Hayes v. State

2020 Ark. 311

608 S.W.3d 142

Steven C. HAYES, Appellant

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee

No. CR-19-64

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: October 8, 2020

Rehearing Denied November 19, 2020

Stephen C. Hayes, pro se appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice

Steven C. Hayes appeals the trial court's denial of his three pro se petitions for a writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, Hayes alleges that the court erred by not granting relief because (1) he was insane when he pleaded guilty, (2) his guilty plea was coerced, and (3) the State withheld exculpatory evidence. We hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.

I. History

In 2014, Hayes negotiated a guilty plea to four counts of first-degree sexual assault in exchange for the State declining to prosecute the remaining seven counts of rape and three counts of terroristic threatening. The trial court imposed a sentence of 336 months' imprisonment. In 2017, Hayes filed two separate petitions for error coram nobis relief. The trial court denied the petitions by letter but did not effectuate an order. Hayes filed a third petition for relief in 2018. The trial court denied all three petitions. It explained that Hayes's pleadings did not surpass the evidence that he had confessed to Investigator Parsons and had admitted guilt in open court at the time of his plea.

II. Standard of Review

The standard of review for an order denying a petition for writ of error coram nobis is abuse of discretion. Pitts v. State , 2020 Ark. 7, 591 S.W.3d 786. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court acts arbitrarily or groundlessly. Id. There is no abuse of discretion in the denial of error coram nobis relief when the claims in the petition were groundless. Osburn v. State , 2018 Ark. 341, 560 S.W.3d 774.

III. Nature of the Remedy

A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy. Id. In coram nobis proceedings, the strong presumption is that the judgment of conviction is valid. Id. A petitioner has the burden to demonstrate a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. Id. The court issues the writ in compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to address errors of the most fundamental nature. Id.

A writ of error coram nobis is available for addressing errors that are found in one of four categories: (1) insanity at the time of trial; (2) a coerced guilty plea; (3) material evidence withheld by the prosecutor in violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) ; or (4) a third-party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Howard v. State , 2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d 38.

IV. Insanity at the Time of Plea Hearing

Hayes contends on appeal that he was suffering from psychosis when he pleaded guilty. Hayes maintains that he had an extensive history of mental disease and received treatment for his conditions. Hayes also alleges that the trial court erroneously accepted his guilty plea before the trial court received the mental evaluation.

Not every manifestation of mental illness reveals incompetence to stand trial. Bryant v. State , 2019 Ark. 183, 575 S.W.3d 547. The mere fact that a petitioner suffered from, and was treated for, a mental illness does not establish his incompetence. Id. The law presumes a criminal defendant is mentally competent to stand trial, and the burden of proving incompetence is on the defendant. Id. When a petitioner seeking the writ makes no assertion that there was any evidence on his incompetence extrinsic to the record, hidden from the defense, or unknown at the time of trial, grounds based on the petitioner's incompetence fail. Id.

Hayes was aware of his history of mental instability at the time of his plea, and thus it was not extrinsic to the record. He waived his right to consideration of the court-ordered mental evaluation or to otherwise challenge his competency to plead guilty. Id. ; see also Hayes v. Kelley , 2020 Ark. 79, 2020 WL 830048 (rejecting Hayes's argument that trial court did not have jurisdiction to accept plea before receipt of the mental evaluation). In any event, Hayes attached the court-ordered mental evaluation, which found him competent. Furthermore, the transcript of the plea hearing contained no evidence that Hayes suffered from psychosis at the time.

V. Coercion

As a second claim for relief, Hayes contends his guilty plea resulted from coercion. He states that officers at the detention center mistreated him by manipulating the temperature of his cell, not allowing him to shower, refusing to turn on the lights, and failing to provide him with his medications. On appeal, Hayes also alleges that counsel coerced his plea by threatening him with the possibility of a more severe sentence if Hayes went to trial.

To prevail on a claim of a coerced guilty plea, the petitioner must establish that the plea resulted from fear, duress, or threats of mob violence as recognized by this court as grounds for a finding of coercion. Hall v. State , 2018 Ark. 319, 558 S.W.3d 867. Mere pressure to plead guilty occasioned by the fear of a more severe sentence is not considered coercion. Gray v. State , 2018 Ark. 79, 540 S.W.3d 658.

