Hassan v. Fordham Univ.

515 F.Supp.3d 77

Kareem HASSAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.FORDHAM UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

20-CV-3265 (KMW)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed January 28, 2021

Sarah Westcot, Bursor & Fisher P.A., Miami, FL, Philip Lawrence Fraietta, Bursor & Fisher, P.A., New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Isaac Jonathan Burker, Jonathan Marc Kozak, Jackson Lewis P.C., White Plains, NY, for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

KIMBA M. WOOD, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Kareem Hassan has filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint (the "Complaint") against Defendant Fordham University ("Fordham"), seeking a refund of tuition and all fees in connection with the university's suspension of in-person instruction in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiff requests relief based on four grounds: breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, and money had and received. Fordham has moved to dismiss the Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, Fordham's motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an undergraduate student at Fordham. (Compl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 12.) Fordham's Spring 2020 semester began on January 13. (Id. ¶ 10.) On March 9, the COVID-19 pandemic caused Fordham to suspend in-person instruction and to begin holding classes "in an online format, with no in-person instruction." (Id. ¶ 12.) Students were asked to leave Fordham's campuses no later than March 22. (Id. ¶ 34.) Remote instruction continued through the end of the semester on May 12. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 35.) Simply put, Fordham did not provide in-person education for approximately half of the Spring 2020 semester. (Id. ¶ 14.)

According to Plaintiff, Fordham's remote-learning opportunities were "subpar in practically every aspect, from the lack of facilities, materials, and access to faculty." (Id. ¶ 13.) Remote learning was "in no way the equivalent of the in-person education that Plaintiff and the putative class members contracted and paid for," and educational opportunities offered to Fordham students were "a shadow of what they once were." (Id. ¶¶ 13, 39.) Nonetheless, Fordham has not issued tuition refunds for any portion of the Spring 2020 semester. (Id. ¶ 15.) Fordham has reduced some but not all non-tuition fees. (See id. ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff thus brings this action on behalf of "all people who paid tuition and other fees for the Spring 2020 academic semester at Fordham" and "lost the benefit of the education for which they paid." (Id. ¶¶ 1, 42.) Plaintiff seeks also to represent a subclass consisting of class members who reside in New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff claims that the class is "entitled to a refund of tuition for in-person educational services, facilities, access, and/or opportunities that [Fordham] has not provided," as well as a refund of "all fees." (Id. ¶ 16.) More specifically, Plaintiff seeks "disgorgement of the pro-rated portion of tuition and fees" for the period from March 9 to May 12. (See id. ¶¶ 17, 41.)

Plaintiff filed a complaint on April 25, 2020 and a First Amended Complaint on August 5, 2020. (ECF Nos. 1, 12.) On September 4, Fordham moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 15.) On October 5, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Fordham's motion. (ECF No. 21.) On October 19, Fordham filed its reply memorandum. (ECF No. 26.) Since the filing of the reply, both parties have filed notices of supplemental authority, bringing to the Court's attention recent decisions in other tuition-related lawsuits. (ECF Nos. 27, 29, 31, 32.) Fordham has filed objections to each of Plaintiff's notices. (ECF Nos. 28, 30, 33.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

A complaint must be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A court must accept "all factual allegations as true," but gives "no effect to legal conclusions couched as factual allegations." See Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. , 861 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm't , 592 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir. 2010) ).

When adjudicating a motion to dismiss, district courts "may review only a narrow universe of materials." Goel v. Bunge, Ltd. , 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016). Courts generally do not "look beyond facts stated on the face of the complaint, documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Id. (quoting Concord Assocs., L.P. v. Entm't Props. Tr. , 817 F.3d 46, 51 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016) ) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)

DISCUSSION

I. Whether Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred

As an initial matter, the Court must decide whether Plaintiff's claims are barred by New York law and public policy regarding "educational malpractice" and the proper role of courts in cases involving educational institutions. At least one federal court in New York has allowed claims for tuition refunds in connection with suspensions prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic to proceed. See Ford v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. , 2020 WL 7389155, at *5-6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2020) (holding that plaintiff's claims "seeking recompense from their tuition payments" were not barred); see also Bergeron v. Rochester Inst. of Tech. , 2020 WL 7486682, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2020) (allowing similar claims to proceed but not addressing the educational malpractice doctrine). As explained below, the Court holds that New York law does not bar Plaintiff's claims in their entirety at this stage.

