Harris v. Univ. of Mass. Lowell

43 F.4th 187

Hunter HARRIS ; Cora Cluett, Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS LOWELL; Jacqueline Moloney; University of Massachusetts Boston; Marcelo Suárez-Orozco; Shawn De Veau, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 21-1770

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

August 4, 2022

Ryan McLane, with whom McLane & McLane, LLC was on brief, for appellants.

Richard S. Weitzel, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Christine Fimognari, Assistant Attorney General, were on brief, for appellees.

Before Barron, Chief Judge, Selya and Howard, Circuit Judges.

Howard, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a section 1983 suit filed by two college students against their now-former universities and university officials. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the students' complaint lodged constitutional challenges to the universities' COVID-19 vaccination policies, which require all students either to be vaccinated or to obtain an exemption in order to be allowed on campus. The students appeal from the district court's order denying their motion for preliminary injunction and dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In the period since judgment was entered below, however, both students have disenrolled from the universities—one by transfer, and one by graduation. Finding, as we do, that the students' claims are now moot, we dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits.

I.

This action began in July 2021, when Hunter Harris, then a rising junior attending the University of Massachusetts, Lowell ("UMass Lowell"), and Cora Cluett, then a rising senior attending the University of Massachusetts, Boston ("UMass Boston"), jointly filed individual claims for prospective relief against their universities and several university officials (collectively, "UMass"). Specifically, the students' complaint alleged that the universities' recently implemented COVID-19 vaccination policies violated their Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights. Cluett also separately alleged that UMass Boston and its named officials violated her First Amendment right to free exercise of religion by denying her request for a religious exemption from the vaccination requirement.¹ Contemporaneously with filing their complaint, the students moved for a preliminary injunction to block the universities from enforcing the policies against them for the fall 2021 semester.

The challenged policies were essentially the same in all relevant respects. Each was announced in April 2021 and effective for the following fall semester. UMass Boston, for one, "require[d] vaccinations for all UMass Boston students ... coming to campus, or physically accessing campus resources for the fall semester, and [who] wish[ed] to live, learn and/or conduct research on campus."² The announcement further explained that the university's officials had determined that the plan for "widespread immunization" was "[o]ne of the critical factors" and a "key component" of its "plan[ ] for a return to campus [in the] fall," finding that "vaccination is the most effective way to stop the spread of the virus." It further stated that the university would "accommodate medical, disability, and religious exemptions."

In response to this announcement, Cluett submitted a written request for a religious exemption on the ground that the available "vaccinations [were] in direct conflict with [her] sincerely held religious beliefs." Her initial request was denied by a review committee. She later appealed to the school's Interim Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs, defendant Shawn DeVeau, and provided additional explanation for her faith-based objection. Days later, DeVeau denied Cluett's appeal, explaining that he understood her to be Roman Catholic and that, based on his research, receiving the vaccine would not violate the tenets of the Catholic faith. He further explained that she could opt to unregister for in-person classes for the upcoming semester to avoid the vaccine requirement.

UMass Lowell's policy "require[d] all residential and commuter students" not qualifying for an exemption³ "to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 prior to the beginning of the fall semester to live, learn or visit any UMass Lowell campus or property."⁴ According to the announcement, the university "ma[de] this decision based on widely anticipated additional state and federal public health guidelines in the coming months [and] ample vaccine availability," and its "strong[ ] belie[f]" that vaccination is the "most effective tool to return to ... pre-pandemic campus life." The announcement further linked to a "Frequently Asked Questions" page, which provided additional details on the policy and available vaccines.⁵ Among other things, this page explained that students who take "all [ ] classes online and never intend to be on the UMass Lowell[ ] campus" need not be vaccinated.

In August 2021, the district court denied the students' motion for preliminary injunction and granted UMass's motion to dismiss all claims. See Harris v. Univ. Mass., Lowell, 557 F. Supp. 3d 304 (D. Mass. 2021). The students filed this timely appeal. During its pendency, the students remotely completed classes at their respective schools through the end of the fall 2021 semester. In January 2022, Harris transferred from UMass Lowell to the University of South Carolina, where he apparently remains enrolled. Cluett completed her degree at UMass Boston through "remote learning" and received her diploma on May 31, 2022.

II.

We begin and end our review by considering whether the students' claims are moot.⁶ UMass contends that they are,⁷ now that Harris is no longer enrolled at UMass Lowell and Cluett has graduated from UMass Boston. In other words, because neither student is currently subject to the universities' vaccination policies, UMass argues that neither student would benefit from the exclusively prospective relief sought in the complaint. We agree that the students' claims are moot, and further conclude that they are not otherwise justiciable under any exception to the mootness doctrine. Accordingly, we must dismiss this appeal.

A.

Because Article III restricts our jurisdiction to "Cases" and "Controversies," U.S. Const. art. III § 2, "a suit becomes moot[ ] ‘when the issues presented are no longer "live" or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’ " See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172, 133 S.Ct. 1017, 185 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91, 133 S.Ct. 721, 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013) ); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) ("To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’ " (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975) )). "A party can have no legally cognizable interest in the outcome of a case if the court is not capable of providing any relief which will redress the alleged injury." Gulf of Me. Fishermen's All. v. Daley, 292 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 2002). This is true "[n]o matter how vehemently the parties continue to dispute the lawfulness of the conduct that precipitated the lawsuit." Already, LLC, 568 U.S. at 91, 133 S.Ct. 721. "Thus, ‘if an event occurs while a case is pending ... that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party, the [action] must be dismissed.’ " Gulf of Me. Fishermen's All., 292 F.3d at 88 (alterations in original) (quoting Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) ). "Unless an exception to the doctrine applies, to do otherwise would be to render an advisory opinion, which Article III prohibits." Pietrangelo v. Sununu, 15 F.4th 103, 105 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2013) ).

Here, the students' claims for injunctive relief are inescapably moot because the universities' vaccination policies no longer apply to them. Cluett has graduated from UMass Boston and Harris is no longer enrolled at UMass Lowell. Thus, there is simply "no ongoing conduct to enjoin" presently affecting either student. See Bos. Bit Labs, Inc. v. Baker, 11 F.4th 3, 9 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Town of Portsmouth v. Lewis, 813 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2016) ). Where, as here, "challenged measures [no longer] adversely affect[ ] any plaintiff's primary conduct," injunctive relief is unavailable and the attendant claims become moot. See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055 ; Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 24 F.4th 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (dismissing students' challenges to COVID-19 vaccination requirement as moot after students either received religious exemptions or withdrew from the university).

The same goes for the students' claims for declaratory relief. As we have previously explained, requests for declaratory relief can only survive a mootness challenge where "the facts alleged ... ‘show that there is a substantial controversy ... of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’ " ACLU of Mass., 705 F.3d at 53-54 (second alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Preiser, 422 U.S. at 402, 95 S.Ct. 2330 ). Here, the students' alleged injuries are no longer "immediate or real" for the same reasons just discussed. See Bos. Bit Labs, Inc., 11 F.4th at 9 (quoting Lewis, 813 F.3d at 58 ). That is, Cluett has graduated and Harris has withdrawn and transferred. These changes in circumstance have extinguished any immediate and real effect that the challenged policies once had on the students during their enrollment in the UMass system. See Governor Wentworth Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. Hendrickson, 201 F....