Hassett v. Secor's Auto Ctr., Inc.

215 Conn.App. 463

284 A.3d 31

Erin C. HASSETT

v.SECOR'S AUTO CENTER, INC.

AC 44804

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 16, 2022

Officially Released October 4, 2022

Sergei Lemberg, Wilton, with whom was Vlad Hirnyk, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Sandra R. Stanfield, with whom were Victoria S. Mueller, New London, and Matthew H. Greene, for the appellee (defendant).

Cradle, Clark and Harper, Js.

HARPER, J.

In this action arising from the purchase of a used motor vehicle by the plaintiff, Erin C. Hassett, from the defendant, Secor's Auto Center, Inc., a used car dealer, in accordance with a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff with respect to four of the five claims set forth in the complaint and awarded the plaintiff $11,000 in damages. On appeal from that judgment, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied her motion for additur.¹ We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On November 4, 2017, the plaintiff purchased a used vehicle, a 2010 BMW X6 XDrive 50i, from the defendant. The purchase price for the vehicle was $25,471.79, including sales tax, a dealer conveyance fee, and license and title fees. The plaintiff made a down payment of $2500 by way of a trade-in and financed the remainder of the purchase price. Her monthly payments were $439.14, to be paid over a total of sixty months beginning on December 19, 2017, and she testified that she continued to make those payments through the time of trial. The dealer warranted the vehicle under a limited warranty for 60 days or 3000 miles, whichever came first.²

The record reveals that the plaintiff financed $22,971.79, the majority of the purchase price of the vehicle, by way of a loan with the defendant. The defendant subsequently assigned its interest in that loan to Volvo Car Financial Services U.S., LLC (Volvo). The loan between the plaintiff and the defendant provides that the assignee of the loan, Volvo, has a security interest, or lien, on the title of the vehicle.³ Volvo has not been made a party to this action.

The plaintiff began to experience issues with the vehicle beginning approximately three weeks after purchase. On November 22, 2017, the oil level light came on in the vehicle, indicating that the oil level was low. After she added oil to the engine, she brought the vehicle back to the defendant. The defendant tightened the oil drain plug, cleaned off residual oil, and returned the vehicle to the plaintiff. About one week later, the oil level light came on again. On December 8, 2017, the plaintiff again brought the vehicle to the defendant. The defendant found no evidence of an oil leak and referred the plaintiff to seek further inspection at New Country Motor Cars (New Country) in Hartford.

On December 13, 2017, the plaintiff brought her vehicle to New Country for inspection. New Country found no leaks in the engine but discovered that the vehicle "smokes excessively after idling for a couple minutes" and determined that it would need to replace the "valve seals" and "exhaust on both banks" to rectify the plaintiff's oil burning concern. The quoted cost to repair her vehicle was $9200. The plaintiff communicated the quote from New Country to the defendant and requested that the defendant replace the vehicle's engine valve seals. The defendant declined to replace the valve seals on the engine because it claimed that it was not necessary. Subsequently, the plaintiff retained counsel. On December 29, 2017, the plaintiff's counsel sent a letter on her behalf to the defendant seeking to revoke her acceptance of the vehicle and demanding "return of all money paid so far, including the down payment, amount of payments thus far, finance charges, other fees, incidental and consequential damages, costs, and attorney's fees."

On January 3, 2018, the plaintiff brought the vehicle back to the defendant for the third time because the check engine light had come on, and the defendant advised her that the oxygen sensors required replacing. The defendant initially agreed to repair the oxygen sensors but stopped work on the vehicle when it received the letter from the plaintiff's counsel seeking revocation of the plaintiff's acceptance of the vehicle. On January 8, 2018, when the plaintiff picked up the vehicle, the low oil level light again had turned on. In March, 2019, the plaintiff stopped using the vehicle, but continued to make monthly payments. She testified at trial that the vehicle has not run since March 22, 2019, and has been parked in her driveway since then.

The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, with a return of service date of March 6, 2018, alleging six counts sounding in (1) breach of implied warranties under General Statutes § 42a-2-314 ; (2) breach of written warranties under General Statutes §§ 42a-2-313 and 42a-2-318 ; (3) breach of written and implied warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. ; (4) revocation of acceptance under General Statutes § 42a-2-608 ;⁴ (5) breach of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing under General Statutes § 42a-1-304 ; and (6) violation of General Statutes § 42-110b of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. A jury trial was held in March, 2020, and the jury returned its verdict in favor of the plaintiff on all claims except the CUTPA claim. Relevant to this appeal, the jury made a finding that the plaintiff had met her burden of proof with respect to her claim of revocation of acceptance.

With respect to damages relating to the plaintiff's revocation of acceptance claim, the court charged the jury as follows: "If you find that the plaintiff has met her burden of proof on [her] revocation of acceptance claim, then the plaintiff is entitled to a refund of so much of the purchase price as has been paid as well as damages for incidental and consequential expenses. Incidental damages include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation, and care and custody of the vehicle rightfully rejected, and any other reasonable expense incident to the defendant's breach. Consequential damages resulting from the defendant's breach include any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the defendant at the time had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty. Consequential damages include any loss that may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally, according the usual course of things from such breach." The plaintiff's counsel did not object to the court's charge to the jury.

The jury awarded the plaintiff a lump sum of $11,000 in total damages. The special verdict form used by the jury did not include a breakdown of damages; the form stated that the lump sum of $11,000 awarded to the plaintiff included "damages ... compensatory, incidental and/or consequential, as applicable ...." No punitive damages were awarded.

On March 17, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict, which the court denied on December 28, 2020. On March 19, 2020, the plaintiff filed the motion for additur that is the subject of this appeal, asking the court to order that the ownership of the vehicle be transferred back to the defendant and that the full purchase price be returned to the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that, "upon showing that acceptance was revoked, the court must order [the defendant] to repay [the plaintiff] the purchase price paid. ... Here, the price paid for the vehicle was $25,471.79.... Therefore, based on the jury's verdict, the court must find that, by operation of law, the title to the vehicle revests in [the defendant] ... and the defendant must refund the plaintiff the purchase price paid of $25,471.79."

On January 8, 2021, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion, arguing that "a hearing should be [held] regarding the value of the vehicle ... before the court enters an award on the purchase price, as is requested by the plaintiff. ... Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to have her car inspected, which motion was denied. No testimony was given by the plaintiff regarding the condition of the vehicle with exception of her statement at trial ... that the vehicle wasn't running. She did not indicate the current mileage of the vehicle, and there is no way of knowing same. These facts should be established before refunding the plaintiff the full purchase price of a vehicle which she still possesses ...."

On January 20, 2021, the plaintiff filed a reply to the defendant's objection to her motion for additur, arguing that "[t]he jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and against the defendant on the claim for revocation of acceptance. ... The jury awarded the plaintiff $11,000 in damages. ... Here, the price paid for the vehicle was $25,471.79 .... Therefore, based on the jury's verdict, the court must find that, by operation of law, the title to the vehicle revests in [the defendant] and the defendant must refund the plaintiff the purchase price paid of $25,471.79."

On March 30, 2021, the defendant, with leave from the court, submitted a supplemental objection in response to the plaintiff's reply. The defendant argued that the jury's verdict in this case is well supported by the evidence and should be allowed to stand. Specifically, the defendant argued that, "[i]n the case at hand, it would appear that the jury awarded the plaintiff as damages return of the payments that she had already paid regarding the purchase of her vehicle, which is exactly the law regarding revocation of acceptance. ... [T]he plaintiff testified and submitted an exhibit, based upon which the jury could have...