Hathaway v. Cintas Corporate Servs., Inc.

903 F.Supp.2d 669

Rex HATHAWAY and Tammy Hathaway, Plaintiffs

v.CINTAS CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., Cintas Corporation # 2 d/b/a Cintas Corporation, Cintas Fire Protection and Cintas First Aid & Safety, The Lincoln Electric Company, Air Gas—Mid America, Inc., and Air Gas—North Central, Inc., Defendants.

No. 1:10 CV 195.

United States District Court,

N.D. Indiana,

Fort Wayne Division.

Oct. 11, 2012.

Kristy M. Rans, Martin J. Gardner, Gardner & Rans PC, South Bend, IN, for Plaintiffs.

Mary Beth Arnold, Paul T. Fulkerson, Skiles Detrude, Indianapolis, IN, Lisa M. Dunkin, Daniel D. Bobilya, Bobilya & Reidy LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, Stephen P. Ellenbecker, Gloor Law Group LLC, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES T. MOODY, District Judge.

Defendant Cintas Corporate Services # 2 d/b/a Cintas Corporation (“Cintas”) has moved for summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III of plaintiffs' complaint. (DE # 105.) For the following reasons, that motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Facts and Procedural History¹

Plaintiff Rex Hathaway was employed as a welder/plasma torch operator at Quik Cut, Inc. (“Quik Cut”), a welding/plasma cutting company located in Allen County, IN. On February 12, 2009, Mr. Hathaway was operating a Pro Cut 80 plasma cutter, which was manufactured by defendant Lincoln Electric Company (“Lincoln”). The Pro Cut 80 plasma cutter (“the plasma cutter”) is a machine that is used to cut through metal and steel. The plasma cutter emits sparks when used to cut metal.

While using the plasma cutter on February 12, Mr. Hathaway's shirt caught on fire, which resulted in Mr. Hathaway suffering serious burns to a substantial portion of his body. The fire was started when sparks from the plasma cutter contacted the shirt Mr. Hathaway was wearing at the time. The shirt Mr. Hathaway was wearing at the time of the accident was a 100% cotton shirt (“the shirt”) provided to Quik Cut by defendant Cintas Corporate Services # 2 d/b/a Cintas Corporation (“Cintas”).

The relationship between Quik Cut and Cintas was governed by a uniform rental agreement. (DE # 105–1 at 3.) Under that agreement, Cintas provided Quik Cut employees with work clothes, and also provided laundering and repair services for those clothes. ( Id.)

Mr. Hathaway and his wife, Tammy Hathaway, brought suit against several defendants, including Cintas. (DE # 1.) In their complaint, plaintiffs brought three Counts against Cintas: negligence (Count I), breach of warranty (Count II), and products liability (Count III). ( Id.) Plaintiffs also brought a loss of consortium claim against all defendants (Count VIII). ( Id.) Cintas has now moved for summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III.

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate-in fact, is mandated-where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.” Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir.1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that these requirements have been met; it may discharge this responsibility by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, Ill., 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir.2010) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548). To overcome a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence, however, is insufficient to fulfill this requirement. Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The nonmoving party must show that there is evidence upon which a jury reasonably could find for him. Id.

The court's role in deciding a summary judgment motion is not to evaluate the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505;Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir.1994). On summary judgment a court may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir.2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505). In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Chmiel v. JC Penney Life Ins. Co., 158 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir.1998); Doe, 42 F.3d at 443. Importantly, the court is “not required to draw every conceivable inference from the record [in favor of the non-movant]-only those inferences that are reasonable.” Bank Leumi Le–Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236 (7th Cir.1991) (emphasis added).

III. Count II: Breach of Warranties

Cintas begins its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment by arguing that Count II of plaintiffs' complaint is superseded by plaintiffs' product liability claims, and therefore Count II should be dismissed as duplicative. (DE # 106 at 7.) Plaintiffs do not respond to this argument.

“When interpreting state law, a federal court's task is to determine how the state's highest court would rule.” Rodas v. Seidlin, 656 F.3d 610, 626 (7th Cir.2011). It is also proper for a federal court to defer to state appellate courts, unless there is a “persuasive indication[ ] that the state supreme court would decide the issue differently.” Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tozer, 392 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir.2004)).

The Indiana Supreme Court discussed, but ultimately did not decide, this issue in Kovach v. Caligor Midwest, 913 N.E.2d 193, 197 (Ind.2009). It did, however, make note that the Indiana Court of Appeals and several federal district courts sitting in Indiana have all held that “tort-based breach-of-warranty claims have been subsumed into the PLA.” See Cincinnati Ins. Cos. v. Hamilton Beach/Proctor–Silex, Inc., No. 4:05 CV 49, 2006 WL 299064, at *3 (N.D.Ind. Feb. 7, 2006); N.H. Ins. Co. v. Farmer Boy AG, Inc., No. IP 98–0031–C–T/G, 2000 WL 33125128, at *3 (S.D.Ind. Dec. 19, 2000); Condon v. Carl J. Reinke & Sons, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Ind.Ct.App.1991).

Plaintiffs' breach of implied and express warranty claims are based in tort because plaintiffs have not sought recovery for damage to the shirt or any economic loss arising from the failure of the shirt to work as expected. Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ind.2005) ( “Indiana law under the Products Liability Act and under general negligence law is that damage from a defective product or service may be recoverable under a tort theory if the defect causes personal injury or damage to other property, but contract law governs damage to the product or service itself and purely economic loss arising from the failure of the product or service to perform as expected.”).

The court agrees with the cases cited above, and concludes that plaintiffs' breach of implied warranty claims have been subsumed by their IPLA claim. See Henderson v. Freightliner, LLC, No. 1:02–CV–01301DFH, 2005 WL 775929, at *3 (S.D.Ind. Mar. 24 2005) (“The IPLA effectively supplants both the common law negligence claims and the breach of implied warranty claims.”) ² Additionally, the court agrees that plaintiffs' express warranties are also merged into their IPLA claim. See Atkinson v. P & G–Clairol, Inc., 813 F.Supp.2d 1021, 1024–27 (N.D.Ind.2011). Therefore, Cintas's motion for summary judgment as to Count II of plaintiffs' complaint is granted.

IV. Count III: Products Liability

The Indiana Products Liability Act (“IPLA”), Indiana Code sections 34–20–1–1 through 34–20–9–1, governs all actions brought by a user or consumer against a manufacturer or seller for physical harm caused by a product, regardless of the legal theory upon which the action is brought. SeeInd.Code § 34–20–1–1.

To succeed in an action under the IPLA, a plaintiff must prove the following elements:

(1) he or she was harmed by a product; (2) the product was sold “in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to any user or consumer”; (3) the plaintiff was a foreseeable user or consumer; (4) the defendant was in the business of selling the product; and (5) the product reached the consumer or user in the condition it was sold.

Bourne v. Marty Gilman, Inc., 452 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir.2006) (quoting Ind.Code § 34–20–2–1); see also Moss v. Crosman Corp., 136 F.3d 1169, 1171 (7th Cir.1998). “[A] plaintiff can satisfy the second element-that the product was defective-by showing one of the following: a design defect, a manufacturing defect, or a failure to warn.” Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 720 (7th Cir.2001); see also Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 155, 161 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). In this case, plaintiffs allege that the shirt was defective under all three theories. (DE # 1.)

Defendant Cintas has moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs' product liability claims. (DE # 106 at 14.) The court will address all three possible theories of defect in turn.

A. Manufacturing Defect

Plaintiffs allege that Cintas is liable under the IPLA due to a manufacturing defect in the shirt. (DE # 1 at 9.) Cintas argues that plaintiff...