A. The Educational Malpractice Doctrine

When applying traditional legal principles and rules to disputes within the academic community, courts in New York exercise the "utmost restraint." Olsson v. Bd. of Higher Ed. , 49 N.Y.2d 408, 413, 426 N.Y.S.2d 248, 402 N.E.2d 1150 (1980) ; see Maas v. Cornell Univ. , 94 N.Y.2d 87, 92, 699 N.Y.S.2d 716, 721 N.E.2d 966 (1999) (stating that courts play a "restricted role" in controversies involving universities); see also Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharm. of Union Univ. , 633 F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (stating that courts must show restraint when "intervening in controversies involving a student's academic qualifications"). Judicial restraint in the academic arena reflects the public policy that educational professionals are "peculiarly capable" of making decisions that are "appropriate and necessary" for educational institutions to function. Gertler v. Goodgold , 107 A.D.2d 481, 485-86, 487 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1st Dep't 1985), aff'd , 66 N.Y.2d 946, 498 N.Y.S.2d 779, 489 N.E.2d 748 (1985). Courts have thus "refused to substitute their judgment for that of university officials or to review the day-to-day administration of academic policies." Sirohi v. Lee , 222 A.D.2d 222, 634 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1995) ; see also Torres v. Little Flower Children's Servs., 64 N.Y.2d 119, 126, 485 N.Y.S.2d 15, 474 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1984) (stating that courts should avoid being "thrust into the position of reviewing the wisdom of educators’ choices and evaluations").

This public policy does not mean that students may never sue universities for breach of contract. Ansari v. New York Univ. , 1997 WL 257473, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1997) (Mukasey, J.). If a contract with a university provides for "certain specified services," such as a "designated number of hours of instruction," and the university fails to satisfy that obligation, "a contract action with appropriate consequential damages might be viable." Id. (quoting Paladino v. Adelphi Univ. , 89 A.D.2d 85, 92, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (2d Dep't 1982) ).

New York's public policy does, however, preclude lawsuits that are predicated on claims of "educational malpractice." If the "essence of the complaint is that the school breached its agreement to provide an effective education," or if a court is asked to "evaluate the course of instruction" or "review the soundness of the method of teaching that has been adopted by an educational institution," those claims should be dismissed. Ansari , 1997 WL 257473, at *3 (citing Paladino , 89 A.D.2d at 89-90, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 ).

B. Nature of the Allegations in the Complaint

Fordham argues that the Complaint runs afoul of the educational malpractice doctrine because it "is premised on the notion that Plaintiff should be refunded money because the ‘online learning options’ ... were ‘subpar.’ " (Mem. at 8, ECF No. 18; Reply at 12.) Fordham asserts that the Complaint improperly urges the Court to "substitute [its] judgment for that of university officials" in deciding whether the methods and techniques of remote education were indeed "subpar." (Mem. at 9.) In response, Plaintiff insists that the Court need not "evaluate the course of instruction" or analyze "uniquely professional academic decisions." (Opp'n at 5.) Rather, according to Plaintiff, the Court is required to evaluate only whether Fordham "promised to provide services and failed to do so." (Id. (quoting Ansari , 1997 WL 257473, at *3 ).)

The Court holds that Plaintiff's claims are not barred by the educational malpractice doctrine, because they are sufficiently grounded in whether an alleged promise for educational services was made and breached. The Complaint focuses on statements in documents issued by Fordham to its students, such as the university's course catalog, that form the contractual relationship between the university and the student body. (E.g. , Compl. ¶¶ 5-9.) The Complaint alleges that Fordham made a promise in these documents to provide in-person educational services. (Id. ¶ 59.) A court attempting to ascertain...