This court has held that a later allegation that conditions in a county jail coerced a guilty plea is insufficient when a defendant was represented by counsel and informed the trial court the plea was voluntary. Davis v. State , 267 Ark. 507, 592 S.W.2d 118 (1980). The trial transcript reveals that the trial court specifically asked Hayes if anyone had threatened or hurt him to get him to change his plea to which Hayes responded, "No sir." Finally, the court-ordered mental evaluation reveals that Hayes reported to the evaluator that he had "no problems with the jail staff." Hayes has failed to demonstrate that his plea resulted from fear, duress, or threats of mob violence. Hall , 2018 Ark. 319, 558 S.W.3d 867.

VI. Brady Violation

There are three elements of a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the State must have suppressed evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued. Carner v. State , 2018 Ark. 20, 535 S.W.3d 634.

When a petitioner alleges a Brady violation in coram nobis proceedings, the facts alleged in the petition must establish that there was evidence withheld that was both material and prejudicial. Martinez-Marmol v. State , 2018 Ark. 145, 544 S.W.3d 49. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the State disclosed the evidence, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id.

Hayes alleges that the State withheld the victim's inconsistent statements to investigators about her age during the time of the abuse. He alleges that she told investigators the abuse took place between the ages of eleven and thirteen and stated that she was sexually abused between the ages of eleven and sixteen.¹

Even if Hayes's allegations of an inconsistency in the victim's statements are considered true, he does not establish that there is a reasonable probability that the alleged inconsistency in the age range in which the abuse took place would have changed the result of the proceedings. McClinton v. State , 2020 Ark. 153, 597 S.W.3d 647. The record reveals that Hayes confessed to Investigator Parsons that he had sexually abused his daughter, confessed the abuse to the psychiatrist who conducted the court-ordered mental evaluation, and pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting his daughter on four occasions when she was between the ages of eleven and thirteen. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hayes's petitions for writs of error coram nobis.

Affirmed.

Hart, J., dissents.

Josephine Linker Hart, Justice, dissenting.

Denying Steven C. Hayes's petition for a writ of error coram nobis without an evidentiary hearing is clearly an abuse of discretion. In his petition submitted to and summarily dismissed by the circuit court, Mr. Hayes asserted three grounds: (1) he was insane when he pleaded guilty, (2) his guilty plea was coerced, and (3) the State withheld exculpatory evidence. Each of these grounds was supported by specific facts that, at the very least, entitled him to an evidentiary hearing.

I. Insanity at the Time of Plea Hearing

Mr. Hayes not only claimed that he was suffering from mental illness but also attached a considerable amount of documentary evidence to his error coram nobis petition substantiating this fact. This documentary evidence indicated that he was receiving Social Security Disability for his mental illness. Further, these documents substantiated that he had been treated at Arkansas State Hospital, Bridgeway, Rivendale, Living Hope, Malvern Hospital, Baptist Hospital, and the Little Rock Community Mental Health Center. Mr. Hayes was prescribed a lengthy list of psychotropic medications including chlorpromazine --the generic form of the powerful antipsychotic drug Thorazine --lithium, Dilantin, venlafaxine, and trazodone.

Significantly, Mr. Hayes alleged that at the time preceding his guilty plea, jailors at the Saline County Detention Facility were withholding or only sporadically giving him his medication. He claimed that this resulted in him suffering psychotic episodes, including when he was given his court-ordered mental evaluation. Accordingly, Mr. Hayes asserts that he was incapable of making a knowing and intelligent guilty plea. Mr. Hayes finally asserts that he was able to enter his guilty plea only because he said what chief deputy prosecutor Rebecca Bush told him to say.

It is essential to remember that the circuit court denied Mr. Hayes's petition without an evidentiary hearing. This is improper. Because postconviction cases are "civil in nature," Walden v. State , 2016 Ark. 306, 498 S.W.3d 725, in the pleading stage, all allegations...