Harris v. Wallace

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RONNIE L WHITE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This matter is before the Court on a remand from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding Petitioner Jim Harris, Jr.'s (“Harris”) claim that his plea counsel was ineffective. Harris maintains that his plea counsel was ineffective because she advised Harris that his state prison term would run concurrently with his federal prison term. For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds Harris's counsel was not ineffective and denies Harris's habeas petition.

BACKGROUND

The State of Missouri charged Petitioner Jim Harris, Jr. (“Harris”) with one count of Assault in the First Degree, one county of Armed Criminal Action, and one count of Robbery in the First Degree. On February 19, 2020, Harris was arrested and taken into custody of the Scott County Sheriff. Thereafter, Harris was “on loan” to federal custody, having been charged by Indictment in federal court on April 15, 2010. In federal court and prior to entering his State Court Plea, Harris pleaded guilty and received a 25-year (300 month) sentence in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri (“Federal Court Plea”). The District Court did not order Harris's federal sentence to run concurrent to his state sentence. Over two years later,

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Harris entered a plea of guilty (“State Court Plea”) to Assault in the First Degree in the Circuit Court of Scott County (“State Plea Court”). At the time of the plea, Harris was represented by an attorney (hereinafter, “Plea Counsel”).

Prior to Harris's State Court Plea, Plea Counsel and the state prosecuting attorney agreed to recommend a 15-year state sentence to run concurrent with Harris's federal sentence. Plea Counsel and Harris executed a Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty, affirming that the prosecuting attorney had promised to recommend a 15-year sentence to run concurrently with his federal sentence. At the State Court Plea, the State dismissed the Armed Criminal Action and Robbery in the First Degree charges and recommended a 15-year sentence for Armed Criminal Action and Robbery in the First Degree to run concurrent with Harris's federal sentence. Harris entered an Alford guilty plea, ^[1] and the State Plea Court sentenced Harris to 15 years in the Missouri Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) to run concurrent with his federal sentence.

Thereafter, Harris was sent to the MDOC. Harris filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035. Post-conviction Counsel (“PCR Counsel”) was appointed to represent Harris. PCR Counsel filed an amended 24.035 Motion (“PCR Motion”), which included a claim that Harris did not understand the consequences of the plea agreement, Plea Counsel coerced Harris into pleading guilty, and Harris did not understand the amount of his sentence.

The State Plea Court held a post-conviction evidentiary hearing (“PCR Hearing”), where

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Harris and Plea Counsel testified. Plea Counsel testified that Harris made the decision to plead guilty “[i]n light of the fact he was already serving a 25-year [federal] sentence, which would completely swallow the 15-year [state] sentence.” During the PCR Hearing, Harris was not asked about his consecutive sentences. The State Plea Court denied Harris's PCR Motion and found that his claims were refuted by the record in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.

Harris filed his Notice of Appeal and appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals to the Southern District. Harris argued he was abandoned by PCR Counsel because she pleaded a deficient amended motion and failed to present evidence on Harris's behalf. Harris stated PCR Counsel failed to raise the validity of the state court plea agreement and failed to allege it was breached or unfulfilled, based upon a mutual mistake or ineffective assistance of counsel. Harris asked the Court of Appeals to grant him a new evidentiary hearing or allow him to withdraw his plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed the state court's judgment and declined to review Harris's claim or grant him a new evidentiary hearing to develop the record because Harris had not previously raised these issues. (ECF No. 9-5).

On March 28, 2016, Harris filed his Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 1). After this Court initially denied Harris's claim for habeas relief, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded this action for a hearing on Harris's claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by advising Harris that his state prison term would run concurrently with his federal prison term. (ECF No. 26). On June 21, 2021 this Court held an evidentiary hearing on Harris's claim. The parties introduced live testimony of Harris, deposition transcripts from Harris's Plea and PCR counsel, and other relevant documents.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, a district court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(a). “[A]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). “‘A state court's decision is contrary to clearly established law if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result.'” Cagle v. Norris, 474 F.3d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003)). The Supreme Court has emphasized the phrase “Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, ” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions, ” and has cautioned that §2254(d)(1) “restricts the source of clearly established law to [the Supreme] Court's jurisprudence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). “A [s]tate court unreasonably applies” federal law when it “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case, ” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where

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it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. A state court decision may be considered an unreasonable determination “only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.” Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1)).

As to Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he “must show ‘that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.'” Strongv. Roper, 737 F.3d 506, 517 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Under this standard, counsel must “‘make reasonable investigations or ... make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.'” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). “‘Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential, indulging a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional judgment.'” Id. (quoting Bucklew v. Luebbers, 436 F.3d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006)). The Court's review is governed by both § 2254(d) and Strickland, meaning the Court must be “‘twice deferential: we apply a highly deferential review to the state court decision; the state court, in turn, is highly deferential to the judgments of trial counsel.'” Strong, 737 F.3d at 517 (quoting Nooner v. Norris, 402 F.3d 801, 808 (8th Cir.2005)); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (stressing the difficulty of overcoming both § 2254(d) and Strickland “when the two apply in tandem”); Forrest v. Steele, 764 F.3d 848, 853 (8th Cir. 2014) (same).

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Default

As stated, Harris claims that his plea counsel was ineffective in that he pleaded guilty to a state assault charge with the understanding that his 15-year state sentence would run concurrent with his then-25-year federal sentence. The parties agree that Harris did not raise this issue during

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post-conviction review.

“Ordinarily, a federal court reviewing a state conviction in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding may consider only those claims which the petitioner has presented to the state court in accordance with state procedural rules.” Arnold v. Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Beaulieu v. Minnesota, 583 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2009)); see Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012) (“[A] federal court will not review the merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule.”); Kemp v. Kelley, 924 F.3d 489, 499 (8th Cir. 2019). It is undisputed that the constitutional claim at issue here is procedurally defaulted because Harris's state...