Harris v. Hill

DEBRA HARRIS v. JASON HILL, ET AL.

CIV. ACTION No. 3:21-01280

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Monroe Division

July 14, 2021

TERRY A. DOUGHTY JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

KAYLA DYE MCCLUSKY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the undersigned magistrate judge, on reference from the District Court, is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and associated request for fees and costs [doc.# 7], filed by Defendant, St Francis Medical Center, Inc. For reasons assigned below, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant, St. Francis Medical Center, be DISMISSED, with prejudice, but that Defendant's request for attorney's fees and costs be DENIED. It is further recommended that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant, Jason Hill, under Title VII and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, only, be DISMISSED with prejudice.

Background

On April 9, 2021, Debra Harris filed the instant petition in the Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Ouachita State of Louisiana, to recover damages for sexual harassment and unlawful retaliation against her former employer, St Francis Medical Center (hereinafter, “SFMC”); her alleged harasser/abuser, Jason Hill; and Hill's employer, Crothall Healthcare, Inc. (misidentified in the Petition as “Compass Group U.S.A. Inc. (Crothall Healthcare, Inc.)”)^[1] (hereinafter, “Crothall”). (Petition, ¶¶ I-III). Plaintiff alleged that on multiple occasions, she was subjected to sexual harassment and sexual abuse by defendant, Jason Hill. Id. Although Plaintiff advised SFMC and Crothall about Hill's unwelcome sexual harassment and physical sexual conduct, she alleges that SFMC and Crothall failed to take any remedial action. Id., ¶¶ X-XI. Instead, on March 7, 2020, Plaintiff contends that SFMC and Crothall targeted her for retaliation and terminated her from employment on a fabricated charge. Id., ¶¶ XII-XIII. Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages, plus attorney's fees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Id., ¶¶ XIV-XVII.

On May 13, 2021, Defendant, Crothall, removed this matter to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal [doc. # 1]). In the notice of removal, Crothall further asserted that Plaintiff had improperly joined Defendant, Hill, because there was no individual liability under Title VII and because any delictual action against Hill was time-barred. Id.

On May 19, 2021, Defendant, SFMC, filed the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, together with an associated request for an award of attorney's fees and costs. In support of its motion, SFMC argued that Plaintiff's claims for harassment and retaliation under Title VII were time-barred because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Insofar as Plaintiff sought alternative or parallel relief under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, Louisiana Revised Statute § 23:301, et seq. (“LEDL”), SFMC asserted that the claim also was time-barred because Plaintiff filed suit beyond the one-year prescriptive period. Moreover, Plaintiff failed to provide requisite notice as required by Louisiana Revised Statute § 23:303(C) before filing suit. Finally, SFMC argued that the LEDL does not recognize a cause of action for retaliation, and, in any event, the LEDL exempts non-profit corporations such as SFMC from its provisions.

Plaintiff did not file a response to the motion, and the time to do so has lapsed. See Notice of Motion Setting [doc. # 8]. Accordingly, the motion is deemed unopposed. Id.

12(b)(6) Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanction dismissal where the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A pleading states a claim for relief when, inter alia, it contains a “short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. See Iqbal, supra. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, supra (citation omitted). A well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of the asserted facts is improbable, and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, XXXXX

Although the court must accept as true all factual allegations set forth in the complaint, the same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. Moreover, courts are compelled to dismiss claims grounded upon invalid legal theories even though they might otherwise be well-pleaded. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989).

Nevertheless, “[t]he notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and case law do not require an inordinate amount of detail or precision.” Gilbert v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida Inc., 295 Fed. App'x. 710, 713 (5^th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “a complaint need not pin plaintiff's claim for relief to a precise legal theory. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires only a plausible ‘short and plain' statement of the plaintiff's claim, not an exposition of [her] legal argument.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011). Indeed, “[c]ourts must focus on the substance of the relief sought and the allegations pleaded, not on the label used.” Gearlds v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 709 F.3d 448, 452 (5^th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl., 127 S.Ct. at 1958). In the context of employment discrimination claims, “the ordinary rules for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint apply, ” and a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination in her complaint. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511, 122 S.Ct. 992, 997 (2002).

Statutes of limitations serve as absolute bars to suit. Nottingham v. Richardson, 499 Fed. App'x. 368, 375 (5th Cir. 2012). Although limitations is an affirmative defense, a district court is authorized to dismiss a case (even sua sponte) when “it is clear from the face of the complaint that the claims asserted are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.” Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).^[2]

When considering a motion to dismiss, courts generally are limited to the complaint and its proper attachments. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5^th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). However, courts may rely upon “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice” - including public records. Dorsey, supra; Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n9 (5^th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (proper to take judicial notice of matters of public record). Furthermore, “[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [her] claim.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-499 (5^th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Analysis

I. SFMC

a) Title VII Exhaustion

Employment discrimination plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing claims in federal court. Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc. 296 F.3d 376, 378 -379 (5^th Cir. 2002); Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1996). A Title VII plaintiff exhausts administrative remedies when she files a timely charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory notice of right to sue. Id. In a “deferral state” such as Louisiana, ^[3] the Title VII plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 30 days after receiving notice that the state or local agency has terminated proceedings or within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory employment action, whichever is earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Burrell v. Brown, 2000 WL 1056312, *3 (5^th Cir. 2000) (unpubl.); Janmeja v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 96 Fed. App'x. 212, 214 (5^th Cir. 2004).

Once the plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies by presenting her claim to the EEOC and received a right to sue letter, she must file suit in federal court within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC's notice of the right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The failure to exhaust administrative remedies or to file suit in federal court in a timely manner...