings.

Plaintiff Christopher David Harman ("Chris Harman") filed a complaint and an amended complaint in this Court. He brings claims of negligence or wantonness (count one); strict liability in tort (count two); breach of implied warranty of merchantability (count three); negligent failure to disclose, failure to warn, concealment, and misrepresentation (count four); fraudulent concealment and failure to warn (count five); and violation of the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD")(count six). (3:21cv98, doc. 22).

Plaintiff Rita Harman filed a putative class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the case was transferred to this Court. (3:21cv697, doc. 1). She brings claims of violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA")(count one); negligence (count two); strict liability in tort (count three); breach of express warranty (count four); breach of implied warranty of merchantability (count five); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (count six); negligent failure to disclose, failure to warn, concealment, and misrepresentation (count seven); fraudulent concealment and intentional failure to warn (count eight); and declaratory relief (count nine). (Id. doc. 26).

Taurus seeks to dismiss counts one, two, three, four, and five of Chris Harman's amended complaint, or to require a more definite statement.² Taurus seeks to dismiss the amended complaint of Rita Harman in its entirety, or alternatively, moves for a more definite statement.

Based upon a review of the records and the applicable law, and for the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss or for more definite statement is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as to Chris Harman's amended complaint and GRANTED as to Rita Harman's amended complaint, and the Court will give each of the Plaintiffs an opportunity to more definitely state specified claims, as described below.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).

"Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The plausibility standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Conclusory allegations that are merely "conceivable" and fail to rise "above the speculative level" are insufficient to meet the plausibility standard. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. This pleading standard "does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Indeed, "[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ " Id.

II. FACTS

The facts as alleged in the amended complaints are as follows:

Chris Harman purchased a Taurus PT 738 TCP pistol (hereinafter "PT 738 pistol") in Opelika, Alabama, in December 2011, and gave it to his wife, Rita Harman, as a gift. In 2020, Chris Harman was seriously injured while shooting the PT 738 pistol when it blew apart, causing metal pieces to strike him in the face and eye.

The pistol was designed, manufactured, assembled, and marketed by Taurus in Florida.

Chris Harman alleges that the pistol is defective and unreasonably dangerous because its design and manufacture suffers from a defect which renders the pistol subject to a dangerous weakening or fracturing of the pistol's components. His amended complaint further alleges that despite actual knowledge of the defect, Taurus never remedied the defect, never issued an effective and complete warning to the public, and has never recalled the pistol.

In her amended complaint, Rita Harman alleges that there is defect in the PT 738 pistol as well as in the PT 732 TCP pistol ("PT 732 pistol"). She alleges that the PT 738 pistol and the PT 732 pistol have the same defect; namely, that the slide breaks in half at the ejection port and the pieces of the slide become dangerous projectiles which are capable of striking the shooter or bystanders.

Chris Harman and Rita Harman both allege in their amended complaints that in March of 2012, Brian Aunkst ("Aunkst") of Colorado was firing a PT 738 pistol when the slide broke, injuring Aunkst. According to the amended complaints, Taurus was provided photos of the broken slide and given the opportunity to inspect and investigate what caused the slides to break apart. Rita Harman alleges that despite knowing of the defect, Taurus has failed to acknowledge the defect in any of their marketing or advertising materials and marketed the PT 732 and PT 738 pistols as safe firearms. Chris Harman similarly alleges Taurus’ failure to warn and its misrepresentation regarding the PT 738 pistol.

III. DISCUSSION

The Court begins with the grounds for dismissal, or more definite statement, of claims brought by Chris Harman and then turns to the grounds for dismissal, or more definite statement of, the claims of Rita Harman.

A. Chris Harman

1. Negligence and Wantonness Claims in Count One

Taurus argues that the claims in count one of Chris Harman's amended complaint violate Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because both claims are combined in one count. Taurus also argues that wantonness has not been adequately alleged.

Chris Harman argues in response that negligence and wantonness cannot coexist, so each claim in count one is pleaded in the alternative. Chris Harman further argues that because he has alleged that Taurus knew that the slide on the PT 738 pistol tended to explode, the complaint has alleged the mental state for wantonness.

Upon review of the amended complaint, the Court concludes that the claims of negligence and wantonness are sufficiently alleged to give Taurus adequate notice of the alternative claims brought against it in count one and the grounds upon which each claim rests. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Off. , 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). The Court also concludes that the facts alleged regarding Taurus’ knowledge of another incident with the PT 738 pistol are sufficient to allege that Taurus acted with knowledge of danger or with consciousness that the doing of some act would likely result in injury to support a wantonness claim. See Stone v. Southland Nat'l Ins. Corp. , 589 So. 2d 1289, 1292 (Ala. 1991). The motion to dismiss is due to be DENIED as to count one of Chris Harman's amended complaint.

2. Strict Products Liability Claim in Count Two

Taurus contends that because Alabama has rejected no-fault products liability with the adoption of the AEMLD, the strict products liability claim in count two is due to be dismissed. Taurus also argues that the claim in count two of Chris Harman's amended complaint need not be construed as an AEMLD claim because Chris Harman specifically has brought an AEMLD claim in count six. Chris Harman responds that his claim in count two states an AEMLD claim and if the Court concludes that it is deficiently labeled, the Court should give him leave to rename the second count as an AEMLD claim.

Because Chris Harman has alleged an AEMLD claim in count six, the Court agrees with Taurus that the two AEMLD counts within the complaint based on the same facts are redundant. Therefore, the claim in count two is due to be dismissed as duplicative of the claim in count six.

3. Breach of Implied Warranty in Count Three

Taurus moves to dismiss the claim in count three on the grounds that Taurus is not a seller under Alabama law and so cannot be held liable for the implied warranty of merchantability and, even if the claim can be brought, Chris Harman has not provided notice of breach of warranty as required by Alabama law.

As to the first argument, as Taurus notes that some federal district courts in the Alabama have declined to recognize an implied warranty claim brought against a manufacturer. See Rose v. General Motors Corporation , 323 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (N.D. Ala. 2004). In Rose , the court found that there can be no implied warrant of merchantability brought against a non-seller based on Ex parte General Motors , 769 So. 2d 903, 910 (Ala. 1999). Id. at 1247-48. In Ex...