Hart v. Carver

1

KATHRYN HART, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WILLIE EDWARD TAYLOR CARVER, Defendant.

No. 1:23-cv-03499-JRR

United States District Court, D. Maryland

September 3, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Julie R. Rubin United States District Judge.

This matter comes before the court on Defendant Willie Edward Taylor Carver's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 16; the “Motion to Dismiss.”) The court also has before it Plaintiffs Kathryn Hart and Andrew Hart's “Motion to Strike (FRCP 12(f)) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to Strike or Exclude Matters Not in the Record from Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to Convert the Motion into a Motion for Summary Judgment and Permit the Parties to Conduct Discovery (FRCP 12(d)).” (ECF No. 18; the “Motion to Strike.”) The court has reviewed all papers. No hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted for lack of personal jurisdiction. I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are residents of Carroll County, Maryland. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.) Defendant is a resident of Kentucky and works at the University of Kentucky. Id. ¶ 2. The instant case arises from the following social media post by Defendant on X (formerly, Twitter) directed, according to the Complaint, to Plaintiffs Kathryn and Andrew Hart:

Just because y'all wanna be in a cult doesn't mean we have to be in one with you. You can act like Puritan Martyrs [sic] to justify your unresolved shame about your secret lesbian threesomes. Just leave the rest of us out of it.

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 2.)

In response to this post, Plaintiffs initiated the instant action asserting three privacy torts and a claim for defamation: Defamation (Count I); Unreasonable Publicity Given to a Private Life (Count II); Intrusion Upon Seclusion (Count III); False Light (Count IV). (ECF No. 1 at 1-4.) Plaintiffs allege Defendant's “tweet” contains four defamatory statements about Plaintiffs: (1) Plaintiffs engage in marital infidelity; (2) Plaintiffs are members of a cult; (3) Plaintiffs engage in sexual threesomes; and (4) Plaintiffs are gay. Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs allege the defamatory statements were “published to thousands of residents in Carroll County Maryland and in other parts of Maryland, many of whom know or know of, Mrs. and Mr. Hart.” Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs allege that the defamatory statements have injured their reputations; constitute per se defamation that Defendant knew the statements were false when made, or he recklessly disregarded the truth; and Defendant was negligent for not investigating the veracity of his statements before publishing them. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 6 7.) For their alleged harms, Plaintiffs demand compensatory damages in excess of $75,000.00, punitive damages in excess of $75,000.00, “plus the costs of this suit.” Id. at 4.

Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Specifically, Defendant argues the Complaint fails to allege a basis for personal jurisdiction under Maryland's long-arm statute (as required), and that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants. (ECF No. 16-1 at 2-3.) In the alternative, Defendant argues per Rule 12(b)(6) that the Complaint fails to state a claim. Id. at 12-23. In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Strike, asserting that the Motion to Dismiss must be struck because it contains factual allegations not in the Complaint; alternatively, Plaintiffs ask the court to convert the Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(d), and (it seems) also to permit the parties to conduct discovery. (ECF No. 18 at 2.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)

“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of personal jurisdiction challenges a court's authority to exercise its jurisdiction over the moving party.” Arkansas Nursing Home Acquisition, LLC v. CFG Cmty. Bank, 460 F.Supp.3d 621, 63536 (D. Md. 2020) (citing Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)). “The jurisdictional question is ‘one for the judge, with the burden on the plaintiff ultimately to prove the existence of a ground for jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.'” Id. (quoting Combs, 886 F.2d at 676).

“The plaintiff's burden in establishing jurisdiction varies according to the posture of a case and the evidence that has been presented to the court.” Grayson v. Anderson, 816 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2016). “[W]hen the court addresses the personal jurisdiction question by reviewing only the parties' motion papers, affidavits attached to the motion, supporting legal memoranda, and the allegations in the complaint, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to survive the jurisdictional challenge.” Id. at 268. Importantly, “[i]n deciding whether the plaintiff has proved aprimafacie case of personal jurisdiction, the district court must draw all reasonable inferences arising from the proof, and resolve all factual disputes, in the plaintiff's favor.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1993).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to order stricken from any pleading “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). “Rule 12(f) motions are disfavored and ‘generally will be not granted [for immateriality] unless the challenged allegations have no possible or logical connection to the subject matter of the controversy and may cause some form of significant prejudice to a party.'” Fitchett v. Spartech, LLC, 634 F.Supp.3d 241, 243 (D. Md. 2022) (quoting Gilman & Bedigian, LLC v. Sackett, 337 F.R.D. 113, 117 (D. Md. 2020)). “Nevertheless, motions to strike will be granted when the movant meets its burden of proving that the challenged material is immaterial and prejudicial.” Id. (citing Chapman v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Civ. No. 3:09-37RJC, 2009 WL 1652463, at *3 (W.D. N.C. June 11, 2009)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike (ECF No. 18)

Plaintiffs argue that the Motion to Dismiss “must be stricken en toto” because it contains factual allegations not in the Complaint. (ECF No. 18 at 2.) Rule 12(f) applies to pleadings, not papers. The Motion to Dismiss is not a pleading; it is a paper. The Motion to Strike is, therefore, denied. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f); Agbara v. Prince George's Cnty. Pub. Sch., No. TJS-20-0306, 2020 WL 7425298, at *11 (D. Md. Dec. 18, 2020) (denying motion to strike opposition briefs and affidavits because they are not pleadings), aff'd, No. 21-1029, 2022 WL 683362 (4th Cir. Mar. 8, 2022) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f)); Bracey v. Horry Cty. Council, No. 4:17-399-RBH-TER, 2017 WL 5256895, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 13, 2017) (“Rule 12(f) motions apply to pleadings only and are not available to strike material contained in motions.”); Hardin v. Belmont Textile Mach. Co., No. 3:05-CV-492-M, 2010 WL 2293406, at *3 (W.D. N.C. June 7, 2010) (“Plaintiff's motion to strike is denied because it seeks to strike a filing other than a pleading.”).

With regard to Plaintiffs' alternative request that the court construe the Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment per Rule 12(d) (and allow or direct the parties to engage in discovery), Plaintiffs misconstrue the operable rules. Plaintiffs are correct that, “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). And “[p]ursuant to Rule 12(d), the Court has discretion to determine whether to accept evidence outside the pleadings, and thus convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion.” Coleman v. Calvert Cnty., No. GJH-15-920, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130420, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 22, 2016) (citations omitted). Importantly, however, on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, as the court has before it, the court may consider “the complaint, motion papers, affidavits, and other supporting legal memoranda.” See Arkansas, supra. Because the court determines herein that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant under Rule 12(b)(2), the court declines to reach the balance of the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs' alternative request that the court convert the Motion to Dismiss into a Rule 56 motion (per Rule 12(d)) is, therefore, denied.

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (ECF No. 16)^[1]

“The requirement that the court have personal jurisdiction . . . springs not from Article III of the Constitution, but from the Due Process Clause.” Fidrych v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 952 F.3d 124, 131 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)). “Because the personal jurisdiction requirement ‘recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest, . . . the requirement may be waived by a defendant's ‘express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court.'” Id. (citing Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703.) “Absent consent, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause: valid service of process, as well as . . . minimum contacts with the forum so that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (quoting Hawkins v. i-TVDigitalis Tavkozlesi zrt., 935 F.3d 211, 228 (4th Cir. 2019)) (citations omitted). The nature and quantity of forum-state contacts required depends on whether the case involves the exercise of “specific” or “general” jurisdiction. Id.

A court may assert general jurisdiction...