Hart v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.

1

STEPHON JARVIS HART, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

No. 8:20-cv-1430-TPB-CPT

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

May 4, 2023

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

TOM BARBER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Stephon Jarvis Hart, a Florida prisoner, timely filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Having considered the petition Respondent's response in opposition (Doc. 9), and Hart's reply (Doc. 12), the Court DENIES the petition.

Procedural History

Hart was charged in Sarasota County with armed home invasion robbery, grand theft of a motor vehicle, aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. (Doc. 92, Ex. 2, pp. 16-18.) He pled nolo contendere to all charges except aggravated assault, which the State later nolle prossed. (Id., pp. 56, 117.) The state trial court sentenced Hart to concurrent terms of (1) life imprisonment with a ten-year mandatory minimum on the home invasion count, (2) five years' imprisonment on the grand theft count, and (3) fifteen years' imprisonment with a three-year mandatory minimum on the felon-in-possession count. (Id., pp. 98-105.) After sentencing, Hart moved to withdraw his plea, and the trial court denied the motion following an evidentiary hearing. (Id., Ex. 12, pp. 193-220.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the convictions and sentences. (Id., Ex. 8.)

Hart then filed a motion to reduce sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). (Id., Ex. 10.) The state court denied the motion-a ruling Hart did not appeal. (Id., Ex. 11.) Next, Hart filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Id., Ex. 12, pp. 29-43.) Following an evidentiary hearing, the state postconviction court denied relief on all claims, and the state appellate court affirmed. (Id., pp. 370-89; Id., Ex. 17.)

This federal habeas petition followed. (Doc. 1.) In his petition Hart raises two grounds for relief: (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by advising him to enter an open plea, and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him that he would receive credit for time served if he accepted the State's forty-year plea offer. (Id., pp. 5-8.)

Factual Background^[1]

On December 4, 2008, Hart participated in an armed robbery of a jewelry store in Fort Myers. After the robbery, Hart and the other suspects led police on a high-speed car chase. The suspects' vehicle came to a stop on Interstate 75 in North Port after police successfully deployed stop sticks.

Hart and Corey Lumpkin fled on foot; the other suspects remained in the car. After jumping a fence, Hart broke into a house by smashing a bedroom window with his handgun. The residents-Richard Corrado, his fiancee, and their daughter-were sleeping in the living room. Corrado heard the noise and got up. Hart approached Corrado, pointed the gun at his face, and demanded the keys to his car. Corrado handed the keys to Hart, who ran out the front door. Then Lumpkin came through the bedroom window, asked Corrado where Hart had gone, and followed Hart out.

Once outside the house, Hart and Lumpkin entered Corrado's car. Before they could drive off, law enforcement arrived. Lumpkin fled on foot, and Hart allegedly ran in front of the car and pointed his gun at an officer. In response, the officer shot Hart two times. Lumpkin was apprehended a few minutes later.

As noted above, Hart was charged with, among other crimes, home invasion robbery with a firearm.^[2] That offense carried a mandatory minimum of ten years' imprisonment and a maximum penalty of life in prison. Fla. Stat. §§ 812.135(2)(a), 775.087(2)(a)(1).

In December 2009, trial counsel sent Hart a letter “to follow up on [their] jail meeting.” (Doc. 9-2, Ex. 12 pp. 391-92.) Counsel explained that the home invasion charge “carrie[d] a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence if [Hart was] found to have been in ‘actual possession' of a firearm,” and that “the judge could sentence [him] to life.” (Id., p. 391.) Counsel also noted that Hart had rejected the State's plea offer of forty years' imprisonment. Thus, according to counsel, Hart had two options: “open plea to the court, which would allow the judge to decide [the] sentence, or [] go to trial.” (Id.) Counsel stated that he did not think Hart could “beat the home invasion or grand theft charges,” but that he would begin preparing for trial while Hart “ponder[ed] his options.” (Id., pp. 391-92.) Finally, counsel elaborated on the “open plea” option:

One possibility would be to enter an open plea to the court on [the charges for home invasion robbery, grand theft, and felon-inpossession], but demand a trial on the aggravated assault charge. I think that the judge would give you a more lenient sentence on the home invasion charge if you entered a plea of no contest as opposed to being found guilty after forcing a trial. Again, the judge could give you life, but I think a 20-40 year sentence is possible. I don't think the judge will punish you for requiring a trial on the aggravated assault charge because we have a good defense.

