Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball

283 S.W.3d 838

HARRIS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. TOMBALL REGIONAL HOSPITAL, Respondent.

No. 05-0986.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued December 4, 2007.

Decided May 1, 2009.

Sandra D. Hachem, Harris County Sr. Asst. Atty., Michael A. Stafford, Harris

County Atty., and Glen Van Slyke, Asst. County Atty., for Petitioner.

Margaret A. Pollard and Randal L. Payne, Sullins Johnston Rohrbach & Magers, Houston, TX, for Respondent.

Justice JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice HECHT, Justice WAINWRIGHT, Justice MEDINA, and Justice GREEN joined.

In this case we consider whether Harris County Hospital District is immune from suit by the Tomball Hospital Authority to recover medical expenses for hospital care the Hospital Authority rendered to indigent patients. We hold that the Legislature has not waived the district's immunity from suit either by specific statutory language or by implication from a constitutional and statutory framework.

I. Background

Tomball Hospital Authority (THA) was created and organized pursuant to chapter 262 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ch. 262.¹ It owns and operates Tomball Regional Hospital (the hospital) in Harris County. From 2001 to 2002, the hospital provided medical care to certain indigent patients who were residents of the Harris County Hospital District (HCHD). THA sought payment from HCHD for the care it provided, but HCHD refused to pay. THA sued HCHD in district court, basing its claim on the Indigent Health Care and Treatment Act (IHCTA) and the Texas Constitution. In a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for dismissal and alternatively for summary judgment, HCHD asserted that (1) it had governmental immunity from suit; (2) county courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the matters; and (3) the Texas Department of Health had exclusive, original jurisdiction over the claim. THA responded by alleging that jurisdiction was proper in the district court and that Article IX, Section 4 of the Texas Constitution and Health and Safety Code sections 61.002(6), 61.0045, 61.060, and 281.056(a), which require a hospital district to provide and pay for indigent care, waived HCHD's governmental immunity.

The trial court granted HCHD's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. In an opinion predating this Court's decision in Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex.2006), the court of appeals concluded that Health and Safety Code section 281.056(a) providing that boards of hospital districts like HCHD may "sue and be sued" waived HCHD's immunity from suit. 178 S.W.3d 244, 252-53. The court of appeals also determined that the Health and Safety Code did not vest exclusive, original jurisdiction in either the county court or the Texas Department of Health. Id. at 254-55. The court reversed and remanded the case. Id. at 256.

In this Court, HCHD challenges the court of appeals' holding that the "sue and be sued" language in section 281.056(a) waives its governmental immunity. THA argues the court of appeals is correct, but also contends that even if section 281.056(a) does not explicitly waive HCHD's immunity to suit, its immunity is waived by a framework of law that includes the Texas Constitution and the Health and Safety Code. Additionally, THA argues that upholding HCHD's claim that it retains immunity will lead to: (1) cities withholding taxes collected for hospital districts in order to offset debts owed by districts to the cities for indigent care resulting in suits against the cities to recover the withheld taxes; (2) bankruptcies of cities and municipal hospital authorities; and (3) violations of Texas Constitution Article III, Section 52(a) by cities in that a public benefit does not result from expenditures of public funds benefitting indigent parties not entitled to care by the cities. Disagreeing with THA's positions, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and dismiss the case.

II. Standard of Review

A party asserting governmental immunity to suit challenges the trial court's jurisdiction. See State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex.2007). A motion or plea asserting such immunity involves a question of law that we review de novo. Id. Further, THA's assertions require review of both Texas constitutional and statutory provisions which involve matters of law and are reviewed de novo. See City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex.2003); Tex. Nat'l Guard Armory Bd. v. McCraw, 132 Tex. 613, 126 S.W.2d 627, 634 (1939) (noting that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the State).

III. Analysis

A. Construction

In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question. Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426, 150 S.W. 1149, 1151 (1912). "We presume the language of the Constitution was carefully selected, and we interpret words as they are generally understood." City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 148 (Tex.1995). We rely heavily on the literal text. Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 23 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex.2000). However, we may consider such matters as the history of the legislation, Harris v. City of Fort Worth, 142 Tex. 600, 180 S.W.2d 131, 133 (1944), the conditions and spirit of the times, the prevailing sentiments of the people, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished. See Dir. of the Dep't of Agric. & Env't v. Printing Indus. Ass'n of Tex., 600 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex.1980).

In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent. State v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex.2002); see also TEX. GOV'T CODE § 312.005; Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 92, 95 (Tex.2000). We look first to the "plain and common meaning of the statute's words." Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d at 327 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex.1999)). We determine legislative intent from the statute as a whole and not from isolated portions. Id.

B. Governmental Immunity

Governmental immunity protects political subdivisions of the State from lawsuits for damages. See Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex.2006). Hospital districts have such immunity. See Martinez v. Val Verde County Hosp. Dist., 140 S.W.3d 370, 371 (Tex.2004). Governmental immunity, like the doctrine of sovereign immunity to which it is appurtenant, involves two issues: whether the State has consented to suit and whether the State has accepted liability. Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Tex.2003). Immunity from suit is jurisdictional and bars suit; immunity from liability is not jurisdictional and protects from judgments. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex.2004). Immunity is waived only by clear and unambiguous language. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.034 ("[A] statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language."); Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 328-29.

C. "Sue and be sued"

The board of managers of a hospital district "shall manage, control and administer the hospital or hospital system of the district." TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 281.047. Section 281.056 is entitled "Authority to Sue and be Sued; Legal Representation" and provides that "[t]he board may sue and be sued." The court of appeals held that this language waived immunity from suit. 178 S.W.3d at 252-53. In its brief predating this Court's decision in Tooke, THA cites Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brownsville Navigation District, 453 S.W.2d 812, 813-14 (Tex. 1970), and Tarrant County Hospital District v. Henry, 52 S.W.3d 434, 448 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.), in support of the court of appeals' decision. HCHD discounts Missouri Pacific and Henry because they were decided before Tooke. We agree with HCHD.

When an entity's organic statute provides that the entity may "sue and be sued," the phrase in and of itself does not mean that immunity to suit is waived. Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 337. Reasonably construed, such language means that the entity has the capacity to sue and be sued in its own name, but whether the phrase reflects legislative intent to waive immunity must be determined from the language's context. Id. Thus, section 281.056(a) does not in and of itself waive HCHD's immunity. See id. at 334, 337. Nor does section 281.056(a)'s language indicate a waiver of HCHD's immunity when considered in context with the remainder of section 281.056 which specifies who will represent the district in civil proceedings. This section anticipates the district's involvement in civil proceedings of some nature at some point, but it does not address immunity from suit. See id.

Likewise, the other sections of chapter 281 do not, in context, reflect legislative intent to waive immunity. For example, section 281.050 authorizes a district, in broad terms and subject to approval of the commissioners court, to construct, acquire, and maintain property and hospital facilities to provide services. Section 281.051 grants authority, again subject to approval of the commissioners court, to contract or cooperate with various governmental and private entities to fulfill a district's duties and to enter contracts to provide for medical care of certain classes of needy individuals. Section 281.055 authorizes districts to accept gifts and endowments to be held in trust and to administer them.

The context in which section 281.056(a) is found shows that the Legislature intended to invest districts with powers and authority necessary to conduct their business, subject in large part to approval of the county commissioners court. There is, however, no indication that by use of the "sue and be sued" language the Legislature clearly intended to waive districts' immunity from suit. We...