Hashakimana v. Office of Recovery Servs.

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TITO HASHAKIMANA, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES et al, Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-00010-JNP-CMR

United States District Court, D. Utah

January 13, 2023

DISTRICT JUDGE JILL N. PARRISH

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

MAGISTRATE JUDGE CECILIA M. ROMERO UNITED STATES DISTRICT

This case is referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1)(B) (ECF 4). Before the court is Defendant Office of Recovery Services's (ORS or Defendant) Motion to Dismiss (Motion) (ECF 14) for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.^[1]Having carefully considered the relevant filings, the court find that oral argument is not necessary and will decide this matter based on the written memoranda. See DUCivR 7-1(g). For the reasons set forth herein the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the court GRANT Defendant's Motion (ECF 14) and dismiss Plaintiff's case without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Tito Hashakimana (Plaintiff or Mr. Hashakimana), proceeding pro se, filed his Complaint against ORS and Natisha Nicole Bitsinnie (Defendant Bitsinnie)^[2] on January 6, 2022 (Complaint) (ECF 1). In his Complaint, Mr. Hashakimana asks the court to issue an injunction in his favor “to protect” his property “from being seized or deprived by an administrative income withholding order” in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights (ECF 1 at 1). According to Mr. Hashakimana, the state's child support debt collection agency is a part of the executive branch and is “akin to executive imprisonment causing the dispossession of property without the required judgment by peers” (id. at 4). Mr. Hashakimana also alleges that the child support order against him violates his Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights by having his property seized without a warrant and that “equal protection of law requires this court to issue an injunction” (id. at 6-8). In its Motion, ORS attaches a copy of the Judgment of Paternity (ECF 14-1) to clarify this matter concerns a judgement of paternity for Plaintiff and Defendant Bitsinnie and that a support order requiring Plaintiff to pay child support beginning April 2019 was entered as of March 9, 2022.^[3]

The court received ORS's Motion on April 5, 2022. Mr. Hashakimana failed to file an appropriate Response to the Motion and the time to do so has expired. He did however file three different notices to the court on April 20, 2022: (1) a “Notice of Petition Write of Certiorari Writ of Mandamus Writ of Prohibition,” which appears to be a restatement of the claims alleged in the Complaint in that it asks for judicial review that the state child support enforcement is without judicial powers and there were constitutional violations (ECF 15); (2) a Notice for Non-Statutory Writ of Habeas Corpus where Plaintiff argues he is entitled to a trial, entitled to not be physically restrained, and makes other legal arguments relevant to his claims (ECF 16); and (3) a Notice to Court to Take Judicial Notice where Plaintiff cites to case law and Rules of Evidence arguing he is entitle to a writ of habeas corpus (ECF 17). None of these filings address any of the arguments raised in the Motion by the ORS. As such, despite considering them, the notices are not dispositive to the court's analysis of the Motion (ECF 15-17).

ORS moves to dismiss Plaintiff's case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) & (6) (ECF 13 at 1). ORS argues Mr. Hashakimana's case must be dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), because “Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine,” and because “Defendant is entitled to” immunity under the Eleventh Amendment (id. at 2). Separately, ORS argues that Mr. Hashakimana's Complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and because there “is a valid Utah court order” enforcing “a child support obligation” against Mr. Hashakimana (id.). Because the court agrees the case should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1), it will not address arguments under Rule 12(b)(6).

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal courts “are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction.” Gad v. Kan. State Univ., 787 F.3d 1032, 1035 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing Radil v. Sanborn W. Camps, Inc., 384 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004)). “The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006). Section 1331 provides federal question jurisdiction for cases arising under federal law, and Section 1332 provides diversity jurisdiction for cases involving diversity of citizenship between the parties and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

For federal question jurisdiction under § 1331, “the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint must establish one of two things: either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Firstenberg v. City of Santa Fe, 696 F.3d 1018, 1023 (10th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[J]urisdiction under § 1331 exists only where there is a ‘colorable' claim arising under federal law.” McKenzie v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Dist. Dir., 761 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006)).

To establish diversity jurisdiction under § 1332, “a party must show that complete diversity of citizenship exists between the adverse parties.” Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Symes v. Harris, 472 F.3d 754, 758 (10th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Complete diversity is lacking when any of the plaintiffs has the same residency as even a single defendant.” Id. The amount in controversy must also exceed $75,000. Id.

The court “must [also], sua sponte, satisfy itself of its power to adjudicate in every case and at every stage of the proceedings.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Narvaez, 149 F.3d 1269, 1271 (quoting Tafoya v. United States Department of Justice, 748 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1984)).

The Younger abstention doctrine arises from Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and prevents courts from exercising federal jurisdiction where there is a parallel pending state criminal proceeding. See Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013). The Younger abstention doctrine also applies to certain state civil proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 (1975), or proceedings implicating a state's interest in enforcing its courts orders and judgments, see Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13 (1987).

In undertaking this analysis, the court is mindful that Plaintiff is acting pro se and that his filings are liberally construed and held “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Still, a pro se plaintiff must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). For instance, a pro se plaintiff “still has the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110). Although the court must make some allowances for a pro se plaintiff's “failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements,” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110, the court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf,” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110). With these standards in mind, the court turns to Mr. Hashakimana's Complaint and ORS's Motion.

ANALYSIS

a. This court has Federal Question Jurisdiction as to ORS.

Defendant begins the Motion by arguing that the court is without the power to “exercise Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Petition” and Plaintiff's case should be dismissed due to a lack of diversity of citizenship (ECF 13 at 4). Although Defendant accurately asserts that the two requirements for the court to exercise diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiff's case are not alleged in the Complaint, diversity jurisdiction is not the only way this court could exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's case. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In fact, as far as the court understands Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff seems to focus his request for an injunction on a violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution (ECF 1 at 1). While it is not clear that Plaintiff specifically refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Complaint, the court concludes he appears to be seeking redress for alleged constitutional violations, at least against ORS, of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights pursuant to § 1983. Because Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged federal question jurisdiction for constitutional rights violations, Defendant's first argument that Plaintiff's case should be dismissed for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction fails as to ORS.

b. Plaintiff's Case Should Be Dismissed Under the Younger Abstention Doctrine.

For their second argument, Defendant relies on the Younger abstention doctrine, and argues that “a federal court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a case where there is an ongoing state action.” See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); (ECF 13 at 4). The court agrees the Younger abstention doctrine applies in this case. Under Tenth Circuit precedent, a district...