Hartfiel v. City of Eastpointe

333 Mich.App. 438

960 N.W.2d 174

Eric M. HARTFIEL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.CITY OF EASTPOINTE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 348642

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted August 12, 2020, at Detroit.

Decided September 3, 2020, 9:00 a.m.

Mark K. Wasvary, PC (by Mark K. Wasvary, Rochester) for plaintiff.

Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, PLC, Livonia (by Douglas J. Curlew ) for defendant.

Before: Gleicher, P.J., and Stephens and Cameron, JJ.

Stephens, J. Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court order granting defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter arises from defendant's handling of charges incurred for water and sewer services provided to plaintiff's rental properties. Plaintiff owned two rental properties in the city of Eastpointe: 23126 Beechwood (the Beechwood Property) and 22438 Linwood (the Linwood Property). Defendant's finance director, Randall Blum, established procedures for transferring delinquent water charges from a landlord to a tenant. Pursuant to those procedures, a landlord was required to submit a copy of the lease agreement along with a water affidavit stating that the tenant was responsible for paying the water charges. Subsequent to a landlord's filing both the lease and affidavit, tenants were required to file a security deposit and complete an "ACH Payment Authorization Agreement" to allow automatic withdrawal of the water payment from the tenant's bank account. The written procedures provided that if water service was terminated for nonpayment, the tenant's security deposit was forfeited and the responsibility for all subsequent water and sewer charges became the responsibility of the landlord. Those subsequent water and sewer charges then became a lien against the property. The procedures required that each new leasehold was subject to the same procedures as the first.

Plaintiff initially entered into a one-year lease on the Linwood Property with Francis Eugene Sauro and Sheri Lou Sauro beginning October 1, 2013, with the tenants assuming responsibility for water and sewer charges. On October 3, 2013, plaintiff and Francis executed a water affidavit indicating that the lease agreement made the Sauros responsible for all charges incurred for water during the term of the lease, which had an expiration date of October 1, 2014. Plaintiff and the Sauros subsequently renewed their lease agreement twice with one-year leasing terminating on October 1, 2015, and October 1, 2016. No new water affidavits were filed for the Linwood Property. Defendant issued several shutoff notices between April 2014 and April 2015 due to nonpayment. Defendant's employee verbally told plaintiff sometime between October 2015 and January 2016 that the water affidavit had been voided due to the Sauros’ poor payment history. On June 2, 2016, delinquent charges for unpaid April and May 2016 bills for service to the Linwood Property in the amount of $129.11 were added to plaintiff's tax bill.

Plaintiff leased the Beechwood Property to Tanya Smith and Williams Woodson for a one-year term beginning April 1, 2015. On March 25, 2015, plaintiff, Smith, and Woodson executed a water affidavit indicating that their lease agreement made Smith and Woodson responsible for all charges for water incurred during the term of the lease. The water affidavit indicated that the lease expired on April 1, 2016. Defendant voided the 2015 water affidavit for Beechwood on October 21, 2015, after multiple attempts to automatically withdraw water payments failed. Plaintiff renewed his lease agreement with Smith and Woodson for two additional one-year terms, the first ending April 1, 2017, and the last ending April 1, 2018. Plaintiff claims to have filed a copy of the 2016 lease with defendant. Defendant claims no record of this filing. It is, however, uncontroverted that when plaintiff attempted to file the 2017 lease it was returned to him via certified mail with a letter indicating that the municipality had no understanding of why it had been sent to it. The May 1, 2017 unpaid water bill of $77.02 was added to plaintiff's property tax bill for the year 2018.

On April 23, 2018, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against defendant, alleging causes of action for quiet title, slander of title, and writ of mandamus. In pertinent part, plaintiff alleged that defendant unlawfully claimed liens against the properties and added the unpaid water bills to the property tax assessments for his rental properties. Plaintiff asserted that defendant's liens were prohibited because he complied with the requirements of MCL 123.165 and MCL 141.121 for both rental properties.

