Hawkins v. Holy Family Cristo Rey Catholic High Sch.

CORTNEY R. HAWKINS, Plaintiff, v. HOLY FAMILY CRISTO REY CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL, Defendant.

Case No.: 2:18-cv-00638-ACA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

December 4, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In this employment discrimination case, Plaintiff Cortney R. Hawkins alleges that Defendant Holy Family Cristo Rey Catholic High School ("Holy Family") discriminated against her because of her race and gender, and retaliated against her for reporting student complaints to school administrators. Ms. Hawkins asserts claims against Holy Family under Title VII and Title VI for retaliation, race discrimination, and sex discrimination and § 1981 for race discrimination.

This case is before the court on Holy Family's motion to dismiss Ms. Hawkins's second amended complaint (doc. 26), Ms. Hawkins's motion for leave to file a third amended complaint (doc. 34), and Ms. Hawkins's motion for leave to file a sur-reply (doc. 35). For the reasons explained below, and with the benefit of oral argument, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Holy Family's motion to dismiss, DENIES Ms. Hawkins's motion for leave to amend, and GRANTS Ms. Hawkins's motion for leave to file a sur-reply.

I. Motion to Dismiss

A. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plausible claim for relief requires "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" to support the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

When resolving a motion to dismiss, the court must "accept[] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[e] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Miljkovic v. Shafritz & Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)).

B. Factual Background and Procedural History

Construed in the light most favorable to Ms. Hawkins, the facts alleged in the second amended complaint are as follows. Ms. Hawkins is a 28-year old African-American female. (Doc. 23 at ¶ 7). From July 2016 until March 8, 2018, Ms. Hawkins taught 9th and 10th grade English and 11th and 12th grade African-American History at Holy Family. (Id. at ¶ 8). Holy Family Principal Cheryl Kuyk¹ and Holy Family President Father Jon Chalmers supervised Ms. Hawkins while she was employed by the school. (Id. at ¶ 9).

Ms. Hawkins reported student complaints regarding inappropriate comments and disparate punishment of female students to her supervisors on three separate occasions. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 11, 13). In September 2017, an African-American female student approached Ms. Hawkins about "inappropriate comments and disparate treatment in disciplining female students versus male students." (Doc. 23 at ¶ 10). Ms. Hawkins reported to Father Chalmers and Ms. Kuyk the student's concerns about the "perception of discriminative treatment of female students." (Id. at ¶ 10).

In November 2017, L.W., an African-American female student, and several other female students approached Ms. Hawkins and "reported their discontent withtheir Science teacher, Charles Prib[yl],² a Caucasian man, and the inappropriate comments he [made]." (Doc. 23 at ¶ 11). L.W. told Ms. Hawkins that she (L.W.) was uncomfortable around Mr. Pribyl. (Id. at ¶ 11). Ms. Hawkins reported L.W.'s concerns to Father Chalmers and Ms. Kuyk, and later, to the State of Alabama Department of Human Resources. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12).

On January 4, 2018, a male student, K.D.M., told Ms. Hawkins that he too was uncomfortable with Mr. Pribyl. (Doc. 23 at ¶ 13). Ms. Hawkins reported K.D.M.'s concern to Father Chalmers and Ms. Kuyk. (Id.).

On March 8, 2018, Holy Family terminated Ms. Hawkins's employment for wearing a hooded jacket in class in violation of the school's dress code for teachers. (Id. at ¶ 14). According to Ms. Hawkins, white teachers wore jackets or coats with hoods. (Doc. 23 at ¶14). The white teachers were not reprimanded or fired for dress code violations. (Id. at ¶ 24).

Based on these allegations Ms. Hawkins sued Holy Family. Her second amended complaint asserts the following claims: Title VII and Title VI Retaliation (Count I); Race Discrimination (Count II); and Sex Discrimination (Count III). (Doc. 23). Holy Family filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Hawkins's second amended complaint. (Doc. 26). After the parties fully briefed the motion (see doc. 29; doc.30), Ms. Hawkins filed a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint (doc. 34). On November 28, 2018, the court held a hearing on the motions.³ After the hearing, Ms. Hawkins filed a motion for leave to file a sur-reply. (Doc. 35). Although briefing on Holy Family's motion to dismiss closed more than two months ago, the court reluctantly GRANTS Ms. Hawkins's motion to file a sur-reply.

C. Discussion

Holy Family moves to dismiss Ms. Hawkins's claims on both procedural and substantive grounds. (See Doc. 26; Doc. 30). Procedurally, Holy Family asks the court to dismiss Ms. Hawkins's second amended complaint because it is an improper shotgun pleading. (Doc. 26 at 13-15; Doc. 30 at 3-4). Also procedurally, Holy Family asks the court to dismiss Ms. Hawkins's Title VII retaliation, race discrimination, and sex discrimination claims as abandoned because Ms. Hawkins did not address these claims in her response brief. (Doc. 30 at 2). Substantively, Holy Family argues that Ms. Hawkins's factual allegations do not plausibly state claims for relief. (Doc. 26 at 5-13; Doc. 30 at 4-6). The court addresses each argument in turn.

1. Shotgun Pleading

The court may dismiss shotgun pleadings that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Ms. Hawkins's second amended complaint is a shotgun pleading because it "contain[s] multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of the preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint." Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321; see Doc. 23 at ¶¶ 15, 23, 27. Ms. Hawkins's second amended complaint also is a shotgun pleading because it does "not separate[e] into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief." Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323; see Doc. 23 at 5 ("Retaliation under Title VI & Title VII"); Doc. 23 at 7 (asserting Section 1981 and Title VI sex discrimination claims together in one count).⁴

Despite the shotgun nature of Ms. Hawkins's second amended complaint, the court finds that dismissal on this ground is not appropriate because it is not "virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to supportwhich claim(s) for relief." Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cmty. College, 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996)).

2. Abandonment

In its reply brief, Holy Family asserts that Ms. Hawkins has abandoned her Title VII retaliation, race discrimination, and sex discrimination claims, eliminating the need to consider the merits of those claims.

Holy Family has not cited, and the court has not located, Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent directly on point. And, the court notes that the consequence of adopting Defendant's argument would be to allow the court to do under Rule 12(b)(6) what it cannot do under Rule 56. In the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit's "strong preference that cases be heard on the merits," Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation and citation omitted), the court will not dismiss Plaintiff's claims based entirely on her failure to brief her argument.

Accordingly, the court finds that Ms. Hawkins has not abandoned her Title VII retaliation, race discrimination, and sex discrimination claims for failing to address the claims in her response in opposition. Therefore, the court turns to the merits.

3. Merits

a. Title VII Retaliation

To state a claim for Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010). It is undisputed that Ms. Hawkins's termination constitutes an adverse action, but Ms. Hawkins's second amended complaint fails to state a claim for Title VII retaliation because the facts alleged do not plausibly suggest that Ms. Hawkins engaged in statutorily protected activity.

Title VII's anti-retaliation provision protects an employee from discrimination if "(1) '[s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter' (the opposition clause) or (2) '[s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter' (the participation clause)." Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(3)(a)). Ms. Hawkins does not allege that she was retaliated against for filing a charge or testifying, assisting, or participating in an investigation or proceeding under Title VII. Nor does it appear that Ms. Hawkins...