Harper v. State

922 N.E.2d 75

Canon HARPER and Adrian Porch, Appellants-Defendants, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 10A01-0908-CR-417.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

March 1, 2010.

Jennifer H. Culotta, Culotta & Culotta, LLP, Evan M. Ray, Niles D. Driskell, Jeffersonville, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Angela N. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellants-Defendants, Canon Harper (Harper) and Adrian Porch (Porch), bring this joint interlocutory appeal following the trial court's denial of their motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. We affirm.

ISSUES

Porch and Harper present two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

(1) Whether the trial court erred when it denied their motion to suppress evidence; and

(2) Whether the trial court erred when it failed to apply the Seatbelt Enforcement Act to the present case.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 10, 2008, Clark County Sheriff's Department Officers Bradley Jones (Officer Jones) and Donovan Harrod (Officer Harrod) were on patrol together near the Bel-Air Motel, an area known for "a lot of drug activity." (Suppression Hearing p. 9). Officer Jones noticed that the license plate was not illuminated on the car Harper was driving. Officer Jones intended to pull the car over and make a traffic stop; however, Harper and his passenger, Porch, had already pulled into the Bel-Air Motel parking lot and they had exited the car prior to Officer Jones' initiation of the stop. Officer Jones did not activate his lights and instead pulled up behind Harper's car.

As Officer Jones got out of the car, he observed Harper standing next to the driver's side of his car and Porch walking towards the Motel with a duffle bag in his hand while he was "trying to get to the door." (Suppression Hearing p. 10). At that point, Porch was knocking on one of the room doors and a female opened the door. Officer Jones asked Porch to stop "[c]ause he was carrying a bag and he was going to the door and I didn't know who was in the hotel room or what he was doing." (Suppression Hearing p. 11). Additionally, Officer Jones stated that he wanted to "freeze the scene" because he considered this a "traffic stop and . . . [his] goal [was] to keep people in [his] sight and know what they're doing." (Suppression Hearing pp. 11-12). As a result, he asked Porch to come back to Harper's car and subsequently took the duffle bag and set it on the hood of Harper's car.

Harper asked why he had been stopped, and Officer Jones informed him that his license plate light was out. After starting the car and confirming that the light was in fact out, Officer Jones went back to Porch and asked for permission to perform a pat down search to which Porch consented. Officer Jones then asked both Porch and Harper if the duffle bag belonged to either of them. Porch responded that it was not his bag, and Harper responded that it was an ex-girlfriend's and that had she left it in the car. Officer Jones asked both men if they had a problem with him searching the bag. Neither of them objected. Inside the bag, Officer Jones discovered cocaine and drug paraphernalia. He then placed Porch into handcuffs and asked Officer Harrod to handcuff Harper. Officer Harrod placed one handcuff on Harper, however, Harper began to struggle and broke free from Officer Harrod, and a foot chase ensued and Harper was later apprehended.

On November 18, 2008, the State filed an Information against Harper, under cause number 10D02-0811-FA-378, charging him with: Count I, dealing in cocaine, a Class A felony, Ind.Code § 35-48-4-1; Count II, possession of cocaine, a Class A felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-6; Count III, maintaining a common nuisance, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-13; Counts IV and V, resisting law enforcement, Class A misdemeanors, I.C. § 35-44-3-3; Count VI, battery to a police officer, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-42-2-1; and Count VII, possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3. On that same day, the State filed an Information against Porch, under cause number 10D02-0811-FA-379, charging him with: Count I, dealing in cocaine, a Class A felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-1; Count II, possession of cocaine, a Class A felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-6; Count III, visiting a common nuisance, a Class B misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-48-4-13; and Count IV, possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3. On January 8, 2008, Porch filed a motion to suppress evidence. On March 27, 2009, Harper filed a motion to suppress evidence. A consolidated suppression hearing was held on May 6, 2009. The trial court denied their motions to suppress. After certification by the trial court, on September 8, 2009, this Court granted Harper and Porch's respective Motions to Accept Jurisdiction Over Interlocutory Appeal.

Porch and Harper now appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

We review the denial of a motion to suppress in a manner similar to other sufficiency matters. In conducting our review, we do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Rice v. State, 916 N.E.2d 296, 300 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009). However, unlike the typical sufficiency of the evidence cases where only the evidence favorable to the judgment is considered, we must consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Bentley v. State, 779 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Ind.Ct. App.2002). "Although we generally review a trial court's decision to admit evidence despite a motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard, the ultimate determination of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop is reviewed de novo." Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Ind.Ct. App.2002).

II. Constitutional Violations

Porch and Harper contend that the evidence found in the duffle bag should have been suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

A. Fourth Amendment

Specifically, Porch and Harper argue that the State failed to "justify the seizure because [Officer Jones] never established a particularized belief that Mr. Harper or Mr. Porch [were] armed and presently dangerous." (Appellant's Br. p. 11).

"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protect an individual's privacy and possessory interests by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures." Howard v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). The United State's Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures has been extended to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Thayer v. State, 904 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, and its safeguards extend to the brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). However, under Terry, an officer is permitted to "stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity `may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause." Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ind. 2009) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)). Such reasonable suspicion must be comprised of more than an officer's general "hunches" or unparticularized suspicions. D.K. v. State, 736 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).

This court has recognized that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief. Thayer, 904 N.E.2d at 709. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). An ordinary traffic stop is akin to an investigative detention, and the principles announced in Terry apply. D.K. v. State, 736 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). However, "[t]he Terry investigative detention should `last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). Even if a stop is justified, reasonable suspicion only allows the officer to temporarily freeze the situation for inquiry and does not give him all the rights attendant to an arrest. State v. Campbell, 905 N.E.2d 51, 54 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009). "Therefore, once the purpose of the initial stop has been completed, an officer cannot `further detain the vehicle or its occupants unless something that occurred during the traffic stop generated the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify a further detention.'" D.K., 736 N.E.2d at 761 (quoting United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir.1995)). Thus, our analysis turns on whether the officer's conduct after the initial purpose of the traffic stop had been satisfied was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Here, in support of their argument that the officers' investigative stop exceeded the boundaries imposed by Terry, Porch and Harper direct us to two factually similar cases where passengers walked away from legally stopped vehicles. In Walls v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1266-67 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999), reh'g denied, trans. denied., after the car had been pulled over, Walls, a passenger in the car, began to walk away and the police officer ordered him to come back. Walls complied. Id. A pat down search of Walls revealed two knives, one of which had cocaine residue. Id. This court held that when a passenger of a car that has been lawfully stopped exits the car and walks away, a police officer may not as a...