Hauck v. Wabash Nat'l Corp.

LINDA HAUCK, as personal representative of the Estate ofDeborah A. Chambers, Plaintiff, v. WABASH NATIONAL CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. CV 18-471 KG/LF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

February 17, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Presently before the Court is Defendant Wabash National Corporation's (Wabash) Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion) (Doc. 137). The Motion is now fully and timely briefed. See (Doc. 146, Response, Doc. 149, Reply). The Court notes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. After review of the parties' briefing and the relevant law, the Court grants in part and denies in part Wabash's Motion (Doc. 137).

I. Undisputed Material Fact Summary

On the evening of September 6, 2016, Deborah Chambers' PT Cruiser collided into the side of a Wabash dry-van trailer that was pulled across both lanes of traffic on Route 66. (Doc. 137) at 3, ¶ 1. Because of "[t]he mismatch of the deck height of the Wabash trailer and the front of Ms. Chambers' vehicle," Ms. Chambers' drove under, or "under-rode," the trailer, "causing passenger compartment intrusion of Ms. Chambers' vehicle." (Doc. 146) at 5, ¶ 2. Ms. Chambers was severely injured in the accident and later died in the hospital. Id. at 1. Linda Hauck, as personal representative, brought this action to recover damages on behalf of Ms. Chambers' estate. Id. at 23-24.

At the time of Ms. Chambers' collision, the Wabash trailer was not equipped with a side guard to prevent vehicle under-riding. (Doc. 146) at 8, ¶ 27; (Doc. 137) at 3, ¶ 2. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not require the installation of side-guard protectors on trailers. (Doc. 137) at 4, ¶ 6. Installation of such a device would "necessarily add weight to [the] trailers." Id. at ¶ 10. However, "[v]arious designs of side underride protection have been crash tested on multiple occasions." (Doc. 146) at 6, ¶ 9. Testing of these devices "show the ability of side underride guards to prevent underride and passenger compartment intrusion." Id. Furthermore, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards "did not prevent Wabash from equipping its trailers with a side underride guard." Id. at 10, ¶ 40. Notably, the NHTSA does require the installation of "rear impact guards," a device that prevents under-riding when a vehicle collides with the back of a trailer. Id. at 9, ¶ 28. In accordance with these regulations, a rear impact guard was installed on Wabash's trailer at the time of the accident. (Doc. 137) at 3, ¶ 4.

By the year 2000, "Wabash knew the deck heights of its trailers, and knew that the tops of the fronts of passenger vehicles were less than the deck heights of its trailers." (Doc. 146) at 7, ¶ 17. In addition, Wabash "was aware of the risks that a vehicle could underride its trailers ... because the trailer's deck height was higher than the top of the front of most passenger vehicles." Id. at ¶ 18. Wabash was also "aware that an underride of its trailers could expose an occupant of a passenger vehicle to risks of injury or death." Id. at 8, at ¶ 22. Despite this knowledge, "Wabash had not conducted any testing as it relates to side underride of its trailers." Id. at ¶ 25.

Between 2007 and 2010, "Wabash began to develop a side underride guard for its trailers," and received a patent for the design in April 2012. Id. at 11, ¶ 46. Since receiving the patent, "Wabash continues its efforts to develop, design, test and commercial a side impactguard, despite any mandate or requirement by the government for side underride guards on semi-trailers." Id. at 13, at ¶ 60. To date, Wabash has not installed side-guard protectors on its trailers that travel on U.S. roads and highways. See id. at 8, ¶ 27.

II. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Once the movant meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 767 (10th Cir. 2013). A fact is "material" if it could effect the outcome of the lawsuit. Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc., 740 F.3d 530, 538 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2013)). A dispute over a material fact is "genuine" only if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Tabor, 703 F.3d at 1215.

