Harold G. v. Kijakazi

HAROLD G., Claimant, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Respondent.

No. 19 C 2191

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

April 21, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JEFFREY T. GILBERT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Harold G.^[1] (“Claimant”) seeks review of the final decision of Respondent Kilolo Kijakazi, ^[2] Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying his application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C § 1382c(a)(3)(C). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 73.1, the parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings, including entry of final judgment. [ECF No. 9]. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). Claimant filed a Motion Summary Judgment. [ECF No. 18]. In response, the Commissioner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. [ECF No. 27]. Claimant did not file a reply brief. This matter is briefed and ripe for review. For the reasons discussed in this Memorandum Opinion and Order Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 18] is denied, and the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 27] is granted.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 19, 2015, Claimant filed an application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. R.573-78. The claim was denied initially on November 12, 2015, and again on reconsideration on June 15, 2016. R.458-61, 466-71. Claimant requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on December 8, 2017. R.32-99. After that hearing, ALJ Michael Hellman issued an unfavorable decision denying Claimant's application for supplemental security income on April 2, 2018. R.16-26. The ALJ found that Claimant had severe impairments, including rheumatoid arthritis, bilateral shoulder abnormalities, and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome but concluded, among other things, that Claimant's impairments did not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal a listing. R. 18, 20-21. The ALJ then determined that Claimant had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b) with limitations that “he can lift up to ten pounds occasionally, stand or walk for approximately for [sic] six hours in an eight-hour workday and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday” and “occasionally reach overhead bilaterally and frequently handle objects bilaterally.” R.21. The ALL ultimately determined that Claimant could not perform his past work, but considering Claimant's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs in the national economy that Claimant can perform. R.24-25. After receiving the ALJ's unfavorable decision, Claimant filed a request for review on May 10, 2018, which was denied on January 31, 2019, causing the ALJ's decision to become the final decision of the Commissioner, and this Court now has jurisdiction. R.1-9; see Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 1994); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a claimant files an application for disability benefits and/or supplemental security income, he bears the burden under the Social Security Act to bring forth evidence that proves his impairments are so severe he cannot engage in any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). A five-step inquiry controls whether an individual is eligible for disability benefits or supplemental security income under the Social Security Act, which the Seventh Circuit has summarized as follows:

The ALJ must consider whether: (1) the claimant is presently employed; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant's impairment meets or equals any impairment listed in the regulations as being so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity; (4) the claimant's residual functional capacity leaves him unable to perform his past relevant work; and (5) the claimant is unable to perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.

Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351-52 (7th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920). The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2021); Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644 (7th Cir. 2022).

A decision by an ALJ becomes the Commissioner's final decision if the Appeals Council denies a request for review. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). Judicial review is limited to determining whether an ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in reaching his decision. See Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009). The reviewing court may enter a judgment “affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Substantial evidence “means-and means only-such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotations omitted); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A “mere scintilla” of evidence is not enough. Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154; Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002). Even when there is adequate evidence in the record to support the decision, the findings will not be upheld if the ALJ does not “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to the conclusion.” Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, if the Commissioner's decision lacks evidentiary support or adequate discussion of the issues, it cannot stand. See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009).

Though the standard of review is deferential, a reviewing court must “conduct a critical review of the evidence” before affirming the Commissioner's decision. Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). The reviewing court may not, however, “displace the ALJ's judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence, or by making independent credibility determinations.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).

DISCUSSION

In this case, Claimant contends that the ALJ failed to address significant evidence in the record that does not support his conclusion, and therefore, remand is required. Specifically Claimant argues: (1) the ALJ did not address certain evidence in the record that is contrary to his findings; (2) the ALJ erred in not giving controlling weight to the opinion of his treating physician Dr. Gowhar Khan; (3) the ALJ's assessment of Claimant's subjective complaints is patently wrong; (4) the ALJ failed to address Claimant's need for off-task time in his RFC; and (5) the ALJ's RFC failed to account for the limitations caused by his rheumatoid arthritis. Essentially, Claimant argues that ALJ did not properly consider and weigh the record evidence and medical opinion testimony and that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence. In response, the Commissioner disagrees with Claimant's arguments and asserts that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner argues that Claimant wants the Court to re-weigh the evidence and Dr. Khan's opinion and reach a different conclusion, which the Commissioner points out is not the Court's role. The Court will address the parties' arguments in turn.

At the outset, however, it is important to emphasize that the Court's role in this case is not to determine from scratch whether or not Claimant is disabled and entitled to supplemental security income. Instead, as set forth above, the law mandates that this Court's review of the ALJ's findings is deferential, and the Court only must determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012); Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2010); Overman v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2008). This Court cannot consider the facts anew or draw its own conclusions. Rather, if substantial evidence supports the ALJ's factual findings and analysis, those findings are conclusive, and the Commissioner's decision must be affirmed.^[3] 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In making that determination, the Court must review the record as a whole, and it cannot re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Id.

I. The Record Evidence Supports the ALJ's Findings

Claimant challenges the ALJ's assessment of the medical evidence and essentially argues that the ALJ failed to build a logical bridge between evidence and his conclusions. For the reasons discussed below, the Court disagrees with Claimant's arguments and finds that the ALJ sufficiently evaluated the record evidence, weighed the opinion evidence, and adequately explained his findings.

In his opinion, the ALJ acknowledged Claimant's rheumatoid arthritis, shoulder abnormalities, and carpal-tunnel syndrome, and the ALJ's RFC accommodated Claimant's impairments by limiting him to light work with only: (1) occasional overhead reaching; (2) frequent, rather than constant, handling of objects; and (3) occasional, rather than frequent, lifting of ten pounds. R.18, 21; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). In making this determination the ALJ relied on evidence of Claimant's physical abilities in the...