Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp.

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION, Defendant.

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. MSC CRUISES SA, MSC CRUISES SA CO, and MSC CRUISES USA INC., Defendants.

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., Defendant.

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD., Defendant.

Nos. 19-cv-23591 BLOOM/MCALILEY, 19-cv-21724 BLOOM/MCALILEY, 19-cv-23588 BLOOM/LOUIS, 19-cv-23590 BLOOM/LOUIS

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

December 30, 2022

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT

BETH BLOOM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Havana Docks Corporation's (“Plaintiff” or “Havana Docks”) Motion for Entry of Final Judgment, ECF No. [444] (“Motion”). Defendants filed a Response, ECF No. [448], Plaintiff filed a Reply, ECF No. [449], to which Defendants filed a Sur-Reply, ECF No [451]. The Court has carefully considered the Motion, the Response, the Reply, the Sur-Reply, the record in this case the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.

I. THE MOTION

The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts and procedural history in these cases. Havana Docks has elected to calculate the amount of its damages based on the amount of its certified claim plus interest, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A)(i)(I).

In the Motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter final judgment based on the amount of its certified claim of $9,179,700.88. In its Order on Defendants' Motion to Confirm Interest Calculation Pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(B), ECF No. [428] (“Interest Order”), the Court determined that the applicable rate of interest is the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield for each week over the period between the date of confiscation and the date Plaintiff brought each of these cases against each Defendant, and that the interest is simple, not compound. See ECF No. [428] at 9-11. Based upon the Interest Order, Plaintiff proposes the following interest amounts for each Defendant:

Defendant

Certified Claim

Interest

Total

Carnival

$9,179,700.88

$27,377,359.42

$36,557,060.30

MSC Cruises

$9,179,700.88

$27,436,548.41

$36,616,249.29

Royal Caribbean

$9,179,700.88

$27,436,548.41

$36,616,249.29

Norwegian

$9,179,700.88

$27,436,548.41

$36,616,249. 29

In addition, because Plaintiff has a certified claim, it is entitled to treble damages pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(3)(A), (C). Accordingly, Defendants are liable for the total amounts set forth below:

Defendant

Certified Claim + Interest

Total Damages (after trebling)

Carnival

$36,557,060.30

$109,671,180.90

MSC Cruises

$36,616,249.29

$109,848,747.87

Royal Caribbean

$36,616,249.29

$109,848,747.87

Norwegian

$36,616,249.29

$109,848,747.87

Finally, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A)(ii), Plaintiff is also entitled to court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The parties have agreed with respect to the amounts of fees and costs to be awarded to Plaintiff up to and including September 30, 2022, see ECF No. [447], as follows:

Defendant

Costs

Attorneys' Fees

Total

Carnival

$223,766.78

$3,464,764.69

$3,688,531.47

MSC Cruises

$245,951.11

$2,398,015.65

$2,643,966.76

Royal Caribbean

$233,974.67

$2,062,935.80

$2,296,910.47

Norwegian

$261,002.00

$2,817,073.61

$3,078,075.61

II. DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS

Defendants raise three arguments in response to Plaintiff's Motion and request for entry of judgment in the proposed amounts.^[1] First, Defendants argue that the full amount of the certified claim should not set the floor for Plaintiff's recovery because the certified claim includes items in which Defendants did not traffic. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to assert its claims. Third, Defendants argue that the damages Plaintiff seek are unconstitutionally excessive under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause. The Court considers each argument in turn.

A. Base Amount for Damages

Defendants argue that Plaintiff improperly seeks judgment on the entire value of the claim certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (“FCSC”), which includes items that are not related to the property in which the Court determined that Defendants trafficked. Specifically, Defendants argue that, in addition to the “Concession and tangible assets” of Plaintiff in which Defendants trafficked, the certified claim contains three additional line items including “Securities,” “Accounts receivable,” and “Debt of Cuban Government,” in which Defendants did not traffic. Defendants argue further that the language of Title III ties the damages for trafficking in confiscated property to the value of the certified claim for “such” property. According to Defendants, Title III specifically contemplates this scenario, given that Title III provides that Courts may award damages for amounts less than the certified claim.

Plaintiff responds that pursuant to the plain language of Title III, Plaintiff is entitled to damages calculated on the full amount of the certified claim.

Upon review, the Court agrees with Plaintiff. With any question of statutory interpretation, the Court presumes that Congress “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enterps., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989)) (further citations omitted). “The first rule in statutory construction is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute. If the statute's meaning is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for further inquiry.” United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 797-98 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted); see Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (where “the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it according to its terms.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “This is so because ‘[t]he plain language is presumed to express congressional intent and will control a court's interpretation.'” Moss v. GreenTree-Al, LLC, 378 B.R. 655, 658 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002)) (alterations in the original). It is a court's duty “to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (citations omitted). And, “[w]hen interpreting a statute, words must be given their ‘ordinary or natural' meaning[.]” Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 (2004) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[a] court ‘should not interpret a statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result.'” Moss, 378 B.R. at 658 (quoting Silva, 443 F.3d at 798).

Contrary to Defendants' argument, the plain language of Title III does not tie the amount of damages to the value of the certified claim for specific types of property. Nor does Title III dictate that the Court parse through specific items in a claim certified by the FCSC to determine which types of property were involved in the trafficking activities when determining an award of damages. Rather, as Plaintiff suggests, the language that Defendants rely upon describes to whom a trafficker will be held liable, and then sets forth the amount of that liability.

First, Title III provides that a person who “traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government . . . shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property[.]” 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A). Second, the following subsection of Title III states that the trafficker will be liable for money damages in an amount equal to the sum of-

[. . .]

(I) the amount, if any, certified to the claimant by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 [22 U.S.C. 1621 et seq.], plus interest;

[. . .] and

(ii) court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.

22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). In a case involving a certified claim, Title III is clear that the amount of liability is the amount certified to the claimant by the FCSC.

Moreover, the Court does not agree with Defendants that Title III permits a court to award damages in an amount less than the certified claim. Defendants point to the portion of Title III stating as follows:

In the case of any United States national that brings an action under this section based on a claim certified under title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949-

[. . .]

(ii) if the recovery in the action is less than the amount of the certified claim, the United States national may receive payment under a claims agreement[.]

22 U.S.C. § 6082(f)(2)(ii). This provision, however does not provide that a court may award damages in an amount less than certified claim. Rather, it provides that if the recovery is less than the certified claim, the claim holder may receive additional payment under a claims agreement. The amount of an award and the actual recovery of that award are distinct, and Title III does not provide that an award may be less than the amount of the certified claim. Indeed, as the Court has previously held, if there is a certified claim and liability on the part of a defendant, a plaintiff is entitled to recover damages in a sum no less than the amount of the certified claim, plus interest, as set forth in section 6082(a)(1)(A)(i). Thus, the amount of the certified claim constitutes the floor for damages. See Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No....