Hatcher v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp.

RAGEN H. HATCHER, Plaintiff, v. GARY COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION, Defendant.

CAUSE NO.: 2:13-CV-353-PRC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA HAMMOND DIVISION

November 22, 2016

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 84], filed by Defendant Gary Community School Corporation on July 1, 2016, and a Motion to Strike Affidavit of Judy Cherry, Exhibit 3 and 4 and Portions of Plaintiff's Response Brief [DE 92], filed by Defendant on August 8, 2016. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Motion for Summary Judgment on the § 1983 federal constitutional claims and relinquishes its jurisdiction over the Indiana state law claims of breach of contract and tortious interference with a contract.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 30, 2013, Plaintiff Regan H. Hatcher filed a Complaint against Defendant Gary Community School Corporation and the School Board of the Gary Community School Corporation. On June 11, 2014, Judge Robert L. Miller, Jr. issued an Opinion and Order, granting in part and denying in part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.

On August 7, 2014, the parties orally agreed on the record to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

After extensive proceedings to correct errors in Plaintiff's attempts to file an amended complaint, on March 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendant Gary Community School Corporation only, alleging claims of breach of contract (Count I), tortious interference with a contract (Count II), deprivation of her due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III), and deprivation of her rights of freedom of expression and freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV). Plaintiff attached four exhibits—an Attorney Employment Agreement for the period of June 13, 2006, through June 30, 2007 (Ex. 1), the August 8, 2014 Affidavit of Judy Cherry (Ex. 2), a December 22, 2008 letter from the President of the Board of School Trustees of the Gary Community School Corporation (Ex. 3), and a January 29, 2010 letter from the President of the Board of School Trustees of the Gary Community School Corporation (Ex. 4).

On April 17, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, which the Court granted in part and denied in part on October 22, 2015, dismissing Plaintiff's equal protection claim in Count III for failure to state a claim.

On July 1, 2016, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's remaining claims. Plaintiff filed a response on July 23, 2016, attaching the same four exhibits that she attached to her First Amended Complaint. On August 8, 2016, Defendant filed a reply in support of summary judgment and the Motion to Strike. Plaintiff filed a response to the Motion to Strike on August 20, 2016.

MOTION TO STRIKE

In the Motion to Strike, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, the Affidavit of Judy Cherry (no relation to the undersigned), offered in support of her opposition to summary judgment, should be stricken from the record pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4) because it is not made on her personal knowledge and is not signed under the penalties of perjury. Although there is no explicit statement that the Affidavit is based on personal knowledge, personal knowledge can be inferred from the content of the Affidavit in this instance. See Wine & Canvas Dev., LLC v. Roberts, No. 1:12-CV-1752, 2013 WL 1099895, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 15, 2013) (citing Credentials Plus, LLC v. Calderone, 230 F. Supp. 2d 890, 904-05 (N.D. Ind. 2002); 11 Moore's Fed. Practice § 56.14[1][c] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2002)). Also, the Affidavit is sworn (and signed and sealed by a notary public); thus, the Affidavit need not comply with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746 for unsworn declarations. The Court denies the Motion to Strike Judy Cherry's Affidavit. The Court denies as moot the remainder of the Motion to Strike because Exhibits 3 and 4 are unnecessary for the Court's ruling on summary judgment.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a motion for summary judgment be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "Summary judgment is appropriate when no material fact is disputed and themoving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, meaning that no reasonable jury could find for the other party based on the evidence in the record." Carman v. Tinkes, 762 F.3d 565, 566 (7th Cir. 2014).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a), (c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply "'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see also Spierer v. Rossman, 798 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2015). When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325; Spierer, 798 F.3d at 507-08; Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 2013).

"Once the moving party puts forth evidence showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to provide evidence of specific facts creating a genuine dispute." Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). The non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1), (e); Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 769 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1986)). Rule 56(e) provides that "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-50.

In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; McDowell v. Vill. of Lansing, 763 F.3d 762, 764, 765 (7th Cir. 2014); Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

MATERIAL FACTS

In 2006, Plaintiff Ragen H. Hatcher was hired as an attorney for Defendant Gary Community School Corporation. Plaintiff and Defendant executed an "Attorney Employment Agreement" for the time period of June 13, 2006, through June 30, 2007.

In response to Defendant's interrogatories, Plaintiff states that she also had a signed teacher's contract. Although she has not produced the signed teacher's contract, Plaintiff offers the Affidavit of Judy Cherry. Judy Cherry states that she was an employee of the Gary Community School Corporation from September 2003 through July 31, 2012, in the position of Human Resources Specialist and Compliance Officer. She avers that, at the time Plaintiff was hired in June 2006, it was standard practice for all employees to sign a Regular Teacher's Contract and that she was awareof and personally saw the fully executed Regular Teacher's Contract signed by Plaintiff. Judy Cherry further states that Plaintiff's Regular Teacher's Contract was signed after the Attorney Employment Agreement was signed. Judy Cherry states that Plaintiff asked Judy Cherry for a copy of her contract, that the contract was missing from the file, and that Judy Cherry was unable to locate the contract after inquiries of other staff members.

Plaintiff received a letter dated August 19, 2011, from the President of the Board of School Trustees of the Gary Community School Corporation, indicating that, due to financial constraints on Defendant, at its regular meeting the Board would be considering a proposal to discontinue the position of in-house counsel, effective October 1, 2011. The letter stated that the meeting would take place at the Gary Area Career Center at 6:00 p.m. on August 23, 2011, and that Plaintiff would be notified of the...