Harris Cty. v. Deary

695 S.W.3d 566

HARRIS COUNTY, Appellant

v.Kassandra DEARY, Appellee

NO. 01-23-00516-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued January 23, 2024

On Appeal from the 55th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Case No. 2022-55793

CHRISTIAN MENEFEE, HARRIS COUNTY ATTORNEY, Suzanne Bradley, Rachel Fraser, Sr. Assistant County Attorneys,

1019 Congress, 15th Floor, Houston, Texas 77002, for Appellant.

Chukwuma Njaka, Esq., 7324 Southwest Freeway, Ste. 320, Houston, TX 77074, Harrison Declan, 2600 McCullogh Avenue, San Antonio, TX, 78212, Obinna Okeke, 6924 Glenview Drive, North Richland Hills, TX, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Countiss, and Farris.

OPINION

Gordon Goodman, Justice

In this interlocutory appeal, Harris County contends the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity. According to Kassandra Deary’s petition, a Harris County sheriff's deputy slammed her to the ground and arrested her without probable cause, and she sued the County under state and federal law for the injuries she sustained from this incident. We reverse and render in part and affirm in part.

BACKGROUND

According to Deary’s original petition, she and a friend went to a restaurant and bar one night where the waiters and bartenders refused to serve her. At the bar, she opened the beer taps to get the bartender’s attention, to no avail. She was getting ready to leave when Michael Hines, an off-duty Harris County sheriff's deputy working as a security officer at the restaurant, approached her. He made racist comments toward her. Deary walked away to grab her purse so she could leave, but Hines "started grabbing [Deary’s] hand, shoulder, and neck." He then picked her up and "slammed her face hard on the floor," which broke several of her teeth and caused her to lose consciousness momentarily. Hines arrested Deary, and she was taken to jail until she posted bond.

Deary then sued Hines, the restaurant, and Harris County.

Against Hines, she alleged state law intentional torts of assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. She also alleged state law negligence and gross negligence. She further alleged federal claims under Section 1983 for excessive force and false arrest.

[1] Against Harris County, she alleged federal Section 1983 claims for excessive force and false arrest. She also asserted claims for negligent hiring, training, and supervision of Hines and respondeat superior liability,¹ although she did not specify whether she was asserting these under state or federal law.

Harris County filed a plea to the jurisdiction and, in the alternative, moved to dismiss Deary’s claims against it under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a for having no basis in law or fact. The trial court denied Harris County’s plea to the jurisdiction, and the County now appeals that ruling.

DISCUSSION

Harris County raises two issues on appeal: whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Deary’s claims because of the County’s governmental immunity and whether the trial court erred in denying the County’s plea to the jurisdiction. We consider these two issues together.

Harris County argues the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction because the County has governmental immunity from Deary’s state law claims and because Deary has failed to sufficiently plead elements of her federal claims.

We agree that governmental immunity bars Deary’s state law claims against the County, and therefore the trial court erred in not granting the County’s plea to the jurisdiction as to those claims. But we disagree that the County’s argument—failing to sufficiently plead elements of her federal claims—raised any jurisdictional issue before the trial court. Federal law waives the County’s immunity for Section 1983 claims, and the elements of the federal claims do not implicate the trial court’s jurisdiction. Thus, Harris County has not shown the trial court erred in denying the County’s plea to the jurisdiction as to Deary’s federal claims.

Plea to the Jurisdiction

[2–5] Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s authority to decide a case. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). The plaintiff has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate a trial court’s jurisdiction. Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019). That burden includes the obligation to establish a waiver of sovereign or governmental immunity² in suits against the government. See id. [6–8] Under Texas law, governmental units, including counties, are generally entitled to governmental immunity from suit and liability unless the state legislature has clearly and unambiguously waived immunity. Harris County v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609, 612–13 (Tex. 2018); see Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code § 101.001(3)(B) (defining "governmental unit" to include counties). Because governmental immunity implicates a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a county may challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction by asserting governmental immunity in a plea to the jurisdiction. City of Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth., 602 S.W.3d 444, 457 (Tex. 2020). Whether a plaintiff has alleged facts to affirmatively demonstrate a trial court’s jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).

[9-11] When, as here, a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff’s favor and look to the plaintiff’s intent. Id. If the pleadings do not allege sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction but do not negate the trial court’s jurisdiction, the trial court should give the plaintiff the opportunity to amend her pleadings. Id at 226–27. If the pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction, then the trial court should grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and there is no need to give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend her pleadings. Id. at 227.

[12, 13] When a plaintiff sues for federal claims in a state court, we apply federal substantive law and state procedural law to those claims. Harris County v Coats, 607 S.W.3d 359, 372 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). State courts have concurrent jurisdiction to decide cases arising under federal law unless Congress expressly precludes state court jurisdiction. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734–36, 129 S.Ct. 2108, 173 L.Ed.2d 920 (2009) (explaining state courts and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims and describing "default assumption" that state courts have inherent authority to adjudicate federal claims).

[14] Generally, a party may only appeal a final judgment. City of Watauga v Gordon, 434 S.W.3d 586, 588 (Tex. 2014). But a statutory exception to this general rule authorizes a party to appeal an interlocutory order that grants or denies a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction. Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code § 51.014(a)(8); see also Gordon, 434 S.W.3d at 588. Thus, we have appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.

The Texas Tort Claims Act

The Texas Tort Claims Act waives governmental immunity for personal injury caused by the negligent use of tangible personal property. Tex. Civ Prac & Rem Code § 101.021(2); Gordon, 434 S.W.3d at 589. However, the Act does not waive immunity for intentional torts like assault, battery, or false imprisonment. Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code § 101.057(2); Gordon, 434 S.W.3d at 589.

[15–17] A plaintiff may assert a claim against a governmental unit based on its employee’s conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Fort Worth Transp Auth v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 846 (Tex. 2018) (explaining that doctrine of respondeat superior makes employer liable for conduct of its employee). Or, a plaintiff may assert a claim against the governmental unit for its own conduct relating to the negligent employee, like a claim for negligent hiring, negligent training, or negligent supervision. See Tex. Dep’t of Crim Just.-Cmty. Just. Assistance Div. v. Campos, 384 S.W.3d 810, 815 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam). These types of claims must still satisfy the Tort Claims Act’s requirements, including the use of tangible personal property. Id. (holding plaintiff did not establish waiver of immunity under Texas Tort Claims Act for negligent hiring, training, and supervision because plaintiff did not allege use of tangible personal property).

[18] Further, when a plaintiff alleges facts describing a personal injury caused by an intentional tort like battery or the use of excessive force, the plaintiff cannot reframe her claim as one caused by negligence to circumvent the Act’s intentional-tort exception. See Gordon, 434 S.W.3d at 593–94 (dismissing plaintiff's tort claim against city for negligent use of tangible property—handcuffs—when plaintiff's underlying claim was for intentional torts of excessive force and battery used in applying handcuffs); accord Ector County v. Grace, 661 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, no pet.) (dismissing plaintiff's claim for negligence against county when plaintiff alleged that sheriff's deputy used excessive force against him by striking his motorcycle with deputy’s car); Harris County v Cabazos, 177 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (granting county’s plea to jurisdiction for plaintiff's claims against county for negligently training and supervising sheriff's deputy and against deputy for negligently shooting pistol when claims were based on deputy’s intentional shooting of plaintiff); Medrano v. City of Pearsall, 989 S.W.2d 141, 144–45 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (affirming summary judgment in favor of city based on immunity from plaintiff's claims for negligent hiring and training when plaintiff's claims were based on police officer’s intentional assault of plain...