Hart v. State

260 Md. App. 491

310 A.3d 1157

Rodney Lopaz HART, Jr.

v.STATE of Maryland

No. 1015 September Term, 2022

Appellate Court of Maryland.

February 28, 2024

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Case No. CT210203X, Sean D. Wallace, Judge.

Argued by Tia L. Holmes, Asst. Public Defender (Natasha M. Dartgue, Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellant.

Argued by Derek Simmonsen, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Anthony G. Brown, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellee.

Argued before: Graeff, Arthur, Joseph M. Getty (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Arthur, J.

A jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County convicted appellant Rodney Lopaz Hart, Jr., of several offenses related to the theft of three automobiles. Hart has presented three questions on appeal, which we have reordered and reworded for clarity and concision:

I. Did the trial court err in denying a Batson¹ challenge where the prosecutor offered both a gender-based and a gender-neutral explanation for striking two prospective jurors?

II. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in ruling that the State did not commit a discovery violation when, on the evening before the trial began, it first disclosed a screenshot of a profile photo depicting Hart?

III. Did the trial court err in denying the defense’s motion to sever the three theft counts from each other?²

For the following reasons, we conclude that the court erred in denying a Batson challenge when the State expressly stated that it struck two jurors in part because of an impermissible consideration—their gender. Consequently, we must reverse the convictions and remand the case for a new trial. Because Hart will receive a new trial, we need not decide whether the court erred or abused its discretion in concluding that the State did not commit a discovery violation. For guidance on remand, we address the question of severance and hold that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to sever.

FACTS

During the. jury-selection, process, Hart asserted a Batson challenge after the State struck two men. In response, the State proffered two reasons for the strikes. First, the State asserted that it struck one of the men because he had been sleeping and the other because it had no information about him. Second, the State asserted that it wanted to empanel a gender-diverse jury—i.e., it struck the jurors because they were men.³ The circuit court denied the challenge.

On the merits, the State alleged that, between the end of March and the beginning of April 2020, Hart stole three cars that had been advertised for sale through online marketplace apps. The defense contended that Hart was the victim of misidentification. The following facts were elicited:

Robert Ciecur testified that on March 27, 2020, he met a man named "Lorenzo," who was wearing a yellow jacket, at the College Bark Metro Station. Lorenzo had messaged Ciecur earlier about buying a BMW 528 that he had advertised for sale on the OfferUp app. Ciecur testified that Lorenzo asked him to get out of the car so that he could test-drive it. When Ciecur did so, Lorenzo drove off and did not return.

Ciecur identified Hart in court as Lorenzo. Over Hart’s objection, the State showed Ciecur a screenshot of a user profile on the app Letgo. Ciecur identified the person in the screenshot as the thief. The screenshot shows a man wearing glasses, a yellow jacket with the hood pulled up, and an N95-style mask.

Maurice Howard testified that on March 29, 2020, he met a man named "Lorenzo," who was wearing a hooded, yellow jacket and glasses, on Forestville Road in Prince George’s County. Lorenzo had messaged Howard earlier about buying a 2004 Mercedes Benz C55 that he had advertised for sale on either the OfferUp or Facebook Marketplace app. As the two conversed outside the running car, Lorenzo asked if he could test-drive it. After obtaining Howard’s permission, Lorenzo got into the car and drove off.

Howard could not identify Hart as Lorenzo. On cross-examination, the defense established that the police had shown Howard a photographic array, but that he had been unable to identify the thief.

Fawad Ahmed testified that, in late March or the beginning of April 2020, he met a man named "Lorenzo" in Vienna, Virginia. Lorenzo had messaged Ahmed about buying the 2016 Audi A6 that Ahmed had advertised for sale on the. Letgo app. Lorenzo asked about trunk space. As Ahmed moved some items around in the trunk, Lorenzo got into the driver’s seat and drove off. Ahmed identified Hart in court as the person who stole his car. In addition, when Ahmed was shown the screenshot that was also shown to Ciecur, he testified that the person in the screenshot was Lorenzo.

