Harried v. Maryland

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EMANUEL SHAQUILLE HARRIED, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF MARYLAND, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF CHRIS CORMIER, Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Prince George's County Deputy Sheriff, and PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY POLICE OFFICER CORPORAL GORDON HARRIS, Defendants.

Civil Action No. TDC-24-1190

United States District Court, D. Maryland

November 18, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THEODORE D. CHUANG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Emanuel Shaquille Harried has filed a civil action against Defendants the State of Maryland (“the State”) Prince George's County, Maryland (“the County”), Prince George's County Deputy Sheriff Chris Cormier, and Prince George's County Police Officer Corporal Gordon Harris in which he asserts federal constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), state constitutional claims, and state common law tort claims arising from a March 2021 incident in which he was arrested by Corporal Harris and Deputy Cormier. Defendants the State of Maryland and Deputy Cormier (collectively, “the State Defendants”) have filed a "Partial Motion to Dismiss,” which is fully briefed. ECF No. 30. Having reviewed the submitted materials, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

In his Amended Complaint, Harried alleges that on or about March 2 2021, he visited a Ross Store ("Ross”) in District Heights, Maryland, walked out with clothing valued at approximately $350, and entered a parking lot for a nearby store. A Ross employee contemporaneously reported a theft to the police and identified Harried as the thief.

Harried alleges that, based on the Ross employee's report. Corporal Harris drove into the parking lot where Harried was located, exited his police vehicle, and aggressively approached Harried while shouting commands at him. Because Corporal Harris set upon Harried so quickly, Harried could not initially understand the officer's instructions. Harried eventually heard Corporal Harris's command to "get on the ground," asked Corporal Harris "[F]or what?", and then dropped the clothing he had taken from Ross. Am. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 29. Without providing further explanation, Corporal Harris charged toward him, grabbed him by the shirt, and pulled him down onto the hood of his police vehicle. Corporal Harris then pulled Harried down onto the pavement, where Harried lay on his back with his hands where the officer could see them. Corporal Harris then stated that Harried was "going to jail" for “shoplifting.” Id. ¶ 17.

Harried further alleges that, although he remained on the ground in accordance with Corporal Harris's instructions, Corporal Harris drew his taser, stood over him, and tased him repeatedly. As Corporal Harris was tasing Harried, Deputy Cormier drove into the parking lot, exited his vehicle, and joined Corporal Harris. Initially, Deputy Cormier “stood idly by" and watched as Corporal Harris tased Harried several more times while he was laying on the ground. Id. ¶ 20. Harried alleges that Deputy Cormier then proceeded to assist Corporal Harris by grabbing hold of and wrestling Hamed's arms in opposite directions before both officers began tasing Harried several more times. The officers then placed handcuffs on Harried.

Corporal Harris and Deputy Cormier then yanked, pushed, and pulled Harried down onto the ground, which caused his head to strike the pavement multiple times. Corporal Harris also jerked and contorted Harried's arms and body in a manner that caused pain due to the handcuffs. Because of the tasing. Harried was so weakened that he was unable to sit up without leaning against Corporal Harris, so Corporal Harris also caused Harried's head to slam into the ground several more times when he moved away from Harried and thus removed the support that was keeping Harried from falling to the ground. Corporal Harris and Deputy Cormier also slammed Harried's head and neck into the ground when moving his unconscious body.

When emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”) arrived at the scene. Harried was unconscious and on the ground. Corporal Harris was searching Harried's pockets and pulling his pants down until they were at his knees. Then, prior to stepping away from Harried to allow the EMTs to take custody of him. Corporal Harris kicked at Harried's body while Harried was completely unresponsive.

Harried was initially taken to Southern Maryland Hospital, but due to the severity of his injuries, he was later airlifted to Georgetown University Hospital, where he remained in a coma for over two weeks. Harried alleges that when he finally awoke, he effectively lacked motor skills and was unable to perform even the most basic acts. He therefore needed constant care and. over the next month, engaged in "painstaking and grueling physical therapy” to "re-leam to perform everyday acts and functions, such as eating, walking, and going to the bathroom." Id. ¶ 33.

As a result of this incident. Harried was charged in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George's County with second-degree assault, resisting arrest, and theft of property valued between $100 and $1,500. On September 29, 2021, however, all of these charges were disposed of by nolle prosequi.

On February 28,2024, Harried filed the original Complaint in this case in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. On April 23, 2024, the County removed the case to this Court. On July 19, 2024, Harried filed the presently operative Amended Complaint in which he asserted seven causes of action against Defendants, numbered as follows: (1) a § 1983 claim against Corporal Harris, Deputy Cormier, and the County for excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) a § 1983 claim against Deputy Cormier in his individual capacity for excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) a claim against all Defendants for excessive force in violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights ("Article 24”); (4) a claim against all Defendants for excessive force in violation of Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (“Article 26”); (5) a claim against Corporal Harris and Deputy Cormier for the common law tort of battery; (6) a claim against all Defendants for the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“11ED"); and (7) a claim against all Defendants for the common law tort of gross negligence.

DISCUSSION

In the Motion, the State Defendants assert the following arguments for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of the following counts or claims: (1) the § 1983 claim against Deputy Cormier in Count 1 should be dismissed because it is duplicative of the claim asserted in Count 2; (2) the claim against Deputy Cormier in his official capacity in Count 1 should be dismissed because in that capacity he is not a “person" subject to liability under § 1983 and is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) Count 3 should be dismissed because Harried has failed to state a viable claim for a violation of Article 24; (4) Count 6 should be dismissed because Harried has failed to state a viable claim for HED; and (5) Count 7 should be dismissed as to the State because it has sovereign immunity against the gross negligence claim. Because Harried has now voluntarily withdrawn the gross negligence claim against the State, see Opp'n at 12, ECF No. 41, the Court need not address the argument relating to Count 7 and will dismiss that claim as to the State.

I. Legal Standard

To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Legal conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice. Id. A court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005).

II. Duplicative Claims

In the Motion, the State Defendants argue that Harried's § 1983 claim in Count 1 against Deputy Cormier is duplicative of Harried's § 1983 claim in Count 2 and should therefore be dismissed.

Claims are duplicative if they “stem from identical allegations, that are decided under identical legal standards, and for which identical relief is available.” Doe v. Cmty. Coll, of Balt. Cnty., 595 F.Supp.3d 392, 417 (D. Md. 2022) (quoting Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran. 755 F.Supp.2d 1,81 (D.D.C. 2010)). A “district court "has discretion to dismiss duplicative claims where they allege the same facts and the same injury'” in the interest of judicial economy. Id. (quoting C&KNuCo, LLC v. Expedited Freightways, LLC, No. 13 C 4006, 2014 WL 4913446, at *12(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014)).

Count 1 does not specify whether the § 1983 claim is asserted against Deputy Cormier in his official capacity, in his individual capacity, or both, but the caption and other language in the Amended Complaint specifically state that Deputy Cormier is sued "in his official and individual capacities.” Am. Compl. ¶ 7. Based on such language, the State Defendants fairly construed Count 1 as including a claim against Deputy Cormier in his individual capacity. While such a claim would be duplicative of the claim asserted Count 2, Harried has...