Hart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

1

DANIELLE HART, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 21 Civ. 3104 (NSR) (AEK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

February 16, 2023

TO THE HONORABLE NELSON S. ROMAN, U.S.D.J.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ANDREW E. KRAUSE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Danielle Hart brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”), which denied her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). ECF No. 1. Currently pending before the Court are Plaintiff's motion, and the Commissioner's cross-motion, for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF Nos. 24 28. For the reasons that follow, I respectfully recommend that Plaintiff's motion (ECF No. 24) be GRANTED, the Commissioner's motion (ECF No. 28) be DENIED, and that this case be remanded for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On June 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, alleging November 15, 2014 as the onset date of her disability. AR 75.^[1] In her initial filing, Plaintiff claimed she was disabled due to bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”), Epstein-Barr virus, herniated discs in her neck and compound fracture, severe lower back pain, spinal stenosis, scoliosis, and depression. AR 180. After the Social Security Administration (the “SSA”) initially denied her claims on November 13, 2015, AR 90-95, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), AR 96-97. An administrative hearing was held on October 6, 2017 before ALJ Kieran McCormack, during which Plaintiff was represented by counsel. AR 29-73. On December 4, 2017, ALJ McCormack issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act from the alleged onset date of November 15, 2014 through September 30, 2015, Plaintiff's date last insured.^[2] AR 12-24. Plaintiff subsequently filed a request for review of that decision with the SSA's Appeals Council, AR 153-54, 247-56, and on September 13, 2018, the Appeals Council denied the request for review, AR 1-6. That made the ALJ's December 4, 2017 decision the final decision of the Commissioner.

On November 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit seeking judicial review of the December 4, 2017 ALJ decision. See Hart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-cv-10299 (PAE) (DCF) (S.D.N.Y.). After the filing of the administrative record and Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the parties entered into a stipulation agreeing to remand the matter to the SSA for further administrative proceedings; the court so-ordered the stipulation on November 15, 2019. AR 759-61. On May 6, 2020, the Appeals Council issued an order remanding the case to an ALJ. AR 762-767. In this order, the Appeals Council specified certain issues to be resolved by the ALJ. First, the Appeals Council explained that in the prior administrative proceeding, the record was not adequately developed as to Plaintiff's psychiatric condition, and indicated that the ALJ should seek to obtain treatment records from Plaintiff's treating psychotherapist. AR 764. Second, the Appeals Council observed that the decision did not contain an adequate evaluation of opinion evidence, in particular that the ALJ did not clearly explain why he accorded “little weight” to the opinion of a psychological consultative examiner. AR 765. Third, and finally, the Appeals Council directed the ALJ to further evaluate evidence related to Plaintiff's CTS and degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine. Id. The Appeals Council noted that “the record contains evidence reflecting positive Tinel's sign at the bilateral wrist; positive Phalen's and Durkan's carpal tunnel tests bilaterally; an abnormal electrodiagnostic study revealing severe bilateral sensorimotor demyelinating and axonal medium nerve neuropathy at the wrist; a diagnosis of severe bilateral carpal tunnel; and MRIs reflecting mild to moderate degenerative findings,” but that “the evidence was not adequately considered when evaluating the claimant's residual functional capacity.” Id.

Upon remand, Plaintiff participated in two additional administrative hearings before ALJ McCormack; Plaintiff was represented by counsel at both hearings. AR 655-69, 671-707. On December 9, 2020, the ALJ issued a second decision denying Plaintiff's claim for DIB. AR 62538. Plaintiff did not file written exceptions, and there was no Appeals Council review of the December 9, 2020 decision. Accordingly, the decision became final on February 8, 2021. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 404.984(d), 416.1484(d); Marchand v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-cv-3 252 (ENV), 2017 WL 2633511, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2017). The instant lawsuit seeking judicial review of ALJ McCormack's December 9, 2020 decision was filed on April 9, 2021. ECF No. 1.

B. Testimonial, Medical, Non-Medical, and Vocational Evidence

Both parties have provided summaries of the testimonial, medical, non-medical, and vocational evidence contained in the administrative record. See ECF No. 25 (“Pl.'s Mem.”) at 59; ECF No. 29 (“Def.'s Mem.”) at 2-6. Based on an independent and thorough examination of the record, the Court finds that the parties' summaries of the evidence are largely comprehensive and accurate. Accordingly, the Court adopts the factual background as set forth by the parties and discusses the evidence in the record in more detail to the extent necessary to determine the issues raised in this case. See, e.g., Banks v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-cv-929 (AJN) (SDA), 2020 WL 2768800, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2020), adopted by 2020 WL 2765686 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020).

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. Standard of Review

The scope of review in an appeal from a Social Security disability determination involves two levels of inquiry. First, the court must review the Commissioner's decision to assess whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards when determining that the plaintiff was not disabled. Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1999). “‘Failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal.'” Pollard v. Halter, 377 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984)).

Second, the court must decide whether the Commissioner's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003). “Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 106 (quotation marks omitted). The “substantial evidence” standard of review is “very deferential,” and it is not the function of the reviewing court “to determine de novo whether a plaintiff is disabled.” Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a decision by the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence, courts must “examine the entire record, including contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The substantial evidence standard means once an ALJ finds facts, [courts] can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). “‘If evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld.'” Id. (quoting McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014)).

B. Determining Disability

The Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An individual is disabled under the Act if he or she suffers from an impairment which is “of such severity that he [or she] is not only unable to do his [or her] previous work but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). “‘[W]ork which exists in the national economy' means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.” Id.

Regulations issued pursuant to the Act set forth a five-step process that the Commissioner must follow in determining whether a particular claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R § 404.1520(a)(4). The Commissioner first considers whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not disabled; if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the Commissioner proceeds to the second step, at which the Commissioner considers the medical severity of the claimant's impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A severe impairment is “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant suffers from any severe impairment, the Commissioner at step three must decide if the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; listed impairments are presumed severe enough to render an individual disabled, and the criteria for each listing are found in Appendix 1 to Part 404, Subpart P of the SSA regulations. 20 C.F.R §...