(Id., p. 392.)

At the Rule 3.850 evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that the “dilemma” facing Hart was that the evidence against him was “overwhelming.” (Id., p. 287.) Counsel believed that “the most likely outcome” of a trial would be the judge “hammer[ing]” Hart by sentencing him to life in prison. (Id., p. 290.) As a result, counsel explained, “neither one of us wanted to go to trial and neither one of us wanted to plea[d] ¶ 40 years.” (Id., p. 287.) Additionally, counsel “begged and pleaded” with the prosecutor to accept a “20-year counteroffer,” but “she said no.” (Id.)

Counsel sent Hart another letter in March 2010. He said he “respect[ed] Hart's unwillingness to take an unreasonable plea offer such as the forty year offer that is currently on the table.” (Id., Ex. 2, p. 124.) Counsel explained, however, that Hart was “captured on video, there were a number of witnesses to the incident, and there [was] no doubt about [his] identity because [he was] taken into custody at the scene.” (Id.) Counsel then advised Hart that “the absolute wisest course of action” would be to

[o]pen plea to all the charges but the aggravated assault, which we'll fight at trial. In my experience, the judge will be far more lenient on you if you plea than if you force a trial and are convicted. In her mind, by entering a plea you are “taking responsibility for your actions” and saving the state significant time and expense, and for that reason deserve leniency. Furthermore, if you open plea, you'll only be scored about ten years in prison. While the judge may go higher than that, I would be shocked if she tripled that or quadrupled that as she would almost surely do after a conviction at trial.

(Id., p. 125.)

At the Rule 3.850 evidentiary hearing, counsel pointed to several “mitigating factors” that led him to believe the judge “wouldn't give [Hart] the maximum sentence” if he entered an open plea. (Id., Ex. 12, pp. 290-91.) The mitigating factors included (1) the victims' testimony that Hart appeared to be “apologetic” and “scared” during the incident, (2) Hart's “relatively modest criminal background,” which included no prior convictions for violent offenses, and (3) Hart's willingness to “take responsibility for the crime.” (Id.) In short, counsel believed that “on a spectrum of home invasion robberies,” Hart's case “was less egregious than many [he'd] seen.” (Id., p. 290.)

Hart ultimately chose to enter an open plea to all charges except aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. He signed an “Acknowledgment and Waiver of Rights” form indicating that (1) he faced a “maximum penalty” of “life” and a “minimum mandatory penalty” of ten years in prison, (2) there was “no agreement with [the] State” on sentencing, and (3) nobody had “made any promises or guarantees” to him in connection with the plea. (Id., Ex. 2, p. 62.)

The trial court discussed these matters with Hart during the plea colloquy:

THE COURT: The maximum penalty if I were to sentence you to the maximum penalty -

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: - would be life. There's a minimum, mandatory for the firearm which is ten years. And I don't have any way around that right now -

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: - that I can see. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: So as far as I understand my hands might be tied on that issue.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

...

THE COURT: Do you understand that I may do something that makes all the parties unhappy[?]

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: I may do something totally out of whatever either side asks for so sentencing at this point is totally unknown. And I don't know anything about you, so you're completely a blank slate to me.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

... THE COURT: Has anybody put any pressure on you to enter this plea?

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.

THE COURT: Has anybody threatened you[?]

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.

THE COURT: Has anybody made any promises to you whatsoever in order to get you to enter this plea[?]

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. I find that there is a factual basis for the plea, that it's freely and voluntarily made.

(Id., Ex. 12, pp. 110-18.)

At sentencing, the prosecutor indicated that she was “seeking life.” (Id., Ex. 2, p. 228.) Hart's counsel sought a sentence of ten years in prison. He pointed to multiple “mitigators,” including that (1) the home invasion was “an unsophisticated spontaneous crime,” (2) Hart's encounter with Corrado, the victim, lasted “approximately ten seconds,” (3) Hart had “[n]o...