Harrington v. Wilber

743 F.Supp.2d 1006

Terry J. HARRINGTON, Plaintiff,

v.Matthew D. WILBER and Pottawattamie County, Iowa, Defendants.Curtis W. McGhee, Jr., Plaintiff,

v.Pottawattamie County, Iowa, et al., Defendants.Terry Harrington, individually and in his capacity as the father of Nicole Antoinette Harrington, Plaintiff,

v.County of Pottawattamie, Iowa, et al., Defendants.

Nos. 4:03–cv–90616 (LEAD CASE)

4:05–cv–00255

4:05–cv–00178.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

Oct. 18, 2010.

David Stephen Baker, Fisher Patterson Sayler & Smith LLP, Overland Park, KS, Michael A. Sciortino, City of Council Bluffs Legal Dept., Robert M. Livingston, Kristopher K. Madsen, Stuart Tinley Law Firm LLP, Council Bluffs, IA, for Defendants.Anne F. Danaher, Kansas City, KS, pro se.Stephen Dillard Davis, Steve Davis Law PC, Oak Brook, IL, Thomas P. Frerichs, Frerichs Law Office, Waterloo, IA, William H. Jones, Canel Davis & King, Chicago, IL, Larissa A. McCalla, Gerry L. Spence, Spence Shockey & McCalla, J. Douglas McCalla, Spence Law Firm, Mel C. Orchard, Spence Law Firm LLC, Jackson, WY, Alan O. Olson, Olson Law Office PC, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

ORDER

ROBERT W. PRATT, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 10, 2010, by the City of Council Bluffs (the “City”), Daniel Larsen (“Larsen”), and Lyle Brown (“Brown”) (collectively “Defendants”). Clerk's No. 154. Curtis McGhee (“McGhee”) and Terry Harrington (“Harrington”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) each filed a resistance to the Motion on June 3, 2010. Clerk's Nos. 163 (McGhee), 177 (Harrington). Defendants filed a Reply on June 21, 2010. Clerk's No. 189. The matter is fully submitted.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case has an extensive factual and procedural background that has been articulated repeatedly by the Court in past orders. In short summary, the present case is one of numerous cases pending in this Court that all arise from the investigation, prosecution, and conviction of Plaintiffs for the 1977 murder of John Schweer. In 2003, the Iowa Supreme Court vacated Harrington's first degree murder conviction for the failure of the prosecution to turn over exculpatory evidence. Harrington was released from custody after serving approximately twenty-five years in prison. Given that McGhee's conviction would likely be reversed on the same basis as Harrington's, Pottawattamie County struck a deal whereby McGhee agreed to enter an Alford plea to second degree murder, in exchange for a sentence of twenty-five years with credit for time served. Since McGhee had already spent nearly twenty-six years in custody, he was released after entering his Alford plea on September 2, 2003.

On March 25, 2005 and on May 4, 2005, respectively, Harrington and McGhee filed lawsuits against law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and city and county entities, alleging various state law and civil rights violations. Case Nos. 4:05–cv–00178 ( Harrington v. County of Pottawattamie, et al.); 4:05–cv–00255 ( McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, et al.). While all claims against Pottawattamie County and the county prosecutors have now been resolved pursuant to a settlement agreement, see Clerk's No. 143, Plaintiffs' claims against the City, Larsen, and Brown remain pending. Specifically, Harrington still has the following claims pending against Defendants: Counts 1 and 2 (claims against Defendants for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and Count 3 (claims against Defendants for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). ¹ McGhee still has the following claims pending against Defendants: Counts 1 and 5 (claims against Larsen and Brown, in their individual capacities, for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Count 15 (a claim against Larsen and Brown for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)); Count 18 (a claim against the City of Council Bluffs for violation of § 1983); and Count 19 (a claim against the City of Council Bluffs for indemnity).² See Case No. 4:05–cv–00255, Clerk's No. 1.

II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The term “summary judgment” is something of a misnomer.³ See Hornby, D. Brock, Summary Judgment Without Illusions, 13 Green Bag 2d 273 (Spring 2010). It “suggests a judicial process that is simple, abbreviated, and inexpensive,” while in reality, the process is complicated, time-consuming, and expensive. Id. at 273, 281. The complexity of the process, however, reflects the “complexity of law and life.” Id. at 281. “Since the constitutional right to jury trial is at stake,” judges must engage in a “paper-intensive and often tedious” process to “assiduously avoid deciding disputed facts or inferences” in a quest to determine whether a record contains genuine factual disputes that necessitate a trial. Id. at 281–82. Despite the seeming inaptness of the name, and the desire for some in the plaintiffs' bar to be rid of it, the summary judgment process is well-accepted and appears “here to stay.” ⁴ Id. at 281. Indeed, “judges are duty-bound to resolve legal disputes, no matter how close the call.” Id. at 287.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) provides that “[a] party against whom relief is sought may move at any time ... for summary judgment on all or part of the claim.” “[S]ummary judgment is an extreme remedy, and one which is not to be granted unless the movant has established his right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and that the other party is not entitled to recover under any discernible circumstances.” Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 209 (8th Cir.1976) (citing Windsor v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 523 F.2d 891, 893 n. 5 (8th Cir.1975)). The purpose of summary judgment is not “to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try.” Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (quoting Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944)). Rather, it is designed to avoid “useless, expensive and time-consuming trials where there is actually no genuine, factual issue remaining to be tried.” Anderson v. Viking Pump Div., Houdaille Indus., Inc., 545 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.1976) (citing Lyons v. Bd. of Educ., 523 F.2d 340, 347 (8th Cir.1975)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment upon motion after there has been adequate time for discovery. Summary judgment can be entered against a party if that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriately granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.1994). The Court does not weigh the evidence, nor does it make credibility determinations. The Court only determines whether there are any disputed issues and, if so, whether those issues are both genuine and material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Wilson v. Myers, 823 F.2d 253, 256 (8th Cir.1987) (“Summary judgment is not designed to weed out dubious claims, but to eliminate those claims with no basis in material fact.”) (citing Weight Watchers of Quebec, Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 398 F.Supp. 1047, 1055 (E.D.N.Y.1975)).

In a summary judgment motion, the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must then go beyond its original pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there remains a genuine issue of material fact that needs to be resolved by a trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). This additional showing can be by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or the admissions on file. Id.; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An issue is “genuine,” if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material.... Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.

Courts do not treat summary judgment as if it were a paper trial. Therefore, a “district court's role in deciding the motion is not to sift through the evidence, pondering the nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994). In a motion for summary judgment, the job of a court is only to decide, based on the evidentiary record that accompanies the moving and resistance filings of the parties, whether there really is any material dispute of fact that still requires a trial. See id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 and 10 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2712 (3d ed.1998)). It is the responsibility of the parties to provide the evidence necessary for this assessment. Id. at 921.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs' Complaints each contain...