Harris v. Gear

PAUL HARRIS and PASCAL HARRIS, Plaintiffs, v. SPORTBIKE TRACK GEAR; TWO TWENTY MOTORSPORTS, LLC;PLANET-KNOX LTD; XYZ ENTITIES 1-10 (fictitious designations);ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10 (fictitious designations);GEF LIMITED LTD; JOHN DOES 1-20 (fictitious designations), Defendants

Civil Action No.: 2:13-cv-6527-JLL-JAD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

September 8, 2015

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JOSEPH A. DICKSON, U.S.M.J.

This matter comes before the Court upon motion by Planet-Knox Ltd. ("Planet-Knox") to dismiss Paul and Pascal Harris' ("Plaintiffs") Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), (Mot. To Dis., ECF No. 27), as well as Plaintiffs and Defendants Two Twenty Motorsports LLC and SportBike TrackGear's opposing request for jurisdictional discovery. (Brs. In Opp., ECF Nos. 31, 33). Co-defendants Two Twenty Motorsports and SportBike TrackGear have also requested that in the alternative to dismissal, the Court instead transfer this matter to the Eastern District of Michigan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a). (Br. In Op., ECF No. 33, at 8-9). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78, no oral argument was heard. Upon review of the parties' arguments, and for the following reasons, this Court recommends that Planet-Knox Ltd.'s motion to dismiss be DENIED. The request for jurisdictional discovery, however, is also DENIED. This Court sua sponte recommends that the Court transfer the case to the Eastern District of Michigan, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1631, todetermine whether the Court in that District may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Planet-Knox.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs Paul Harris and Pascal Harris brought this action against Defendants asserting personal injury claims that resulted from a motorcycle accident that took place on March 12, 2011. (First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs assert that Defendant, Planet-Knox, a company located and organized under the laws of the United Kingdom, designed and manufactured defective motorcycle gloves that exacerbated plaintiff's alleged injuries. (Id.) Since 2009, Planet-Knox has exclusively sold its motorcycle gear products to Two Twenty Motorsports, LLC, a corporation located and incorporated in Michigan. (Declaration of Geoff Travell ("Travell Decl."), Ex. A, ECF No. 27-2, ¶ 26). Based on the facts alleged, it appears that Two Twenty Motorsports, LLC resold the alleged defective gloves to co-defendant, SportsBike TrackGear, another corporation located and incorporated in Michigan. (Id.) Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Harris thereafter purchased the "Knox Handroid Hand Armour" motorcycle gloves on his computer from SportsBike TrackGear. (First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs additionally contend that after Mr. Harris placed his order, SportsBike TrackGear, delivered the gloves to his residence in New Jersey. (Id. at ¶ 11).

On or about July 18, 2014, Defendant Planet-Knox moved to dismiss Paul and Pascal Harris' ("Plaintiffs") Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). (Mot. To Dis., ECF No. 27). Planet-Knox argues that it is not subject to either general or specific jurisdiction in this District. (Br. In Sup. of Mot. To Dis., ECF No. 27-1 at 15).

On or about August 19, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a brief opposing Planet-Knox's motion to dismiss. (Pls. Br. In Op., ECF No. 31). Plaintiffs contend that jurisdiction over Planet-Knox is proper because Planet-Knox maintains a website, which they argue solicits consumers throughout the United States, including in New Jersey. (Id. at 4). Plaintiffs also argue that the Court should permit the parties to engage in jurisdictional discovery. (Id. at 7). Specifically, Plaintiffs request discovery to include the following information:

(1) All documentation, data, or other material in any form with respect to all order for Knox products placed by or delivered to SportBike TrackGear;

(2) Names and addresses of all United States based purchasers of Knox products through its website;

(3) Names and addresses of deliveries to the United States of Knox products purchased through the website;

(4) All data obtained through the use of the Planet-Knox.com website connected to any United States based website visitor;

(5) All invoices, shipping documents, labels, manifests, and all other documents and/or communications, electronic or otherwise, between Knox and Co-defendants SportBike TrackGear, Two Twenty Motorsports, and/or any other United States based distributor, retailer and/or dealer;

(6) All marketing materials distributed in the United States;

(7) All electronic information maintained and/or saved with respect to any social media platform including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Youtube; and

(8) All documents or data in connection with any United States based company which receives any Knox product as Original Equipment.

(Id. at 11-12).

On or about the same day, Defendants Two Twenty Motorsports and SportBike TrackGear also filed a brief opposing Planet- Knox's motion to dismiss. (Br. In Op., ECF No. 33). Co-defendants assert that by engaging in nationwide distribution of its products, as well as its Internet activity, Planet-Knox should be subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. (Id. at 8). Co-defendants also contend that if this Court concludes New Jersey does not have jurisdiction over Planet-Knox, transfer of this action to the Eastern District of Michigan is appropriate, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404. (Id. at 10).

Thereafter, on or about September 03, 2014, Defendant, Planet-Knox submitted a reply brief in further support of its motion to dismiss. (Rep. Br., ECF No. 37). Specifically, Planet-Knox argues that personal jurisdiction cannot be established through its website or social media platforms because there is no evidence that Planet-Knox purposefully targeted New Jersey consumers. (Id. at 9). Planet-Knox also asserts that the request for jurisdictional discovery should be denied and that there is also no basis to transfer this action to the Eastern District of Michigan. (Id. at 11-13).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Once a defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing sufficient facts to show that jurisdiction exists. Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2001). The plaintiff "need only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction." Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004). However, a plaintiff may not "rely on the bare pleadings alone" in order to withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; "[o]ncethe motion is made, plaintiff must respond with actual proofs, not mere allegations." Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595, 604 (3d Cir. 1990).

A federal district court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the state in which the court sits to the extent authorized by the law of that state. D'Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Provident Nat'l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir. 1987)). The New Jersey long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent permitted by the United States Constitution. N.J. Sup.Ct. R. 4:4-4(c)(l); Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 201 N.J. 48, 987 A.2d 575, 596 (N.J. 2010). As a consequence, the Court must determine whether, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, Defendants have "certain minimum contacts with [New Jersey] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

There are two types of personal jurisdiction, general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). Since the recent Supreme Court's decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014), courts have recognized that general jurisdiction extends beyond an entity's state of incorporation and principal place of business only where its contacts with another forum are so substantial as to render it "at home" in that state. JWQ Cabinetry, Inc. v. Granada Wood & Cabinets, Inc., No. 13-4110 (FLW), 2014 WL 2050267, *3 (D.N.J. May 19, 2014). "The paradigm forum for general jurisdiction over an individual is the individual's domicile, his home." Id.

Specific personal jurisdiction "allows for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant for actions arising out of the defendant's contact with the forum." Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). "The threshold requirement is that the defendant must have 'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.' " Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958) (internal citations omitted); see also O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 2007). Next, plaintiff must show that the litigation "arises out of or relate[s] to" those contacts. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 318. After the sufficient minimum contacts have been established by plaintiff, courts will consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction would otherwise comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 324, quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. Personal Jurisdiction over Planet-Knox

Planet-Knox first asserts that the Court lacks specific jurisdiction over it because it "has not purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting within New Jersey and thus, has never invoked the benefits and protections of New Jersey's Laws." (I...