Harris v. State

LLOYD HARRIS v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 2298

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

Submitted on Brief: February 14, 2019

September Term, 2017

October 30, 2019

CRIMINAL LAW - RIGHT OF ACCUSED OF COMPULSORY PROCESS - RELEVANCY OF ALTERNATIVE SUSPECT EVIDENCE

Trial judge properly exercised discretion in excluding from evidence material in which appellant proffered to insinuate that another individual had committed the crime for which he had been charged, including evidence of that individual's criminal conviction which consisted of similar underlying acts that occurred in the same area and around the same time of the acts underlying the charges faced by the appellant; the proffered evidence, however, did not give credence to the theory that someone other than the appellant committed the crime at issue, and therefore, was properly excluded pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-403.

CRIMINAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - PRE-INDICTMENT DELAY

Trial judge did not err in denying motion to dismiss based upon a 20-year pre-indictment delay where appellant failed to demonstrate that the State purposefully delayed the indictment to gain a tactical advantage, pursuant to Clark v. State, 364 Md. 611 (2001), and solely argued that the State recklessly disregarded the risk that delay would impair his ability to mount an effective defense, a standard not recognized by case law and that was not argued below.

CRIMINAL LAW - ADMISSIBILTY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY - DUELING EXPERTS

Trial judge properly exercised discretion in admitting the State's expert witness, concluding that the expert's testimony, juxtaposed by the testimony of the appellant's expert, provided the grist for the jury to best weigh, based upon a finding that the scientific testimony proffered, and the underlying methodology and conclusion thereof, was accepted by the relevant scientific community.

Circuit Court for Frederick County

Case No.: 10-K-16-057851

REPORTED

Berger, Leahy, Battaglia, Lynne, A. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Battaglia, J.

On October 2, 1996, the victim, then a 15-year old girl, was reported missing by her mother. Over two months later, her body was discovered in a wooded area of Frederick, Maryland. Prior to the discovery of the victim's body, appellant, Lloyd Harris, had resided at a "campsite" nearby in the wooded area, and, during the course of the investigation into the victim's death, became the primary suspect. The investigation largely concluded in 2000.

On January 22, 2016, a grand jury indicted Harris of first-degree murder, first-degree rape and third-degree sex offense, charges for which he was convicted by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Frederick County. The trial judge sentenced Harris to life in prison for the murder and rape convictions, which were to run concurrently, and merged, for sentencing purposes, the sex offense conviction. The issues in this case involve an alternative suspect, pre-indictment delay and expert testimony, as queued up by Harris in the following questions, which we have renumbered:

1. Did the trial court err when it granted the State's motion to exclude defense evidence regarding an alternate suspect?

2. Did the trial court err when it denied Mr. Harris's motion to dismiss due to pre-indictment delay?

3. Did the trial court err when it denied Mr. Harris's motion to exclude the testimony of the State's expert regarding acid phosphatase and "time since intercourse" on Frye-Reed grounds?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall answer Harris's questions in the negative and shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

ALTERNATIVE SUSPECT

Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence related to individuals who Harris contended were alternative suspects in the case. One of those individuals was Elmer Spencer, who had been convicted of first-degree assault in connection with an attempted rape which took place in Frederick, Maryland on October 9, 1996, days after the victim went missing. Harris had informed the State that he intended to introduce evidence related to Spencer's assault conviction to bolster the theory that Spencer was an alternative suspect:

• Call Michael Hansell to testify about his arrest of Elmer Spencer on October 9, 1996;

• Call the woman, who was assaulted, to testify that Elmer Spencer had attacked her on October 9, 1996¹;

• Introduce the police report in State v. Elmer Spencer, Frederick County Circuit Court Case No. K-96-021289;

• Introduce a Frederick News-Post article dated December 28, 2000 regarding Elmer Spencer as a potential suspect in the rape and murder of the victim; and,

• Introduce a true test copy of Circuit Court Case K-96-021289, State v. Elmer Spencer.

