Harris v. State

RODNEY LEE HARRIS, JR., v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 2383

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2019

June 3, 2021

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 119035015

UNREPORTED

Graeff, Arthur, Shaw Geter, JJ.

Opinion by Shaw Geter, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

Appellant was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of manslaughter, first-degree assault and second-degree assault. He was sentenced to ten years' incarceration for the manslaughter charge and a consecutive sentence of twenty-five years' incarceration for the first-degree assault charge. The second-degree assault conviction was merged into the first-degree assault conviction. Appellant timely appealed and presents the following questions for our review:

1. Whether the circuit court erred by not complying with Maryland Rule 4-215(e) in response to Mr. Harris' repeated requests to discharge counsel?

2. Whether the circuit court erred by refusing to ask during voir dire whether any prospective jurors are unwilling or unable to comply with the jury instructions on the presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof, and the defendant's right to testify?

3. Whether the circuit court erred by denying the motion to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds?

4. Whether the circuit court erred by denying the motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Three?

The State concedes that, in accordance with Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1 (2020), this case must be remanded for a new trial. The trial court did not ask the requested voir dire questions and while appellant's trial occurred prior to the Court of Appeals' decision in Kazadi, his appeal was pending when the opinion was issued. The Court of Appeals determined that its "holding applies to . . . any other cases that are pending on direct appeal . . . where the relevant question has been preserved for appellate review." Id. at 54. We agree with the State that appellant's convictions should be reversed and that the case be remanded for a new trial. We shall address appellant's second and third issues, but wedecline to address appellant's first issue, as it is unlikely to reoccur on remand. See Odum v. State, 156 Md. App. 184, 212 (2004).

BACKGROUND

On April 5, 2018, Officer Brett Gibson responded to a 911 call for a possible assault. He spoke to Ms. Davis, the victim, following her transport to a nearby hospital. She identified Harris as her boyfriend and her assailant. Ms. Davis was six months pregnant at the time and suffered multiple injuries as a result of the attack. She subsequently lost her baby.

Harris was charged initially on April 6, 2018, with first-degree assault, second-degree assault and reckless endangerment. A grand jury indicted him on May 7, 2018, charging him with attempted first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault, and second-degree assault. Appellant filed pretrial motions, including a demand for a speedy trial, on May 24, 2018. His Hicks date was November 28, 2018.

On October 4, 2018, the court granted Harris' request for a postponement of the trial date and the State joined, both, stating additional time was needed for investigation. The court found good cause. On December 18, 2018, a second postponement was granted for the same reason and good cause was also found.

A grand jury, on February 4, 2019, again indicted appellant, adding counts relating to the baby's death. The indictment charged appellant with second-degree murder, manslaughter, first-degree assault and second-degree assault. Ten days later, appellant demanded a speedy trial. On March 7, 2019, the State nolle prossed the initial indictment. The Hicks date on the new indictment was August 12, 2019.

A third postponement was granted on June 26, 2019, because the defense attorney had been involved in an automobile accident and was unavailable to proceed with the trial. On July 8, 2019, a fourth postponement was granted because of a death in defense counsel's family. On July 15, 2019, a fifth postponement was granted because the case had been repaneled to a new attorney, and no courtrooms were available until October 8, 2019. Two days later, appellant filed another motion demanding a speedy trial.

Following a jury trial held in October 2019, appellant was convicted of manslaughter, first-degree and second-degree assault. He was sentenced to a total of thirty-five years' imprisonment.

DISCUSSION

1. The court did not err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds.

Appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds and further, the court did not engage in a proper analysis. The State counters the trial court did not err and appellant was not denied his right to a speedy trial.

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee a defendant in a criminal prosecution, the right to a speedy trial. When appellate courts review "the judgment on a motion to dismiss for violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial" they make their "own independent constitutional analysis." Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 220 (2002). "In other words, '[w]e perform a de novo constitutional appraisal in light of the particular facts of the case at hand; in so doing, we accept a lower court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.'" Vaise v.State, 246 Md. App. 188, 216, cert. denied, 471 Md. 86 (2020) (quoting Glover v. State, 368 Md. 221).

In Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court established a four-factor balancing test to determine if there is a constitutional violation of the speedy trial right. Those factors include: "length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). "'None of these factors is, in itself, either necessary or sufficient to find a violation of the speedy trial right; instead, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.'" Phillips v. State, 246 Md. App. 40, 56 (2020) (quoting Nottingham v. State, 227 Md. App. 592, 613 (2016)). "There is no bright-line rule to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial had been violated," rather courts must use "a balancing test" to weigh the actions of the defendant and the prosecution. Id. "[T]he Speedy Trial Clause has no application after the Government, acting in good faith, formally drops charges." State v. Henson, 335 Md. 326, 336 (1994) (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982)). "[T]he period between the good faith termination of a prosecution and the reinstitution of that prosecution . . . will not be considered in the speedy trial analysis." Id. "The Maryland rule in such case is that, so long as the State acted in good faith, the nolle prosequi terminates the original prosecution, and the speedy trial clock starts anew from the date of the filing of the new charging document." Nottingham v. State, 227 Md. App. 592, 614 (2016).

Appellant does not argue that the State acted in bad faith when it nolle prosequied the initial charges. Thus, we hold the speedy trial clock, starts with the filing of theFebruary 4, 2019 indictment. The length of time from that indictment until trial on October 8, 2019, was approximately 8 months. Such a delay "'might' be construed as presumptively prejudicial and of constitutional dimension." Lloyd v. State, 207 Md. App. 322, 329 (2012). We will, therefore, analyze the Barker factors.

1. Barker Analysis

Length of Delay

The Court of Appeals "has noted that the first factor, the length of the delay, is a 'double enquiry,' because a delay of sufficient length is first required to trigger a speedy trial analysis, and the length of the delay is then considered as one of the factors within that analysis." State v. Kanneh, 403 Md. 678, 688 (2008). "The length of delay, in and of itself, is not a weighty factor." Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 225 (2002). "The arrest of a defendant, or formal charges, whichever first occurs, activates the speedy trial right." Wheeler v. State, 88 Md. App. 512, 518 (1991). However, the length of the delay must be analyzed in correlation "to the other factors, such as the reasonableness of the State's explanation for the delay, the likelihood that the delay may cause the defendant to more pronouncedly assert his speedy trial right, and the presumption that a longer delay may cause the defendant greater harm." Id. "'[T]he length of delay is measured from the date of arrest or filing of indictment, information, or other formal charges to the date of trial.'" White v. State, 223 Md. App. 353, 377 (2015) (quoting Divver v. State, 356 Md. 379, 388-89 (1999)). "The Court of Appeals has consistently held that a delay of more than one year and fourteen days is 'presumptively prejudicial' and requires balancing the remaining factors." Lloyd v. State, 207 Md. App. 322, 328 (2012).

Appellant maintains that his first demand for a speedy trial was made on May 24, 2018, yet his trial did not occur until October 8, 2019, 502 days later. As a result, he argues his right to a speedy trial was violated. As stated above, the re-indictment occurred on February 4, 2019. In either case, there was delay. The State concedes that the "delay was of constitutional dimension but does not weigh significantly in favor of dismissal." We agree.

Reason for Delay

"Closely related to length of delay is the State's reason justifying a delay with different weights being assigned to different reasons." Phillips v. State, 246 Md. App. 40, 59 (2020). The Supreme Court stated in Barker:

A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily

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