Harris v. State

896 S.E.2d 238

HARRIS

v.The STATE.

A23A1258

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

December 13, 2023

Angela Marie Coggins, Perry, for Appellant.

Rodrigo Lucio Silva, William Marshall Kendall, for Appellee.

Miller, Presiding Judge.

This is Shalita Harris’s second appearance before this Court following her conviction for homicide by vehicle in the first degree. See Harris v. State, 360 Ga. App. 695, 859 S.E.2d 587 (2021) ("Harris I"). Harris appeals from the judgment and sentence and the denial of her motion for new trial based on juror misconduct. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct did not contribute to the verdict, we affirm.

The following facts are taken from Harris I, supra, 360 Ga. App. at 696-697, 859 S.E.2d 587:

On January 29, 2018, Harris, a school bus driver for Houston County schools, was driving on Forest Park Drive as part of her afternoon drop-off route. She was carrying 33 elementary school students, ranging in age from pre-kindergarten to fifth grade, and one adult school bus monitor. One section of the road went downhill at a gradient of approximately 11.9 percent, and in the downhill portion there was a sharp turn to the left. The posted speed limit for the road was 25 miles per hour ("mph"), but the suggested speed for the curve, as displayed on a yellow traffic sign, was 15 mph. It was common for children to throw their hands up as they entered this part of the route, "as if they were on a roller coaster," and yell "hands up"; this day was no different.

According to testimony at trial, Harris had previously driven the bus on this stretch of road without issue. However, the bus monitor testified that on this day the bus’s front wheels left the road as it entered the curve, and Harris was unable to regain control. The bus left the road, struck nearby trees and a dirt embankment, and flipped over on its right side. Six-year-old A. H., who was sitting behind Harris and near the aisle, was ejected from the bus during the crash and suffered fatal injuries. A. H. was transported to the hospital,but ultimately died from the trauma she sustained during the crash.

At trial, Harris’s brother testified that he had spoken with her just after the crash, and that she had stated "I was going too fast." Additionally, a student who rode on the bus that day stated that although it did not feel "much faster than the previous times," it did feel fast that day.

Both the State and Harris offered expert testimony regarding key details surrounding the crash. The State’s expert testified that the speed at which a school bus could safely navigate the curve on the road was between 17 and 20 mph. He testified that at the time the bus left the road, however, it was traveling between 29 and 35 mph. He concluded that "the bus had to [have been] traveling at least 24.516 [mph] to cover the distance from the roadway exit point to the first major impact." In contrast, Harris’s expert testified that he believed the bus was traveling approximately 17.75 mph when it entered the curve, and approximately 24 mph when it left the road.

We add here that a post-crash inspection of the bus did not discover any mechanical issues that could have contributed to the crash.

Harris was charged with one count each of homicide by vehicle in the first degree (OCGA § 40-6-393 (a)), reckless driving (OCGA § 40-6-390 (a)), speeding (OCGA § 40-6-181), and driving too fast for conditions (OCGA § 40-6-180), and two counts of homicide by vehicle in the second degree (OCGA § 40-6-393 (c)). The charge of first-degree vehicular homicide alleged that Harris caused the death of A. H. by engaging in reckless driving. One of the charges of second-degree vehicular homicide alleged that Harris caused the death of A. H. by speeding, while the other such charge alleged that Harris caused the death of A. H. by driving too fast for conditions. The trial court directed a verdict of acquittal on the charge of driving too fast for conditions and the charge of second-degree vehicular homicide based on driving too fast for conditions.

The jury found Harris guilty of first-degree vehicular homicide and reckless driving but acquitted her of speeding and second-degree vehicular homicide based on speeding. The reckless driving count merged with the first-degree vehicular homicide count for sentencing purposes, and the trial court sentenced Harris to ten years, with the first three years to be served in prison and the remainder to be served on probation.