The trial judge subsequently held a hearing on the issue and orally granted the State's motion to exclude, but reserved Harris's ability to cross-examine the State's witnesses about information regarding potential suspects that was developed during thecourse of the investigation. The State, then, would be able to introduce evidence as to why those suspects had been excluded as potential suspects.

During trial, before the testimony of Candace Mercer, a childhood friend of the victim, the State again orally moved to exclude testimony from Ms. Mercer regarding her having allegedly seen the victim and Spencer together shortly before her disappearance. Harris proffered that Ms. Mercer, when interviewed in either late 2016 or early 2017 by defense counsel, indicated that she may have seen Spencer in the victim's "neighborhood right around the time she disappeared." The State disagreed, contending that Ms. Mercer informed prosecutors that she "had no idea" when she had seen the victim with Spencer.

Both defense counsel and the prosecutor, however, also informed the trial judge that Ms. Mercer had never mentioned Spencer to the police during the initial investigation, proffering a two-page police report of her interview conducted in 1996 in which no mention was made of Spencer. The trial judge granted the State's motion to exclude the testimony, reasoning that, because Ms. Mercer never told anyone that she had seen the victim and Spencer together in October 1996, a statement elicited twenty-one years later was "too far removed":

The first time that [Spencer] comes up is 21 years afterwards. She says, yes, she thinks she saw him about that time, and now she's expected to testify that she doesn't. I think it's too far removed. If there was any mention whatsoever [sic] in the report of Mr. Spencer back at that time, I may have let her testify to that; there's not.

Furthermore, the State also sought to exclude testimony from Thomas Chase, the former head of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Frederick City Police Department, recounting the statement he made to a local newspaper in which he said thatSpencer could not be ruled out as a suspect in the rape and murder of the victim.² The trial judge denied the State's motion, and Mr. Chase later read his statement to the jury. Mr. Chase, however, testified that he did not believe Spencer to ever be a suspect, and that if he had "not gotten" the call from the reporter, he "wouldn't have thought of Spencer" as a suspect; his goal was merely to provide "[t]ruthful information."

Harris contends that the evidence regarding Elmer Spencer "was not speculative or remote" because it tended to demonstrate that Spencer raped and murdered the victim, and as such, the trial court committed reversible error when it granted the State's motion in limine.³ Harris avers that the evidence related to Spencer did more than "cast a bare suspicion" of his culpability because the acts underlying Spencer's assault conviction were similar to the acts underlying the charges with which Harris had faced, both incidents occurred in Frederick around the same time and Spencer had an opportunity to commit the crime because he was not incarcerated at the time of the victim's disappearance.

The State, conversely, argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence regarding Spencer because the evidence was irrelevant as it"supported only a conjectural inference that Spencer committed the crime for which Harris was on trial, and even if minimally relevant, its significant potential for unfair prejudice warranted exclusion under Maryland Rule 5-403."

"Although the right of a defendant in a criminal trial to present witnesses in his defense is a critical right, it is not absolute." Taneja v. State, 231 Md. App. 1, 10 (2016), cert. denied, 452 Md. 549 (2017) (citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 407-10, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988)). The accused may not offer testimony that is "incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence." Id. (quoting Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798). The admissibility of "evidence that someone other than the defendant committed other crimes or bad acts," Allen v. State, 440 Md. 643, 664 (2014) (internal citation omitted), is "subject, however, to two paramount rules of evidence, embodied both in case law and in Maryland Rules 5-402 and 5-403," Smith v. State, 371 Md. 496, 504 (2002); Muhammad v. State, 177 Md. App. 188, 274 (2007).

"Relevant evidence" is evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Md. Rule 5-401. "[A]n item of evidence can be relevant only when, through proper analysis and reasoning, it is related logically to a matter at issue in the case, i.e., one that is properly provable in the case." Taneja, 231 Md. App. at 11 (emphasis in original) (quoting Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580, 591 (2000)). Relevant evidence is admissible, while evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Md. Rule 5-402. Although relevant, a trial judge may exclude evidence "if its probative value issubstantially outweighed by the danger of unfair...