On February 19, 2019, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). Relevant to this appeal, defendant argued that plaintiff's quiet-title claim was barred by his failure to comply with applicable statutes or defendant's procedures. In response to defendant's motion, plaintiff asked for summary disposition in his favor under MCR 2.116(I)(2) and argued that defendant's procedure for water affidavits included additional requirements to those set forth in MCL 141.121(3) and MCL 123.165. Plaintiff argued that defendant did not have the authority to impose such additional requirements. Therefore, because he was compliant with state law, plaintiff argued that defendant was prohibited from imposing liens on his properties. Plaintiff asserted that once water affidavits were filed, defendant's only remedy for nonpayment was to shut off services.

On April 9, 2019, the trial court issued an opinion and order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition. The court opined that plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory requirements of MCL 123.165 and MCL 141.121(3) that he file both a lease and water affidavit with defendant for each leasehold period in order to avoid liability for charges and a lien on the property. The court further determined that defendant was statutorily required to place liens on the Linwood and Beechwood properties as security for the collection of the water arrearages and that the placement of the liens on the tax rolls was proper. This appeal followed.

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition.¹ El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc. , 504 Mich. 152, 159, 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019). "When deciding a motion for summary disposition under [ MCR 2.116(C)(10) ], a court must consider in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties." Campbell v. Kovich , 273 Mich. App. 227, 229, 731 N.W.2d 112 (2006). Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lowrey v. LMPS & LMPJ, Inc. , 500 Mich. 1, 5, 890 N.W.2d 344 (2016). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." El-Khalil , 504 Mich. at 160, 934 N.W.2d 665 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

"Questions of law, including statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo."

Kuhlgert v. Mich. State Univ. , 328 Mich. App. 357, 371, 937 N.W.2d 716 (2019). This Court's primary goal in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature, as conveyed through the plain language of the statute. Hegadorn v. Dep't of Human Servs. Dir. , 503 Mich. 231, 245, 931 N.W.2d 571 (2019). "When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is not permitted and this Court must give the words their plain and ordinary meaning." Buckmaster v. Dep't of State , 327 Mich. App. 469, 475, 934 N.W.2d 59 (2019). "This Court must avoid interpreting a statute in a way that would make any part of it meaningless or nugatory." Maples v. Michigan , 328 Mich. App. 209, 218, 936 N.W.2d 857 (2019). In addition, "[w]hen two statutes cover the same general subject, they must be construed together to give reasonable effect to both, if at all possible." Buckmaster , 327 Mich. App. at 475, 934 N.W.2d 59 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of MCL 123.165 and MCL 141.121(3). We disagree.

MCL 123.165 pertains to municipal water and sewage liens. It provides:

The lien created by this act^{[2 ]} shall, after June 7, 1939, have priority over all other liens except taxes or special assessments whether or not the other liens accrued or were recorded before the accrual of the water or sewage system lien created by this act. However, this act shall not apply if a lease has been legally executed, containing a provision that the lessor shall not be liable for payment of water or sewage system bills accruing subsequent to the filing of the affidavit provided by this section. An affidavit with respect to the execution of a lease containing this provision shall be filed with the board, commission, or other official in charge of the water works system or sewage system, or both, and 20 days’ notice shall be given by the lessor of any cancellation, change in, or termination of the lease. The affidavit shall contain a notation of the expiration date of the lease. [Emphasis added.]

The second statutory provision, MCL 141.121(3), is from the Revenue Bond Act (the RBA), MCL 141.101 et seq. , and provides:

Charges for services furnished to a premises may be a lien on the premises, and those charges delinquent for 6 months or more may be certified annually to the proper tax assessing officer or agency who shall enter the lien on the next tax roll against the premises to which the services shall have been rendered, and the charges shall be collected and the lien shall be enforced in the same manner as provided for the collection of taxes assessed upon the roll and

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