Hawkins v. Douglas Cnty., Corp., : 2:15-CV-0283-TOR

EDWIN TROY HAWKINS, Plaintiffs, v. DOUGLAS COUNTY, a municipal corporation; CHELAN COUNTY,a municipal corporation; and JOHN DOE OFFICERS 1-10, Defendants.

NO: 2:15-CV-0283-TOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

January 28, 2016

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

BEFORE THE COURT is Douglas County's 12(b) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) and Defendant Chelan County's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13). This matter was heard on January 28, 2016, in Spokane, Washington. Heather C. Yakely appeared on behalf of the Douglas County. Kirk A. Ehlis appeared on behalf of the Chelan County. Scott Andrew Volyn appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Edwin Hawkins. The Court has reviewed the briefing, files, and record therein; heard from counsel; and is fully informed.

BACKGROUND

On September 16, 2015, Hawkins filed his Complaint in Grant County Superior Court, alleging state law claims against Douglas and Chelan Counties for false arrest, illegal search and seizure, conversion, defamation, and malicious prosecution. Hawkins also asserts violation of unspecified constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which this Court construes as claims for unlawful arrest, unlawful search and seizure, and malicious prosecution. ECF No. 1-1 at 4-17. Defendants subsequently removed the action to this Court. ECF No. 1

In the instant motion, Defendants move to dismiss Hawkins' Complaint, primarily asserting that all claims therein are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. ECF Nos. 11, 13. Douglas County also moves to dismiss the claims of malicious prosecution on the ground of prosecutorial immunity. ECF No. 11 at 8-11.

FACTS¹

This action concerns the events leading up to and concerning Hawkins' underlying criminal conviction in state court. In short, Hawkins was charged with and convicted of first degree attempted possession of stolen property and firstdegree possession of stolen property, but the charges were ultimately dismissed in December 2014 after Hawkins had successfully appealed and obtained a right to a new trial.

Hawkins is an orchardist in Eastern Washington. In early 2006, equipment from another orchard, Twin W, was reported missing. In late summer or early fall of 2006, the Douglas County Sheriff's Office received a tip that the missing equipment was located on Sandcastle Orchard, property leased by Plaintiff. An officer from the Douglas County Sheriff's Office visited Sandcastle Orchard, purporting to have a search warrant for the missing equipment. In October 2006, an officer from the Chelan County Sheriff's Office also visited Hawkins' property; although he did not have a warrant, Hawkins gave him permission to inspect the farm equipment.²

Later that year, a tractor went missing from one of Hawkins' orchards. Hawkins subsequently learned that the Chelan County Sheriff's Office took the tractor because it had been reported stolen. Chelan County allegedly turned thetractor over to Douglas County. To date, Hawkins has not been given an opportunity to prove ownership of the tractor.

In the spring of 2007, Hawkins brought one of his tractors to East Wenatchee for repair. The mechanics noticed that the serial number had been ground off and the identification plate was missing. The mechanics determined that this tractor was one of the pieces of equipment previously reported missing and advised the police.

Over a three day period in June 2007, Hawkins was arrested twice by the Douglas County Sheriff's Office, both times for possession of this tractor.

Hawkins was first arrested for possession of stolen property when he went to pick up the tractor from the mechanics. The arresting officer did not explain why he was arresting Hawkins, but the bail receipt stated Hawkins was arrested for possession of stolen property.

After he was released on bail, Hawkins returned to the mechanic to pick up the tractor. While driving home with the tractor, Hawkins was pulled over by a Chelan County Sheriff's deputy who had been in communication with the Douglas County Sheriff's Office. There was confusion over whether this tractor was the missing tractor. Ultimately, deputies from both Douglas and Chelan County took pictures of the tractor and then helped Hawkins lock the tractor in his shed.

Two days later, on June 11, 2007, several Douglas and Chelan County deputies arrived at Hawkins' home and arrested him for possession of stolen property. Douglas County took the tractor, the alleged stolen property. A bin trailer, claimed stolen, was also "taken away;" although, it is unclear by whom. To date, neither have been returned.

Hawkins was ultimately charged with four counts related to the stolen farm equipment and convicted on two. Hawkins appealed the conviction, and while the appeal was pending, successfully moved the trial court for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The state appealed the trial court's grant of a new trial, and the Washington State Supreme Court ultimately ruled in Hawkins' favor.

On December 19, 2014, the Douglas County Superior Court entered a stipulated order of dismissal with prejudice as to the charges against Hawkins.

On September 16, 2015, Hawkins initiated the present action.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

To avoid dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege "sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-meaccusation." Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "In conducting this review, we accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." AE ex rel Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012).

"A district court may dismiss a claim if the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint." Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). "However, a district court may do so only if the assertions of the complaint read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled." Id.

B. Doe Defendants

In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a), a plaintiff must name all intended defendants in the caption of the complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). The use of "Doe" Defendants is not favored in the Ninth Circuit. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). For a plaintiff to properly name "John Doe" Defendants, he must provide all of the information he would normally provide if the name of the defendant is known. The plaintiff should identify "John Does" by their function, their actions, and the dates these actions occurred; and most importantly, provide a short andplain statement of the law or legal theory and facts supporting each claim against each defendant which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.

Here, Hawkins has named "John Doe Officers 1-10" in the caption of his Complaint. ECF No. 1-1 at 5. Beyond asserting that they are law enforcement officers of either Chelan County or Douglas County, Hawkins has failed to identify their actions, the dates these actions occurred, and which claims are alleged against them. ECF No. 1-1 at 5. The Court will dismiss these defendants if Hawkins is unable to properly identify these defendants in an amended pleading.

C. Statute of Limitations

Defendants contend all of Hawkins' claims, which arose from events that occurred in 2006 and 2007, are barred by the two- or three-year statute of limitations on each claim. In response, Hawkins generally asserts that his claims could not have been brought prior to the successful conclusion of the underlying criminal prosecution.

1. Section 1983 Claims

Construing the Complaint liberally in favor of Hawkins, this Court discerns three causes of action under section 1983: (1) unlawful arrest, (2) illegal search and seizure, and (3) malicious prosecution.

The parties agree that the statute of limitations for a section 1983 action in Washington is three years: the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims is thelength of time provided by state law for personal-injury torts. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Under Washington law, this period is three years. RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing RCW 4.16.080(2)).

The issue before the Court is when the statute of limitations began to run on each claim. "[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law." Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. Rather, "[a]spects of § 1983 which are not governed by reference to state law are governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort principles." Id. "Under those principles, it is the standard rule that accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief." Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). To determine the proper date of accrual for a specific claim, the court should look to the "cause of action [that] provides the closest analogy to" the claim asserted to determine if any distinctive accrual rules apply. Id. (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)); Bradford v. Scherschligt, 803 F.3d 382, 388 (9th Cir. 2015).

One wrinkle may arise in the accrual analysis when the tort action raises claims that relate to a previous conviction. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a state prisoner filed suit under § 1983 raising claims which, if true, wouldhave established the invalidity of his outstanding conviction. The Supreme Court held that

in order to recover

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