Harnden v. Brown

1

PAMELA S. HARNDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUDGE ELWOOD BROWN, SAMANTHA LORD, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, MICHAEL WENDLING, JUDGE MICHAEL HULEWICZ, ST. CLAIR COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, SHERIFF MAT KING, PORT HURON POLICE DEPARTMENT, and CHIEF JOSEPH PLATZER, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 361549

Court of Appeals of Michigan

April 13, 2023

UNPUBLISHED

St Clair Circuit Court LC No. 2022-000317-CZ

Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Boonstra and Riordan, JJ.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff proceeding in propria persona, appeals as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, Judge Elwood Brown, Samantha Lord, the Prosecuting Attorney's Office (PA's Office), Michael Wendling, Judge Michael Hulewicz, the St. Clair County Sheriff Department (Sheriff's Department), Sheriff Mat King, the Port Huron Police Department (PHPD), and Police Chief Joseph Platzer, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) (immunity granted by law) and (8) (failure to state a claim). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from charges of eavesdropping, MCL 750.539c, filed against plaintiff in 2014 by the PA's Office. The prosecution ultimately filed a nolle prosequi and the charges were dismissed. Plaintiff brought this action against numerous defendants who allegedly were involved in her arrest and prosecution, ostensibly asserting claims of malicious prosecution and violations of her constitutional rights. Defendants moved for summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity, prosecutorial immunity, judicial immunity, and quasi-judicial immunity. Defendants also argued that any claim based on plaintiff's arrest was barred because the arrest was made pursuant to a lawfully issued arrest warrant. They further argued that any federal claims were barred by various immunities and the failure to state a claim. The trial court granted defendants' motion on the basis of both immunity and failure to state a claim.

II. IMMUNITY

The trial court did not err by granting defendants' motion for summary disposition on the basis of immunity.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Serven v Health Quest Chiropractic, Inc, 319 Mich.App. 245, 252-253; 900 N.W.2d 671 (2017). Summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when relief is appropriate because of "immunity granted by law." "A party may support a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence, which is otherwise admissible." Serven, 319 Mich.App. at 253 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and accept the contents of the complaint as true, unless contradicted by documentary evidence submitted by the moving party. Id.

MCL 691.1407 of the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., provides, in relevant part: "Except as otherwise provided in this act, a governmental agency is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function." "The immunity from tort liability provided by the governmental immunity act is expressed in the broadest possible language; it extends to all governmental agencies and applies to all tort liability when governmental agencies are engaged in the exercise or discharge of governmental functions." McLean v McElhaney, 289 Mich.App. 592, 598; 798 N.W.2d 29 (2010). "The GTLA allows suit against a governmental agency in only five areas." Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich. 186, 195; 649 N.W.2d 47 (2002). "The five statutory exceptions to governmental immunity are the 'highway exception,' MCL 691.1402, the 'motor vehicle exception,' MCL 691.1405, the 'public building exception,' MCL 691.1406, the 'proprietary function exception,' MCL 691.1413, and the 'governmental hospital exception,' MCL 691.1407(4)." Id. at 195 n 8.

"Generally, governmental employees acting within the scope of their authority are immune from tort liability except in cases in which their actions constitute gross negligence." Tarlea v Crabtree, 263 Mich.App. 80, 89; 687 N.W.2d 333 (2004). MCL 691.1407(2) provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, and without regard to the discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each officer and employee of a governmental agency, each volunteer acting on behalf of a governmental agency, and each member of a board, council, commission, or statutorily created task force of a governmental agency is immune from tort liability for an injury to a person or damage to property caused by the officer, employee, or member while in the course of employment or service or caused by the volunteer while acting on behalf of a governmental agency if all of the following are met:

(a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.

(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.

(c)The officer's, employee's, member's, or volunteer's conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage.

"[E]ven if governmental employees are found liable for gross negligence, the state may not be held vicariously liable unless an exception to governmental immunity applies[.]" Mays v Governor, 506 Mich. 157, 198; 954 N.W.2d 139 (2020). This is also true for governmental agencies. See Yoches v Dearborn, 320 Mich.App. 461, 476-477; 904 N.W.2d 887 (2017). "[T]here is no exception to governmental immunity for intentional torts committed by governmental employees exercising their governmental authority, and governmental employers may not be held liable for the intentional tortious acts of their employees[.]" Mays v Snyder, 323 Mich.App. 1, 68; 916 N.W.2d 227 (2018) (citations omitted).

MCL 691.1407(5) "provides certain high-ranking officials with absolute immunity from tort liability[.]" Petipren v Jaskowski, 494 Mich. 190, 204; 833 N.W.2d 247 (2013). It provides:

A judge, a legislator, and the elective or highest appointive executive official of all levels of government are immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or damages to property if he or she is acting within the scope of his or her judicial, legislative, or executive authority. [MCL 691.1407(5).]

"It is well settled that judges are accorded absolute immunity from liability for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions." Serven, 319 Mich.App. at 253 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "[J]udges are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Quasi-judicial immunity is an extension of absolute judicial immunity to non-judicial officers[.]" Id. at 254 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Quasi-judicial immunity "is available to those serving in a quasi-judicial adjudicative capacity as well as those persons other than judges without whom the judicial process could not function." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

There are also "other areas outside the GTLA where the Legislature has allowed specific actions against the government to stand, such as the Civil Rights Act. Further, municipalities may be liable pursuant to 42 USC 1983. Monell v New York City DSS, 436 U.S. 658; 98 S.Ct. 2018; 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)." Mack, 467 Mich. at 195. "Establishing municipal liability under 42 USC 1983 requires proof that: (1) a plaintiff's federal constitutional or statutory rights were violated and (2) the violation was caused by a policy or custom of the municipality." Johnson v Vanderkooi, 502 Mich. 751, 762; 918 N.W.2d 785 (2018). "An official has qualified immunity from suits under 42 USC 1983 when the official's conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Holeton v City of Livonia, 328 Mich.App. 88, 102; 935 N.W.2d 601 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

On appeal, plaintiff only individually addresses the liability of the "heads of department," who she argues are liable because they must have given authorization to their employees to arrest her. She further argues that there is no immunity available to any defendant because they entered her property and seized her without a valid warrant in violation of her constitutional rights. Plaintiff also argues that defendants are not entitled to immunity because they acted outside the scope of their authority.

With regard to the "heads of departments," plaintiff is apparently referring to Wendling, Sheriff King, and Chief Platzer. The trial court found that plaintiff failed to allege that those defendants directed any actions taken by their employees, they were acting within the scope of their authority, plaintiff failed to allege that their conduct amounted to gross negligence, and plaintiff did not allege that those defendant directly violated her constitutional rights. A sheriff, prosecutor, and police chief are all entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken within the scope of their authority. See Petipren, 494 Mich. at 193-194 (police chief); Margaris v Genesee Co, 324 Mich.App. 111, 116; 919 N.W.2d 659 (2018) (county sheriff); Bischoff v Calhoun Co Prosecutor, 173 Mich.App. 802, 806; 434 N.W.2d 249 (1988) (prosecutor). Plaintiff's complaint does not specifically refer to Sheriff King or Chief Platzer and, therefore, fails to allege that they were not acting within the scope of their authority or that they violated any constitutional rights.^[1]

With regard to Wendling, plaintiff merely alleged that he "is involved in ...