III. Discussion

In its Motion, Wabash requests summary judgment on each of Ms. Hauck's two claims for relief, strict products liability and negligence. (Doc. 137) at 6-13. Alternatively, Wabash argues that if Ms. Hauck's claims survive summary judgment, this Court should conclude that she is unable to recover punitive damages. Id. at 13-14. Finally, Wabash asserts that because Ivy Chambers, Deborah Chambers' surviving daughter and statutory beneficiary, did not participate in discovery, she should be barred from receiving any damages awarded in this case.Id. at 14. Ms. Hauck contests the basis for each of Wabash's arguments in favor of summary judgment. See (Doc. 146). As a result, the Court will address each of Wabash's contentions in turn.

A. Strict Products Liability Claim

To recover under a strict products liability theory in New Mexico, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) "the product was defective;" (2) "the product was defective when it left the hands of the defendant and was substantially unchanged when it reached the user or consumer;" (3) "because of the defect the product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer;" (4) "the consumer was injured or damaged;" and (5) "the defective product was the proximate cause of the injury or damage." Garner v. Raven Indus., Inc., 732 F.2d 112, 114 (10th Cir. 1984). In considering whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous," a plaintiff must demonstrate that "a reasonably prudent person having full knowledge of the risk would find [the risk] unacceptable." Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2010-NMCA-090, 149 N.M. 1, at *12 (citing UJI 13-1407 NMRA). The question of "[w]hether a product is unreasonably dangerous, and therefore defective, is ordinarily a question for the jury." Nowell v. Medtronic, Inc., 372 F.Supp. 3d 1166, 1228 (D.N.M. 2019) (Browning, J.) (quoting Smith ex rel. Smith v. Bryco Arms, 2001-NMCA-090, ¶ 14, 131 N.M. 87).

When considering whether a product is defective to support liability, the jury is instructed to engage in "a risk-benefit calculation" and "balance meritorious choices for safety made by the manufacturer while minimizing the risk that the public will be deprived needlessly of beneficial products." Id. (quoting Smith, 2001-NMCA-090, at ¶ 14). In reaching its conclusion, the jury may consider:

(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product...; (2) the availability of other and safer products to meet the same need...; (3) the likelihood of injury and itsprobable seriousness, i.e., 'risk,'...; (4) the obviousness of the danger...; (5) common knowledge and normal expectation of the danger (particularly for established products)...; (6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (including the effect of instructions or warnings)...; and (7) the ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive.

McDonald v. Zimmer, Inc., 2020-NMCA-020, ¶ 33, 461 P.3d 930 (citing UJI 13-1407 NMRA, committee notes).

The parties dispute whether Ms. Hauck can establish that Wabash's trailer was unreasonably dangerous and, thus, whether a jury could conclude it was defective and reach a verdict in her favor. Ms. Hauck presents significant evidence of the risk, obviousness, and common knowledge associated with driving a trailer unequipped with a side-guard protector. Most notably, Wabash agreed that it "w[as] discussing side underride and side underride guards at least as of 2007." (Doc. 147) at 10, ¶ 44. In addition, Wabash developed its own "side underride guard for its trailers, filing a patent for a side underride guard in April of 2010[.]" Id. at 11, ¶ 46. By 2016, Wabash admits it was moving forward "with development and testing of a side impact guard to commercialize a guard able to stop a passenger from underride with no passenger compartment intrusion." Id. at ¶ 49. In 2017, "Wabash developed and displayed a side impact guard at a commercial motor vehicle show." Id. at ¶ 53.

Wabash then installed on its trailer, for purposes of testing, a side-guard protector. Id. at 12, ¶ 56. At present, "Wabash continues its efforts to develop, design, test and commercial a side impact guard, despite any mandate or requirement by the government for side underride guards on semi-trailers." Id. at 13, ¶ 60. Wabash further admitted that the purpose of its side-guard protector was specifically developed to prevent and minimize "the risk of passenger compartment intrusion of passenger vehicles that may strike the side of a Wabash trailer." Id. at ¶ 61.

While this evidence is not conclusive on the elements of risk, obviousness, or common knowledge, it is sufficient for a reasonable jury to construe the facts in favor of Ms. Hauck. See Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted) (explaining that "issue of material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant"). Indeed, Ms. Hauck has presented evidence, which, if the jury accepts, demonstrates that Wabash independently researched, tested, and designed its own mechanism for protecting against vehicle underride. Based on this evidence, the jury could...