Haslam–James v. Lawrence

133 Conn.App. 321

35 A.3d 368

Katari HASLAM–JAMES

v.Kimberly LAWRENCE.

No. 32761.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 25, 2011.Decided Jan. 31, 2012.

Cecil J. Thomas, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Doris B. D'Ambrosio, West Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).

LAVINE, BEAR and MIHALAKOS, Js.

BEAR, J.

The plaintiff, Katari Haslam–James, appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendant, Kimberly Lawrence, on two counts of her revised entry and detainer complaint. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1) concluding that the defendant's actions did not constitute an unlawful entry in violation of General Statutes § 47a–16 and thereby entitle her to damages under General Statutes § 47a–18a and (2) concluding that the defendant's actions did not violate the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42–110a et seq. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On June 17, 2010, the defendant filed a summary process action against the plaintiff in the Housing Session of the Hartford Superior Court. On August 2, 2010, the court rendered judgment pursuant to a stipulated agreement reached by the parties through court-ordered mediation. In the stipulation, the parties agreed to a final stay of execution through August 10, 2010. The defendant agreed to return $800 of the plaintiff's $1200 security deposit no later than August 6, 2010, and the plaintiff agreed to leave the premises in “broom-clean condition” and return her keys to the defendant upon vacating.

On August 16, 2010, the plaintiff filed a three count amended complaint. ¹ In the first count, the plaintiff alleged that on August 6, 2010, the defendant entered her dwelling unit, changed the locks and removed, damaged or took possession of certain personal property belonging to her in violation of General Statutes § 47a–43. In the second count, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's actions constituted a violation of § 47a–16 and she sought damages pursuant to § 47a–18a. In the third count, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's actions on August 6 in changing the locks to her apartment and refusing her access through the end of the period staying execution violated both the terms of the parties' stipulation and CUTPA.

On August 31, 2010, the court heard evidence and oral argument on the present matter. Later that day, the court filed a memorandum of decision, rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the first count of the amended complaint and for the defendant on the two remaining counts. Pursuant to General Statutes § 47a–45a, the court awarded the plaintiff $139 as restitution for property the defendant removed in violation of § 47a–43. On September 17, 2010, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue and, on September 20, 2010, the court denied that motion. This appeal followed. On November 5, 2010, after the filing of the present appeal, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation pursuant to Practice Book § 66–5 and, on December 2, 2010, the court issued an articulation of its decision.

The court articulated, as to the first count of the amended complaint, that the defendant entered the apartment and changed the locks at a time when the plaintiff was still the actual possessor of the property. The court further found that “[a]fter being made aware that the plaintiff was still in possession of the premises, there was a delay by the defendant in providing the plaintiff with access to the premises to remove her belongings.”

As to the second count, the court articulated that the defendant, “having been informed by Valeria Calloway, an employee of the Hartford Housing Authority, that the plaintiff had vacated the premises, did enter those premises and begin the process of cleaning the dwelling unit. The sworn testimony established that the plaintiff told Ms. Calloway that she had moved from the premises.” ² The court further articulated that “the defendant's entry was not an abuse of her right of entry based on the [defendant's] reliance on information from the Hartford Housing Authority.... In the context of the evidence presented as to the timeframe for the plaintiff to vacate the premises pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, the court [found] the defendant's reliance on information from the plaintiff transmitted through a representative from the Hartford Housing Authority, to be reasonable.” ³

As to the third count, the court articulated that the actions of the defendant, “given the nature of the stipulated agreement and the evidence adduced at trial,” did not constitute a practice prohibited under CUTPA. The court further articulated that “the defendant's actions, in their totality, including returning the plaintiff's security deposit related to the underlying tenancy, were undertaken in good faith and not to perpetrate an unfair or deceptive trade or practice.”

I

On appeal, the plaintiff first claims that, having found her in actual possession of the premises, the court erred in concluding that the defendant's conduct did not violate § 47a–16.⁴ Specifically, the plaintiff argues that by finding the defendant's actions justified due to her reliance on information provided by Calloway, the court improperly created an exception not found in the plain language of § 47a–16 (d). The plaintiff contends that permitting a landlord “to rely upon the representations of a third party with no possessory interest in the subject premises and without making any effort to contact the tenant prior to entry, creates an absurd and unworkable result. Such a holding creates precedent for potentially limitless exceptions to a rule that has ancient public policy considerations.” We disagree.

The plaintiff's claim raises a question of statutory interpretation, over which our review is plenary. See Bengtson v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 86 Conn.App. 51, 56, 859 A.2d 967 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 922, 867 A.2d 837 (2005). “Relevant legislation and precedent guide the process of statutory interpretation. [General Statutes § 1–2z] provides that, [t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rodriguez v. Ancona, 88 Conn.App. 193, 197, 868 A.2d 807 (2005).

Generally, a landlord may not enter a dwelling unit without the consent of the unit's tenant. Section 47a–16 (d) codifies four exceptions to that general rule, including, inter alia, allowing a landlord to enter a dwelling unit without consent “in case of emergency” and where “the tenant has abandoned or surrendered the premises.” General Statutes § 47a–16 (d)(1) and (4). The plaintiff asks this court to adopt a narrow reading of § 47a–16 (d), essentially requiring a court to award damages pursuant to § 47a–18a whenever a landlord enters a tenant's apartment without consent while the tenant remains in actual possession of the premises, regardless of the reasonableness of the landlord's conduct.⁵

Although § 47a–16 (d) does not provide explicitly for consideration of the reasonableness of a landlord's belief that a tenant has vacated or abandoned a dwelling unit, such legislative silence does not necessarily create an ambiguity in whether to apply a reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 419, 862 A.2d 292 (2004) (silence in statute does not necessarily equate to ambiguity). Considering the text of § 47a–16 and its relationship to other statutes, we conclude that a proper reading of the statute permits consideration of the reasonableness of a landlord's conduct.

In support of our conclusion, we note the language of General Statutes § 47a–11b (c), which provides in relevant part: “The landlord shall not be required to serve a notice to quit ... and bring a summary process action ... to obtain possession or occupancy of a dwelling unit which has been abandoned. Nothing in this section shall relieve a landlord from complying with the provisions of sections 47a–1 to 47a–20a, inclusive ... if the landlord knows, or reasonably should know, that the occupant has not abandoned the dwelling unit.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the foregoing sentence in § 47a–11b (c) requires an examination of the reasonableness of a landlord's knowledge in circumstances where an abandonment of a dwelling unit has not occurred. Although this statute is of limited applicability under the facts of this case, in which the defendant already has resorted to the dispossession procedure provided by the summary process statutes, we find its reference to a reasonableness standard to be instructive.⁶

Moreover, practical realities counsel against finding a landlord liable for entry into a tenant's apartment when such entry is predicated on facts creating a reasonable belief that an exception to the notice requirement of § 47a–16 applies. For example, it could be a disproportionate result for a landlord to pay at least one month's rent and attorney's fees to a tenant in a situation where the landlord, at the time of entry into a dwelling unit, acted pursuant to a reasonable, good faith belief that an emergency existed, even if the landlord, ultimately, was mistaken. In light of the specific exception for emergency action, we do not think the legislature intended to discourage a landlord's action under such circumstances. See, e.g., Shortell v. Cavanagh, 300 Conn. 383, 388–89, 15 A.3d 1042 (2011) (recognizing that “those who promulgate statutes ... do not intend to promulgate statutes ... that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results” [internal quotation marks...