Hawkins v. Capital Fitness, Inc.

29 N.E.3d 442

Michael HAWKINS, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.CAPITAL FITNESS, INC., d/b/a X–Sport Fitness, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 1–13–3716.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

March 4, 2015.

Rehearing Denied April 2, 2015.

Keith L. Young, of Chicago, for appellant.

Loretta M. Griffin, Heather L. Nelson, and Ana Maria L. Downs, all of Law Offices of Loretta M. Griffin, of Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Michael Hawkins was at fitness club working out with hand weights when suddenly a nearby mirror fell from the wall and struck him, causing injuries. Hawkins sued the fitness club, Capital Fitness, Inc., alleging it negligently failed to secure the mirror or warn patrons about the mirror and failed to cordon off the area around the mirror. Capital Fitness sought and obtained summary judgment on the basis of the exculpatory clause in its membership agreement. Hawkins argues the trial court erred in holding that the exculpatory clause bars his personal injury claim. Hawkins asserts that the incident is not within the scope of possible dangers ordinarily accompanying the use of a fitness club and a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether his injury related to exercise. We agree and reverse.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Michael Hawkins purchased a membership with X–Sport Fitness, owned and operated by Capital Fitness. (In his brief, Hawkins states that at the time of the incident, he had a seven-day trial membership, but the record indicates Hawkins purchased a full membership and signed a membership agreement on January 5, 2010.) The membership agreement, under “Additional Terms and Conditions,” included a clause entitled, “Disclaimers, Waiver, Release, and Indemnification.” This clause, in bolded capital lettering, provided in relevant part:

“MEMBER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT EXERCISE, TANNING AND USE OF THE EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES OF THE COMPANY OR OF THEIR AFFILIATES NATURALLY INVOLVES THE RISK OF INJURY AND MEDICAL DISORDERS, INCLUDING DEATH, WHETHER MEMBER, SOMEONE ELSE, SOME ACTIVITY OR SOMETHING CAUSES IT. MEMBER AGREES THAT MEMBER ENGAGES IN ALL EXERCISE * * * AND USES ALL FACILITIES AND SERVICES OF THE COMPANY AND THEIR FACILITIES, AT SUCH PERSON'S OWN RISK. SUCH ENGAGEMENT AND USE INCLUDES, WITHOUT LIMITATION, USE OF THE EQUIPMENT * * *. YOU AGREE THAT YOU ARE VOLUNTARILY (A) PARTICIPATING IN THESE ACTIVITIES AND USING THE EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES BASED ON SUCH PERSON'S OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS AND BENEFITS * * * AND (B) ASSUMING ALL RISK OF INJURY * * *.

* * *

MEMBER SHALL HOLD COMPANY AND THEIR AFFILIATES * * * HARMLESS FROM ANY AND ALL LOSS, CLAIM, INJURY, DAMAGE AND LIABILITY SUSTAINED OR INCURRED BY MEMBER FROM OR ARISING OUT OF THE NEGLIGENT ACTS AND OMISSIONS AND ALLEGED NEGLIGENT ACT AND OMISSIONS AND OTHER ACTS AND OMISSIONS, OF ANY OF THE RELEASED PARTIES, ANY PERSON AT THE FACILITY OR ANYONE ELSE, OR ANY OCCURRENCE ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THIS AGREEMENT OR ARISING OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO MEMBER'S PRESENCE AT OR USE OF THIS FACILITY * * * WITHOUT LIMITING THE GENERALITY OF THE FOREGOING, YOU AGREE * * * TO RELEASE AND DISCHARGE RELEASED PARTIES FROM ANY AND ALL CLAIMS OR CAUSES OF ACTION, AND DO HEREBY WAIVE ALL RIGHTS THAT YOU MAY HAVE * * * TO BRING A LEGAL ACTION OR ASSERT A CLAIM, FOR INJURY OR LOSS OF ANY KIND AGAINST ANY

OF THE RELEASED PARTIES ARISING OUT OF THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OR OMISSIONS OR OTHER ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF ANY OF THE RELEASED PARTIES OR ANYONE ELSE AT THE FACILITY * * * OR ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO PARTICIPATION BY YOU IN ANY OF THE ACTIVITIES, OR YOUR USE OF THE EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES OR SERVICES * * *. THIS HOLD HARMLESS FROM AND WAIVER AND RELEASE OF ALL LIABILITY INCLUDES, WITHOUT LIMITATION, (i) INJURIES, DAMAGES OR DISEASES WHICH MAY OCCUR AS A RESULT OF (A) YOUR USE OF ANY FACILITY OR ITS IMPROPER MAINTENANCE, (B) YOUR USE OF ANY EXERCISE * * * EQUIPMENT, (C) IMPROPER MAINTENANCE OF ANY EXERCISE * * * EQUIPMENT OR FACILITIES * * * AND (ii) INJURIES OR MEDICAL DISORDERS RESULTING FROM EXERCISE, OR USE OF EQUIPMENT OR FACILITIES, AT THE FACTILITY OR ANY OF THE OTHER FACILITIES * * *.”

