Harris v. Forest River, Inc.

1

KENNETH HARRIS, JR., Plaintiff, v. FOREST RIVER, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:23-0570

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Huntington Division

March 15, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT C. CHAMBERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant Forest River, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 4. Plaintiff Kenneth Harris, Jr. opposes the motion. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES this action WITHOUT PREJUDICE, but STAYS enforcement of this decision to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to file a motion to transfer.

I.

FACTUAL AND

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court of Putnam County, West Virginia, against Forest River, Inc. (Forest River) and Summit RV. Plaintiff states he is a resident of West Virginia, Forest River is a manufacturer of recreational vehicles with its principal place of business in Indiana, and Summit RV is a dealer of recreational vehicles located in Ashland, Kentucky. Comp. ¶¶1-3 12, 13, ECF No. 1-2.^[1] In his Complaint, Plaintiff contends that, on or about May 21, 2022, he purchased a new 2022 Forest River Sandpiper recreational vehicle (also referred to as an “RV”) from Summit RV for approximately $86,452.72. Compl. ¶¶4, 5. Plaintiff states “[t]he vehicle was purchased . . . in the State of West Virginia and is registered in the State of West Virginia.” Id. ¶4. After Plaintiff took possession of the Sandpiper, he claims he noticed numerous defects and sought repair of those defects. Id. ¶¶8, 9. Despite those efforts, Plaintiff asserts the repairs were ineffective, rendering the Sandpiper “worthless and/or substantially impaired.” Id. ¶6. Plaintiff alleges these nonconformities violate the written warranties that were issued to him. Id. ¶7. As a result, Plaintiff alleges in Count I of his Complaint a claim under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act's Consumer Protection for New Motor Vehicle Warranties (commonly referred to as West Virginia's “Lemon Law”), West Virginia Code § 46A-6A-1 to § 46A-6A-9, and in Count II a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.

On August 23, 2023, Forest River removed the case to this Court based upon federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d), and diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Following removal Forest River filed its Motion to Dismiss. Summit RV was never served a copy of the Complaint, and it was dismissed from this action on December 11, 2023.

II. STANDARD OF REIVEW

Pursuant to Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), courts must look for “plausibility” in the complaint. 550 U.S. at 556-57. This standard requires a plaintiff to set forth the “grounds” for an “entitle[ment] to relief” that is more than mere “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true (even when doubtful), the allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Id. (citations omitted). If the allegations in the complaint, assuming their truth, do “not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.” Id. at 558 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court explained the requirements of Rule 8 and the “plausibility standard” in more detail. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated that Rule 8 does not demand “detailed factual allegations[.]” 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, a mere “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is insufficient. Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility exists when a claim contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court continued by explaining that, although factual allegations in a complaint must be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citation omitted). Whether a plausible claim is stated in a complaint requires a court to conduct a context-specific analysis, drawing upon the court's own judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. If the court finds from its analysis that “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. (quoting, in part, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). The Supreme Court further articulated that “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A.

Forum Selection Clause

In its motion, Forester River argues that the Complaint should be dismissed as the purchase was subject to a one-year limited warranty (the “Limited Warranty”), which contains a valid and enforceable forum selection clause and choice of law provision. Specifically, the Limited

Warranty provides:

LEGAL REMEDIES

THIS LIMITED WARRANTY SHALL BE INTERPRETED AND CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF INDIANA.

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDY AND LEGAL ACTION: THE WRITTEN NOTICE AND REPAIR REMEDY DESCRIBED ABOVE MUST BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO INITIATING ANY ACTION TO SEEK LEGAL OR EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF THIS LIMITED WARRANTY OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES.

ANY ACTION FOR BREACH OF THIS LIMITED WARRANTY OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OR REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE OR ANY ACTION TO ENFORCE ANY PORTION OF THIS LIMITED WARRANTY MUST BE COMMENCED WITHIN NINETY (90) DAYS OF THE EXPIRATION OF THE WARRANTY PERIOD. SOME STATES DO NOT PERMIT REDUCTION

OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SO THE LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.

EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION FOR DECIDING LEGAL DISPUTES RELATING TO THIS LIMITED WARRANTY, AN ALLEGED BREACH OF WARRANTY, BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES, OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND MUST BE FILED IN THE COURTS WITHIN THE STATE OF INDIANA.

ANY AND ALL CLAIMS OR CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS LIMITED WARRANTY OR IMPLIED WARRANTY SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF INDIANA WHETHER SUCH CLAIMS SOUND IN CONTRACT, TORT, OR STATUTE (INCLUDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS), WITHOUT GIVING EFFECT TO ANY CONFLICT OF LAW RULE THAT WOULD RESULT IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAWS OF A DIFFERENT JURISDICTION.

Note: Any authorization or performance of repairs, attempt to resolve a complaint, or request for warranty service shall not constitute a waiver of Forest River's rights and shall not extend the warranty coverage period or when you must commence an action to enforce any breach of warranty claim, unless prohibited by state law.

THE ABOVE LIMITED WARRANTY GIVES YOU SPECIFIC LEGAL RIGHTS. YOU MAY ALSO HAVE OTHER RIGHTS, WHICH VARY FROM STATE TO STATE AND PROVINCE TO PROVINCE.

Forest River Ltd. Towable Warranty, at 5, ECF No. 5-1 (bold and capitalization original). Pursuant to the Limited Warranty, Forest River insists Plaintiff was required to file this action in Indiana and Indiana law applies. As Plaintiff filed in West Virginia, Forest River argues the case should be dismissed.

Plaintiff responds that the forum selection clause in the Limited Warranty is void and unenforceable for at least three reasons. First, Plaintiff claims he never signed the Limited Warranty agreement. Second, he argues that West Virginia has a strong public policy in protecting the rights of consumers and the Limited Warranty strips consumers of those rights. Third, he asserts that the Limited Warranty is an unconscionable contract of adhesion. Forest River refutes all these arguments.

In considering the parties arguments, the Court finds Lantz v. Roy's R.V. Supercenter, LLC, Civ. Act. No. 2:21-11, 2022 WL 2762712 (N.D. W.Va. Feb. 15, 2022), Omnibus Report and Recommendation, adopted by 2022 WL 17414859 (N.D. W.Va. Dec. 5, 2022), particularly instructive and persuasive. In Lantz, West Virginia consumers purchased a camper from an RV dealership in West Virginia. 2022 WL 2762712, at *1. The camper was manufactured in Indiana by Gulf Stream Coach, Inc. (Gulf Stream), which is incorporated in Indiana. Id. at **1, 7. Ultimately, the purchasers found the camper to be unusable due to defects and nonconformities and filed an action in West Virginia state court against both the dealership and Gulf Stream, asserting, inter alia, claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and West Virginia's Lemon Law. Id. at **2, 6-7. The action then was removed to federal court, and Gulf Stream moved to dismiss the complaint or, alternatively, transfer the action to Indiana. As here, Gulf Stream stated the purchasers were bound to a forum selection clause in the limited warranty agreement they entered into when they bought the camper.

In defense to Gulf Steam's motion, the purchasers made many of the same arguments as Plaintiff makes in this case. To begin, the court recognized that “federal courts treat a motion...