Harris v. State

Anton Jamail HARRIS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee

No. 04-20-00116-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio

April 27, 2022

DO NOT PUBLISH

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2018CR3427 Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Irene Rios Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

MEMORANDUM OPINION

IRENE RIOS, JUSTICE

Appellant Anton Harris appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress DNA evidence obtained pursuant to two different search warrants. In his first issue, Harris argues the DNA evidence should have been suppressed because it is the fruit of a prior illegal seizure of Harris's DNA. In his second issue, Harris argues he was denied due process of law when the prosecutor asked the jury to consider the application of parole laws during jury argument of the punishment phase of trial. We affirm.

Background

Law enforcement suspected Harris, a high school student, had committed the offenses of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated robbery. Without obtaining a search warrant detectives from the San Antonio Police Department ("SAPD") arrived at Harris's high school on June 1, 2017, and asked Officer Andrew Adams from the Northside ISD Police Department to help procure a sample of Harris's DNA.

Harris was drinking from a cup with a straw as he was sitting at a table with his friend, Carlos, in the school cafeteria. Harris momentarily left the table to take a sandwich to his girlfriend, leaving his cup at the table with Carlos. When Harris left the table, Officer Adams directed a school custodian to collect Harris's cup and straw. Carlos told the custodian Harris was not finished with the drink and would be returning. Officer Adams, who went to the table as well, stated the custodian had already touched the straw and the custodian should give Harris a new, clean straw. Carlos agreed and Officer Adams pulled the used straw from the cup and gave it to the SAPD detectives. The detectives collected DNA from Harris's straw and confirmed his DNA could not be excluded as being a match to the DNA collected from several sexual assault cases, including the one they were investigating.

On June 8, 2017, law enforcement obtained a search warrant to collect samples of Harris's DNA ("the 2017 Warrant").^[1] To show probable cause, the affidavit attached to the 2017 Warrant application stated the DNA collected from the straw could not be excluded as being a match to the DNA collected at the crime scenes.

On April 2, 2018, Harris was indicted for aggravated sexual assault with a deadly weapon and aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. On July 18, 2019, law enforcement obtained a second search warrant to collect a sample of Harris's DNA ("the 2019 Warrant"). The 2019 Warrant affidavit did not reference the DNA collected from the straw.

Harris filed a motion to suppress DNA evidence obtained from the straw and the two subsequent search warrants. During the motion to suppress hearing, Harris argued the school custodian's seizure of the straw was an illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Harris argued DNA evidence from the straw and any fruits of that illegal seizure- including additional DNA samples later obtained under the 2017 Warrant and the 2019 Warrant- should be excluded from evidence.

The trial court found the initial seizure of the straw was an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and excluded evidence obtained from the straw. However, the trial court determined the DNA samples obtained pursuant to the 2017 Warrant and the 2019 Warrant were not fruits of the illegal search and seizure and denied Harris's motion to suppress the DNA evidence obtained pursuant to those warrants.

The jury found Harris guilty of the offenses of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated robbery, and assessed punishment at ninety-nine-years' confinement for the aggravated sexual assault conviction and sixty-years' confinement for the aggravated robbery conviction to run concurrently. Harris appeals.

Motion to Suppress

In his first issue, Harris argues the trial court erred when it did not exclude the DNA samples collected under the 2017 Warrant and 2019 Warrant. According to Harris, the evidence obtained under these warrants were fruits of the illegal seizure of the straw.

The State argues the trial court did not err because: (1) the 2019 Warrant is based on information independent of the seizure of the straw; (2) the 2017 Warrant contained probable cause even if all references to the straw are redacted; and (3) the straw was not obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the school custodian received third-party consent from Carlos to take the straw.^[2]

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard, giving almost total deference to a trial court's determination of the historical facts supported by the record, and reviewing the trial court's application of the law de novo. Wells v. State, 611 S.W.3d 396, 405-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). "Ordinarily the preference for searches based upon warrants requires reviewing courts to give 'great deference' to a magistrate's determination of probable cause." State v. Cuong Phu Le, 463 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Tex Crim. App. 2015) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). "If the ruling of the trial court is correct under any applicable theory of law, we will sustain its ruling." Wells, 611 S.W.3d at 406.

B. The Exclusionary Rule

"The cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment and its Texas equivalent is that a magistrate shall not issue a search warrant without first finding 'probable cause' that a particular item will be found in a particular location." Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). "An affiant must present an affidavit that allows the magistrate to independently determine probable cause and the magistrate's actions cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusion of others." Id. at 61 (quotation marks and alterations omitted).

"Probable cause exists when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a [person] of reasonable prudence to believe that the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime will be found." Hyland v. State, 574 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). "Neither federal nor Texas law defines precisely what degree of probability suffices to establish probable cause, but that probability cannot be based on mere conclusory statements of an affiant's belief." Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 61.

"In determining whether probable cause exists to support the issuance of a search warrant, the magistrate to whom the probable cause affidavit is presented is confined to considering the four corners of the search warrant affidavit, as well as to logical inferences the magistrate might draw based on the facts contained in the affidavit." Hyland, 574 S.W.3d at 910-11. "The test is whether a reasonable reading by the magistrate would lead to the conclusion that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the issuance of the warrant, thus, the magistrate's sole concern should be probability." Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 60 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). "The determination of whether probable cause exists is a 'totality of the circumstances' inquiry, based on the magistrate's reasonable reading of the affidavit, but the magistrate may not act as a mere 'rubber stamp.'" Hyland, 574 S.W.3d at 911 (quoting State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).

The exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the introduction at trial of not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence discovered later that is derivative of an illegality, or that constitutes "fruit of the poisonous tree." Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984). In other words, "the exclusionary rule also prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is the product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search, up to the point at which the connection with the unlawful search becomes so attenuated as to dissipate the taint[.]" Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1988) (quotation marks omitted).^[3]

C. The Independent Source Doctrine

When the causal connection between the constitutional violation alleged and the discovery of the evidence challenged is broken, however, the independent source doctrine operates as an exception to the exclusionary rule. Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).^[4] "At its core, the independent source doctrine provides that evidence derived from or obtained from a lawful source, separate and apart from any illegal conduct by law enforcement, is not subject to exclusion." Id. 465 (citing Murray, 487 U.S. at 537). Explaining its rationale, the Supreme Court has explicated:

[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred . . . . When the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation.

Murray, 487 U.S. at 537 (alterations and emphasis in original).

Under the independent source doctrine, "evidence actually obtained...