¶ 4 Hawkins did not read the agreement before signing it. Instead, he relied only on what a sales associate told him. According to Capital Fitness, however, sales associates lack sufficient familiarity with the contents of the agreement to explain it to members and, in any event, are instructed not to do so. Hawkins was given a copy of the agreement.

¶ 5 On January 27, 2010, Hawkins was working out at X–Sport's Logan Square gym (Hawkins's brief states the injury occurred on January 19, but the record indicates January 27). During his workout, Hawkins sat on a bench in front of a three-foot by eight-foot mirror hanging from a protruding portion of a wall. As Hawkins performed arm curls with free weights, a patron bumped into the mirror, dislodging it. Hawkins tried jumping out of the way, but his feet hit some weights scattered on the floor and he landed on a weight rack at which point the mirror hit his head.

¶ 6 An unidentified fitness club patron or employee told Hawkins that a maintenance crew had been working on the mirror before the accident. Hawkins then noticed a hole in the wall with supporting wire mesh pulled out and several missing tiles from the wall.

¶ 7 Hawkins filed a one-count complaint against Capital Fitness alleging negligent conduct in failing to adequately secure the mirror, failing to warn patrons that the mirror was loose and likely to fall, and failing to cordon off the area around the mirror. Capital Fitness moved for summary judgment, arguing that (i) the exculpatory language of the membership agreement barred Hawkins's claim for personal injury damages and (ii) Capital Fitness could not be held liable without proof of notice of an actual defect in the premises that proximately caused Hawkins's accident.

¶ 8 After a hearing, the trial court granted Capital Fitness's motion for summary judgment. The trial court enforced the exculpatory clause, finding (i) no substantial disparity in bargaining power between the parties; (ii) no public policy bar to enforcement; and (iii) nothing in the social relationship between the parties that would militate against upholding the clause. The trial court further held that Hawkins failed to provide evidence that Capital Fitness had actual or constructive notice of any defect concerning the mirror.

¶ 9 STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 “Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Direct Auto Insurance Co. v. Beltran, 2013 IL App (1st) 121128, ¶ 43, 376 Ill.Dec. 182, 998 N.E.2d 892. A triable issue of fact exists “where there is a dispute as to material facts, or where, the material facts being undisputed, reasonable persons might draw different inferences from the facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wolfram Partnership, Ltd. v. LaSalle National Bank, 328 Ill.App.3d 207, 215, 262 Ill.Dec. 404, 765 N.E.2d 1012 (2001). The movant for summary judgment has the initial burden of proof. Beltran, 2013 IL App (1st) 121128, ¶ 43, 376 Ill.Dec. 182, 998 N.E.2d 892. An appellate court reviews a disposition of summary judgment de novo. Id.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Execution of Membership Agreement

¶ 13 Hawkins initially claims the sales associates were unfamiliar with the language of the membership agreement and failed to point out or explain the exculpatory clause. Hawkins concedes that he did not read the agreement before signing it but suggests Capital Fitness employees had a duty to explain the release. Hawkins appears to argue that the circumstances surrounding the execution of the membership agreement should invalidate the exculpatory clause.

¶ 14 Generally, absent fraud, the act of signing legally signifies that the individual had an opportunity to become familiar with and comprehend the terms of the document he or she signed. An individual “who has had an opportunity to read a contract before signing, but signs before reading, cannot later plead lack of understanding.” Breckenridge v. Cambridge Homes, Inc., 246 Ill.App.3d 810, 819, 186 Ill.Dec. 425, 616 N.E.2d 615 (1993). See also, e.g., Urban Sites of Chicago, LLC v. Crown Castle USA, 2012 IL App (1st) 111880, ¶ 40, 365 Ill.Dec. 876, 979 N.E.2d 480 (a person may not avoid legal consequences of an executed contract on the ground that the signing was done without knowledge of its contents); State Bank of Geneva v. Sorenson, 167 Ill.App.3d 674, 681, 118 Ill.Dec. 305, 521 N.E.2d 587 (1988) (“[f]ailure to read a [contract] before signing it is normally no excuse for a party who signs it”); Miller v. Wines, 197 Ill.App.3d 447, 452, 143 Ill.Dec. 849, 554 N.E.2d 784 (1990) (same).

¶ 15 Hawkins had a duty to read the membership agreement before he signed it. He did not ask for more time to review the document and no Capital Fitness employee prevented him from reading the agreement. Hawkins also received a copy of the agreement. There is no evidence, and Hawkins did not contend otherwise, that the sales associates made false representations to get him to enter the agreement or about its terms. Hence, nothing is raised by the circumstances of Hawkins' signing the agreement that would render the exculpatory clause unenforceable.

¶ 16 Scope of Exculpatory Clause

¶ 17 Hawkins primarily argues a question of fact exists as to whether his injury falls within the contractual limits of the exculpatory clause. Specifically, Hawkins asserts that his injury resulted from a possible danger beyond the ordinary risks accompanying the use of a fitness club membership.

¶ 18 A party may contract to avoid liability for his own negligence. Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill.App.3d 581, 584, 147 Ill.Dec. 187, 559 N.E.2d 187 (1990). Absent fraud or willful...