Harper v. Lindon City

GEORGE E. HARPER, an individual, Plaintiff, v. LINDON CITY, a Utah municipal corporation,and HUGH VAN WAGENEN, a Utah resident, Defendants, andFAIR CARE LINDON, LLC, Defendant in Intervention.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00772-DAK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

January 29, 2020

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Judge Dale A. Kimball

This matter is before the court on Intervenor-Defendant Fair Care Lindon, LLC's Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Motion for Voluntary Dismissal and to Set Aside Judgment pursuant to Rules 59(e) and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the court concludes that oral argument would not significantly aid in its determination of the motion, the court issues the following Memorandum Decision and Order based on the memoranda submitted by the parties and the law and facts relevant to the motion.

BACKGROUND

This suit arose from Plaintiff George E. Harper's ("Harper") request for a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). In November 2017, Harper purchased a home (the "Property") located in Lindon, Utah with the intent of turning the Property into a residential inpatient treatment facility. In order to open the facility, Harper submitted a land use application to Defendants Lindon City and Hugh Van Wagenen, the City Planning Director (collectively, the "City"), wherein he sought a reasonable accommodation under the FHA by asking the City to waive its eight-person limit on the number of unrelated people that can live together in a residential facility for disabled individuals in the City's R1-12 zone. Specifically, Harper requested that the City permit him to house sixteen unrelated patients at the facility at a time. A group of city residents who own homes and live near the Property (Intervenor-Defendant Fair Care Lindon, LLC ("Fair Care")), however, hired counsel and submitted an opposition to Harper's request. After reviewing the materials submitted by Harper and Fair Care and holding a hearing on the matter, the City denied Harper's request.

Instead of appealing the City's denial, Harper filed suit in this court alleging that the City had violated the FHA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After Harper filed the suit, Fair Care filed a motion to intervene, which the court ultimately granted. Eventually, Harper filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin various provisions of the City's code to allow him to open the facility at the Property. However, after holding an evidentiary hearing, the court denied Harper's motion for preliminary injunction. Following the court's denial of Harper's motion for preliminary injunction, Fair Care and the City moved for summary judgment. Prior to opposing the motions, Harper moved to voluntarily dismiss this case without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the City did not oppose dismissal, Fair Care filed an opposition arguing, among other things, that it would suffer legal prejudice if the court were to grant the motion. After reviewing the parties' briefing, the court granted Harper's motion and dismissed the case without prejudice.

DISCUSSION

Fair Care now asks the court to reconsider its decision in granting Harper's motion for voluntary dismissal and requests that the court set aside the judgment. Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment after it has been entered by the court. "Motions to reconsider, to the extent such motions are recognized, are disfavored." In re: Grass Velley Holdings, L.P. Garth O. Green Enterprises, Inc. v. Harward, No. 2:15-AP-2141, 2016 WL 4444750, at *2 (D. Utah Aug. 22, 2016) (unpublished). This is so because "once the district court enters judgment, the public gains a strong interest in protecting the finality of judgments." Nelson v. City of Albuquerque, 921 F.3d 925, 929 (10th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit has "restricted district courts' discretion when ruling on motions based on Rule 59(e)." Id. As such, a district court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion when it has "misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the law," and the specific grounds for granting such a motion include: "(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 539 (10th Cir. 2014). Importantly, however, "Rule 59(e) motions are 'not appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.'" Nelson, 921 F.3d at 929 (citing Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000)).¹

In this case, Fair care argues that reconsideration is proper based on the second and third elements. Fair Care argues that the court should reopen this case because, contrary to the court's decision, a dismissal will result in legal prejudice to Fair Care. More specifically, Fair Careargues that (1) the court must address the relief it affirmatively requested in its answer; (2) the court must consider new evidence that demonstrates that Harper is still planning on opening a residential inpatient treatment facility at the Property despite the City's denial of his request for accommodation; (3) its status as an intervenor is entirely irrelevant to the prejudice analysis; (4) the court should have imposed curative conditions to minimize the prejudice Fair Care will suffer; and (5) dismissal without prejudice deprives Fair Care of the relief it sought through summary judgment.² The court will address each argument in turn.

In concluding that dismissing this case would not result in legal prejudice to Fair Care, the court noted that "there are no counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims involving or asserted by Fair Care in this case." Mem. Decision and Order [ECF No. 66], at 4. Fair Care now contends that this was incorrect. It points to the Prayer for Relief in its answer where it asked "that a declaratory judgment be entered that the City Code does not violate the Fair Housing Act and that the City Code and/or the City's decision on Mr. Harper's accommodation request was lawful; that Mr. Harper be permanently enjoined from violating the City Code." Intervenor's Answer to First Am. Compl. [ECF No. 34], at 20. This request for affirmative relief, Fair Care contends, is the functional equivalent of a counterclaim and should be treated as such. To support that proposition, Fair Care cites a case from the Second Circuit wherein the court noted that, "[a]rguably," the defendant's "inclusion, in the prayer for relief of its answer, of a request for a declaration that [it] own[ed] all copyright rights in [its books] function[ed] as a counterclaim." Estate of Burne Hogarth v. Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc., 342 F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir. 2003). Fair Care also cites to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(2), which provides that"[i]f a party mistakenly designates a defense as a counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the court must, if justice requires, treat the pleading as though it were correctly designated."

The court finds Fair Care's arguments to be unpersuasive. First, it still remains true that there are no counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims involving or asserted by Fair Care in this case. And although Fair Care urges the court to construe its Prayer for Relief as a counterclaim, the court rejects the opportunity to do so. The court is persuaded that if Fair Care had desired to assert a counterclaim against Harper, it should have done so well before this point of the litigation. Indeed, at the very least, it is an argument that Fair Care should have raised in its opposition to Harper's motion for voluntary dismissal.³ Thus, given that it is inappropriate to raise new arguments on a Rule 59(e) motion that could have been raised in prior briefing, the court is unpersuaded by Fair Care's new characterization of its Prayer for Relief. Second, as for Fair Care's reliance on Edgar Rice Burroughs, that authority is not binding on this court. And,in any event, the Second Circuit's statement that the request for a declaration in the defendant's prayer for relief "arguably" functioned as a counterclaim does not propound a clear-cut rule for that to always be the case. Lastly, Fair Care's reliance on Rule 8(c)(2) is misplaced. Rule 8(c)(2) focuses on the mischaracterization of defenses and counterclaims. In this case, Fair Care did not mistakenly designate one of its defenses as a counterclaim. Rather, it now claims that its Prayer for Relief functions as a counterclaim. Given that Rule 8(c)(2) makes no mention of situations when a party mistakenly designates a counterclaim as a prayer for relief, the court is not persuaded that Rule 8(c)(2) supports Fair Care's position.

Next, when the court dismissed this case, the court determined that Fair Care's concerns about Harper's future actions regarding the Property were entirely speculative in nature. Fair Care now contends that the court must consider new evidence that, despite Harper's representations, he is still actively moving toward opening an inpatient treatment facility at the Property. In other words, Fair Care claims that Harper's future use of the property is not speculative, but is clear in light of two new pieces of evidence. First, Fair Care points out that, within a few days after the court dismissed the case, Harper appeared on television to announce that a facility would be opening at the Property sometime in the beginning of 2020. Second, Fair Care points to a statement on Harper's website that, as of December 5, 2019, stated, "LINDON FACILITY OPENING SOON!" In response, Harper clarifies that he did not personally appear on television, but conceded that what of his employees did. Nevertheless, he claims that he has instructed his employee to not repeat such statements. As for the website, Harper...