Harris v. Cnty. of Wayne

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [20]

LAURIE J. MICHELSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiffs-126 women who were formerly incarcerated at the Wayne County Jail-filed this civil rights class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they were subjected to unconstitutional strip searches between 2014 and 2022. This is not the first case to challenge the constitutionality of the Wayne County Jail's stripsearching practices. Indeed, the present case follows a series of putative class actions, the most recent of which was Woodall v. County of Wayne, No. 17-13707 (E.D. Mich. filed Nov. 14, 2017). There, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of class certification, see Woodall v. Wayne County, No. 20-1705, 2021 WL 5298537, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2021), and the case was dismissed on April 27, 2023, after the individual plaintiffs settled their claims, see Woodall, No. 17-13707, ECF No. 186

(stipulating dismissal).^[1] Undoubtedly aware of the looming statute of limitations issues, counsel filed the present suit the same day Woodall was dismissed-making it the fourth putative class action of its kind.

Plaintiffs seek class-wide and individual relief. Defendants have moved to dismiss most of the Plaintiffs' claims as untimely. The parties dispute whether, due to the string of putative class actions preceding this one, the statute of limitations was tolled as to these Plaintiffs' claims and, if so, when that tolling ceased.

For the reasons below, the Court dismisses some of the Plaintiffs' individual claims as untimely.

I.

As the current Plaintiffs were putative class members in Woodall (ECF No. 14, PageID.88-89), some background on that case is helpful. Woodall also involved women formerly incarcerated at Wayne County Jail who filed suit under § 1983 alleging that unconstitutional strip searches were conducted at the jail. See Woodall, No. 17-13707, ECF No. 1. The presiding district judge granted class certification, but the Sixth Circuit reversed that decision on November 15, 2021. Woodall v. County of Wayne, No. 17-13707, 2020 WL 373073 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2020), rev'd and remanded, 2021 WL 5298537. More than a year later, on April 27, 2023, this Court dismissed the case with prejudice after the individual Plaintiffs settled their claims. Woodall, No. 17-13707, ECF No. 186.

That same day, many putative class members from that case filed this suit, asserting similar factual allegations and again alleging that they underwent humiliating strip searches. (ECF No. 1; see ECF Nos. 11, 14.) Specifically, Plaintiffs here likewise claim that Officer Terri Graham, who worked the registry at the Jail, strip-searched them in groups, made derogatory comments about their bodies, allowed men to see them being strip-searched, and maintained an unsanitary environment. (ECF No. 14, PageID.108-109.) And because many women claim they were subject to similar strip searches, Plaintiffs again accuse Wayne County, the municipality in charge of the Jail, of ignoring a pattern of constitutional violations and failing to train its officers or otherwise address the issue, allowing the violations to continue. (Id. at PageID.109-110.)

So after amending their complaint twice (see ECF Nos. 11, 14), a total of 126 women allege, as in Woodall, that Graham violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and the County is also liable for these violations under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (ECF No. 14.) In addition to pursuing punitive damages, Plaintiffs seek compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive relief, on an individual and class-wide basis. (Id. at PageID.87-88, 107, 113.)

As their first responsive pleading, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 20.) This motion can be separated into two main arguments.

First, Defendants argue that only seven Plaintiffs-those with claims accruing after April 27, 2020-can be class representatives. (Id. at PageID.222, 226-227.) All

other Plaintiffs, they say, should be dismissed because, even if they have timely individual claims that they could bring in individual lawsuits, this was filed as a putative class action and those 119 Plaintiffs cannot represent a class. (Id.)

Plaintiffs agree that only those seven individuals can represent a class. (ECF No. 23, PageID.286.) But they disagree about what this means for the other 119 Plaintiffs with individual claims accruing before that date. Plaintiffs' position is that even if they are barred from representing a class, their individual claims are timely and should proceed because no class certification decision has yet been made. (Id. at PageID.286-287.)

Second, Defendants argue that even if the Court does not dismiss all 119 Plaintiffs with untimely class claims, at least 26 Plaintiffs-those with claims that accrued before April 27, 2016-should be dismissed because their individual claims are also untimely. (ECF No. 20, PageID.226.) Plaintiffs disagree, saying all their claims are timely, including these 26. (ECF No. 23, PageID.277.)

This is in large measure a disagreement about when the tolling of individual claims in Woodall ended. (ECF No. 20, PageID.227; ECF No. 23, PageID.275.) Defendants believe tolling ended when the Sixth Circuit denied class certification. (ECF No. 20, PageID.227.) Plaintiffs counter that tolling did not end until Woodall was dismissed, and, even if the Court finds that tolling ended when class certification was denied, they are entitled to equitable tolling. (ECF No. 23, PageID.281-282.)

The parties' briefs address the relevant issues and the Court dealt with them tangentially in Woodall. Thus, no further argument is needed. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f).

II.

Because Defendants seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court “construes the complaint in the light most favorable” to the Plaintiffs and determines whether their “complaint ‘contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See Heinrich v. Waiting Angels Adoption Servs., Inc., 668 F.3d 393, 403 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Detailed factual allegations are not required to survive a motion to dismiss, HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 614 (6th Cir. 2012), but they must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

III.

The only issue raised in Defendants' motion to dismiss is the statute of limitations.

“When § 1983 claims arise in Michigan . . . ‘the appropriate statute of limitations . . . is [Michigan's] three-year limitations period for personal injury claims.'” Forrester v. Clarenceville Sch. Dist., 537 F.Supp.3d 944, 949-50 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (alteration and second omission in original) (quoting Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 714 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 45 (6th Cir. 1986).

While the three-year statute of limitations comes from state law, “federal law governs when the statute of limitations accrues.” Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2007). In this Circuit, “[t]he statute of limitations commences to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action. A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Hornback v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty., Gov't, 543 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984)). Stated differently, “[i]n determining when the cause of action accrues in § 1983 cases, we look to the event that should have alerted the typical lay person to protect his or her rights.” Trzebuckowski v. City of Cleveland, 319 F.3d 853, 856 (6th Cir. 2003). In the context of § 1983 illegal search claims, the statute of limitations begins to run on the day of the search. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Hornback, 543 Fed.Appx. at 502 (“[Plaintiff] had a colorable claim for the violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights on the day of the search, and the statute of limitations began to run on that date.”).

A. Class Claims

This lawsuit was filed on April 27, 2023. The parties agree, therefore, that Plaintiffs are barred from bringing a class action for claims that accrued before April 27, 2020. (ECF No. 20, PageID.223; ECF No. 23, PageID.286.) Though not disputed, the Court will briefly address the timeliness of the class claims because it is relevant to Plaintiffs' individual claims.

This analysis is a little more involved where, as here, the Plaintiffs were putative class members in a prior case. This is because “[t]he commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue to a class action.” Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552 (1974); see also Potter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 9 F.4th 369, 371 (6th Cir. 2021) (explaining that American Pipe tolling, is “an equitable doctrine under which filing a class action pauses the deadlines for members to file related individual actions”). And the limitations period “remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class certification is denied.” Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983). Once class certification is denied (or a putative class action is dismissed without a ruling on class certification), American Pipe tolling ceases, and the class members' individual statute-of-limitations clocks being running. See...