On April 10, 2020, Detective Donnell Thomas of the Prince George’s County Police Department observed Hart driving an Audi with a registration plate that did not belong on it. The detective stopped the car and discovered that it had-the same vehicle identification number as Ahmed’s car. Hart was arrested.

After hearing the evidence, a jury convicted Hart of: (1) three counts of theft of property valued between $1,500 and $25,000; (2) three counts of unauthorized removal of a motor vehicle; (3) two counts of unauthorized taking of a motor vehicle;⁴ and (4) three counts of rogue and vagabond as to a motor vehicle. After merging the lesser-included offenses into the theft convictions, the court sentenced Hart to an aggregate of 15 years of imprisonment, suspended all but three years, and placed him on probation for five years after his release from prison.

Hart filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Batson Violation

[1, 2] In the landmark case of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Court held that exercising a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the Court extended Batson to peremptory challenges on the basis of gender.⁵ In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991), a plurality of the Court suggested that Batson would also apply to peremptory challenges on the basis of ethnicity. Accord Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522, 529-30, 616 A.2d 356 (1992); see Hernandez v. State, 357 Md. 204, 231, 742 A.2d 952 (1999). "Excusing a juror on any of those bases violates both the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the potential juror’s ‘right not to be excluded on an impermissible discriminatory basis.’ " Ray-Simmons v. State, 446 Md. 429, 435, 132 A.3d 275 (2016) (quoting Edmonds v. State, 372 Md. 314, 329, 812 A.2d 1034 (2002)). Both the prosecution and the defense may invoke Batson. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992).

[3, 4] Batson and its progeny have three underlying purposes: 1) to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial; 2) to protect a potential juror’s right not to be excluded from serving on a jury because of a discriminatory purpose; and 3) to preserve public confidence in the judicial system. Edmonds v. State, 372 Md. at 329, 812 A.2d 1034 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 404-10, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991)); accord Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2242, 204 L.Ed.2d 638 (2019) (stating that, "[b]y taking steps to eradicate racial discrimination from the jury selection process, Batson sought to protect the rights of defendants and jurors, and to enhance public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system"). Under the Equal Protection Clause, even a single instance of unlawful discrimination against a prospective juror is impermissible. See, e.g., Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 139 S. Ct. at 2244.

[5] When a party makes a Batson challenge, a court typically employs a three-step process.

[6, 7] At step one, the party challenging the strike "must make a prima facie showing—produce some evidence—that the opposing party’s peremptory challenge to a prospective juror was exercised on one or more of the constitutionally prohibited bases," Ray-Simmona v. State, 446 Md. 429, 436, 132 A.3d 275 (2016) (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam)). A party can make a prima facie case by showing " ‘that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ " Id. (quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005)). A pattern of strikes against jurors of a particular race, gender, or ethnicity " ‘might give rise to or support or refute the requisite showing.’ " Id. (quoting Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 60-61, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988)).

[8, 9] "If the objecting party satisfies that preliminary burden, the court proceeds to step two[.]" Id. There, " ‘the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with’ an explanation for the strike that is neutral as to race, gender, and ethnicity." Id. (quoting Purkett v. Elem,. 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769). The explanation "must be neutral, ‘but it does not have to be persuasive or plausible.’ " Id. (quoting Edmonds v. State, 372 Md. at 330, 812 A.2d 1034); see Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769. " ‘Any reason offered will be deemed [neutral] unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation.’ " Ray-Simmons v. State, 446 Md. at 436, 132 A.3d 275 (quoting Edmonds v. State, 372 Md. at 330, 812 A.2d 1034); see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859; see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. at 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (stating that, "[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed [neutral]"). "[T]he question of whether the challenger has made a prima facie case under step one becomes moot if the striking party offers an...