Hayes v. Brahim

Hilton Rhoderques Hayes, Plaintiff, v. Drissi Brahim; Hertz Corporation, Defendants.

C/A No. 0:20-4105-MGL-PJG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ROCK HILL DIVISION

March 4, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Hilton Rhoderques Hayes filed this personal injury action in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas. At that time, Hayes was represented by counsel. Defendant Drissi Brahim removed this action on November 25, 2020 based on the court's diversity jurisdiction. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Hayes's motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, filed by counsel. (ECF No. 10.) Brahim filed a response in opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 13.) Subsequently, Hayes's counsel withdrew and Hayes is now proceeding without counsel.¹ Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court finds the motion to remand should be denied.

BACKGROUND

The following allegations are taken as true for purposes of resolving Hayes's motion to remand. This matter arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in South Carolina on October 7, 2017 between Hayes and Brahim. The accident occurred while Brahim was driving acar rented from Defendant Hertz Corporation ("Hertz"). Hayes brings this action for damages resulting from the defendants' purported negligence.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law

A defendant may remove any civil action brought in a state court of which the federal district court has original jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); but the court must remand the case at any time before the final judgment if it appears that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008). The United States Supreme Court has commanded that, when considering jurisdiction over a removed case, federal courts must "scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined." Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, "[r]emoval statutes must be strictly construed against removal," Scott v. Greiner, 858 F. Supp. 607, 610 (S.D. W. Va. 1994), and a federal court must "resolve all doubts about the propriety of removal in favor of retained state court jurisdiction." Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1993).

Where removal is challenged, the defendant bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994); Chau v. Air Cargo Carriers, LLC, 425 F. Supp. 3d 658, 661 (S.D.W. Va. 2019). The court must resolve the issue by reference to the complaint, notice of removal, and state court record at the time the notice of removal was filed and the court may consider evidence on issues of fact. See 14C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3739 (Rev. 4th ed. Oct. 2020); see also Sherr v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 407, 413n.2 (D.S.C. 2016) ("On a motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court may consider materials outside of the complaint including documents appended to a notice of removal or a motion to remand that convey information essential to the court's jurisdictional analysis and may assume the truth of facts raised in the complaint that are non-jurisdictional.") (internal alterations omitted) (quoting BGC Partners Inc. v. Avison Young (Canada) Inc., No. 2:15-CV-02057-DCN, 2015 WL 7458593, at *1 n.2 (D.S.C. Nov. 24, 2015)).

B. Hayes's Motion

Hayes argues the court should remand this matter to the Chester County Court of Common Pleas because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. Specifically, Hayes argues diversity of citizenship is lacking in this case because he and Defendant Hertz are citizens of South Carolina. The court disagrees.

Federal diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity of citizenship of the parties and an amount in controversy in excess of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00):

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—

(1) citizens of different States[.]

28 U.S.C. § 1332.² Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 & nn.13-16 (1978).

Citing to South Carolina's long arm statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-803, Hayes asserts that Hertz is a South Carolina citizen because Hertz has stores that do substantial business in this stateand has a registered agent. (Pl.'s Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 10-1 at 3.) However, the South Carolina long arm statute is relevant to the court's personal jurisdiction over Hertz, but not its subject matter jurisdiction. See S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-803 (stating that a "court may exercise personal jurisdiction" over certain persons).

Rather, to determine whether Hertz, a corporation, is a citizen of South Carolina, the court must look to Hertz's state of incorporation and "principal place of business." See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Fittingly, the test to determine a corporation's principal place of business was announced in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010) (holding that "principal place of business" refers to the corporation's "nerve center," that is, the place where the corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities). Here, Brahim provides uncontradicted evidence via a copy of Hertz's United States Securities and Exchange Commission Registration that Hertz is incorporated in Delaware and maintains a business and mailing address in Florida. (Brahim's Resp., ECF No. 13-5 at 1.) Hayes provides no argument or evidence to contradict Brahim's proof, and as previously stated, Hayes's motion does not analyze Hertz's citizenship under the appropriate test. Consequently, the court finds that Brahim has met his burden of proof to show that Hertz's citizenship satisfies the diversity jurisdiction requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that Hayes's motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction be denied. (ECF No. 10.)

March 4, 2021

Columbia, South Carolina

/s/_________

Paige J. Gossett

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' " Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk

United States District Court

901 Richland Street

Columbia, South...