Immediately after the trial, Harris’s counsel spoke with two jurors and learned that during deliberations some of the jurors had obtained extrajudicial information about the difference in the severity of the charges. Harris filed a motion for new trial, arguing, among other things, that jurors had engaged in misconduct during deliberations by researching the available sentences for her charges.

All 12 jurors testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial.¹ Juror C. S. testified that she "Googled the difference between first and second degree" during a recess from deliberations and that she informed other jurors that first-degree vehicular homicide was a felony and second-degree vehicular homicide was a misdemeanor. C. S. testi- fied that based on her Google search she knew, "what the sentence range was, and … how much time Ms. Harris could get in prison." C. S. denied sharing the sentencing range with other jurors.

Juror S. E. testified that during a recess from deliberations she "used Google to determine first degree versus second degree" and that based on the Google search and her general knowledge she knew that some of the charges were more serious than others in terms of punishment. Other jurors testified that during deliberations a juror informed them that first-degree vehicular homicide was a felony and carried a harsher sentence than second-degree vehicular homicide, which was a misdemeanor. Some jurors testified that their knowledge that certain charges were more serious than others came from the indictment and their general knowledge. Juror A. J. provided conflicting testimony as to whether he knew the sentencing ranges for the charged offenses during deliberations. With the exception of C. S. and A. J., the jurors denied having known such ranges.

The trial court denied the motion for new trial, ruling that (1) the presumption of prejudice, which had previously applied upon a finding of juror misconduct, did not survive enactment of the current Evidence Code, and (2) there was no reasonable probability that the verdict was influenced by the extrajudicial information. This Court affirmed on appeal, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the jurors’ improper actions were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Harris I, supra, 360 Ga. App. at 699 (1), 859 S.E.2d 587. This Court explained that the extrajudicial information obtained by some of the jurors had to do with the difference in the severity of the crimes as opposed to the underlying substantive law or evidence. Id. at 698-699 (1), 859 S.E.2d 587.

Harris subsequently sought certiorari review with the Supreme Court of Georgia, which concluded that the trial court erred in (1) ruling that the presumption of prejudice arising from a showing of juror misconduct no longer applied, and (2) failing to determine whether the State proved that the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 51, 54-55 (2), 875 S.E.2d 649 (2022) ("Harris II"). The Supreme Court further concluded that while this Court properly recognized the presumption of prejudice and the State’s burden in rebutting it, this Court "erred when it concluded as a matter of law that, while extrajudicial information obtained by a juror about the underlying substantive law or evidence could prejudice a defendant, extrajudicial information about the difference in the severity of the crimes had no potential to cause prejudice." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 56 (2), 875 S.E.2d 649. The Supreme Court noted the well-established prohibition on jurors’ consideration of punishment in reaching a verdict, stating that

the concern with injecting sentencing considerations into the guilt-innocence phase of a trial is that, if the jury can discern what sentence(s) the defendant on trial is facing, it might use that knowledge to fashion a verdict that will result in the sentence the jury wishes to see imposed upon the defendant being tried, rather than deciding the defendant’s guilt or innocence based on the evidence and underlying substantive law provided by the court.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 58 (2), 875 S.E.2d 649. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated this Court’s decision and instructed that the trial court should apply the proper legal principles in ruling on Harris’s juror misconduct claim. Id.

On remand, the trial court again denied Harris’s motion for new trial. The court found that "[o]nly one juror [A. J.] suggested he knew the sentencing range for either charge," but "[h]is testimony was conflicting and unclear and … he was not aware of any specifics until after the verdict was rendered." The court also found that: extrajudicial information was procured by or shared with some jurors regarding the difference in the seriousness of some of the charges; two jurors "Googled" the charges for the definition of first and second degree, resulting in their belief that one charge was more serious than the other; and some jurors knew one charge was a felony and one charge was a misdemeanor. The court acknowledged that this created a presumption of prejudice but concluded that the State overcame the presumption by establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm occurred in that there was no reasonable possibility that the misconduct contributed to the verdict.

The trial court explained that because it was prohibited from inquiring about the...