Hayes v. State

AMANDA PERRY HAYES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

NO. 14-18-00789-CR

State of Texas in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals

April 7, 2020

On Appeal from the 400th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 14-DCR-065915B

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Amanda Perry Hayes appeals her conviction for the felony offense of tampering with physical evidence. In a single issue, appellant contends that the trial court erroneously denied her motion to quash the indictment because the applicable limitations period expired before she was charged. We conclude, however, that the limitations period was tolled by the pendency of a prior indictment that charged appellant based on the same conduct. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to quash. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

Background

Laura Ackerson, a resident of Raleigh, North Carolina, was reported missing on July 18, 2011. Local police suspected that Grant Hayes, Ackerson's ex-husband, was involved in her disappearance. At that time, Grant was married to appellant. Grant and Ackerson were involved in a contentious custody dispute, and Ackerson was last seen heading to Grant's and appellant's apartment on July 13. Raleigh police officers recovered evidence implicating Grant and appellant in Ackerson's disappearance, which indicated that Ackerson may have been killed. For example, police learned that Grant purchased on July 14 a reciprocating saw, extra saw blades, waste bags, plastic sheeting, goggles, and gloves. The same day, appellant purchased bleach, gloves, and electrical tape. On July 16, Grant purchased several large coolers and bags of ice.

Officers searched appellant's apartment and noted a strong bleach smell and several bleached patches on the flooring. Additionally, items one would expect to find in an apartment, such as a shower curtain, were missing. After speaking to appellant's daughter, officers learned that a vacuum cleaner was missing; after viewing some photographs, the officers discovered several rugs were missing as well. Officers also discovered a note, purportedly signed by Ackerson, in which she agreed to give up custody of her children in exchange for $25,000. Police later recovered certain items from the trash company, some of which contained Ackerson's DNA.

Around the time that authorities began their investigation into Ackerson's disappearance, appellant and Hayes rented a U-Haul trailer and drove from Raleigh to Richmond, Texas. They brought with them their infant child and Grant's twochildren from his relationship with Ackerson. They told relatives they planned to deliver furniture to appellant's sister in Richmond.

After discovering that appellant and her family drove to Richmond, North Carolina police detectives investigating Ackerson's disappearance traveled there and contacted local officials. Based on information provided to police from appellant's sister in Richmond, police recovered Ackerson's dismembered body from a local creek. Appellant and Grant returned to North Carolina, where officials arrested them for Ackerson's murder.

Appellant was found guilty of second-degree murder in North Carolina and sentenced to 157 to 198 months' incarceration in the North Carolina Department of Corrections. Hayes was also found guilty of murder.

In Texas, meanwhile, appellant faced indictments relating to the disposal of Ackerson's body. In the first indictment, presented on April 7, 2014, cause number 14-DCR-065915, a Fort Bend County grand jury indicted appellant with the offense of tampering with physical evidence (the "original indictment"). At the top of the indictment, a table stated, "FELONY CHARGE: TAMP/FAB PHYS EVID W/INTENT TO IMPAIR HUM CORPSE/ F2," and the indictment contained the notation "37.09(c)" in the header. In the body of the original indictment, the State alleged:

The duly organized Grand Jury of Fort Bend County, Texas, presents in the District Court of Fort Bend County, Texas, that in Fort Bend County, Texas, [APPELLANT], hereinafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about July 24, 2011, then and there observe[d] a human corpse under circumstances in which a reasonable person would have believed that an offense had been committed, to-wit: murder or manslaughter, and the defendant did know or reasonably should have known that a law enforcement agency was not aware of the existence or location of the corpse, and the defendant did fail to report the existence of and location of the corpse to a law enforcement agency.

Notwithstanding the original indictment's header, which referenced a felony offense, the above-quoted language alleged a Class A misdemeanor offense of tampering with physical evidence. See Tex. Penal Code § 37.09(d)(2). The case was assigned to the 400th District Court of Fort Bend County. In early 2016, appellant was extradited from North Carolina to Texas to face the tampering with physical evidence charges.

Appellant was re-indicted on June 25, 2018, cause number 14-DCR-065915A, for the offense of tampering with physical evidence (the "second indictment"). The second indictment's table and header tracked those of the original indictment. However, the body of the indictment provided:

The duly organized Grand Jury of Fort Bend County, Texas, presents in the District Court of Fort Bend County, Texas, that in Fort Bend County, Texas, [APPELLANT], hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about JULY 20, 2011,

Paragraph I

did then and there, knowing that an investigation or official proceeding was pending or in progress, to wit: a missing persons or homicide investigation, intentionally or knowingly alter, destroy, or conceal a human corpse, with intent to impair its verity, legibility or availability as evidence in the investigation or official proceeding;

Paragraph II

did then and there, knowing that an offense had been committed, to wit: murder or manslaughter, intentionally or knowingly alter, destroy, or conceal a human corpse, with intent to impair its verity, legibility or availability as evidence in any subsequent investigation or official proceeding related to the offense[.]

The second indictment alleged a second-degree felony offense of tampering with a human corpse. See Tex. Penal Code § 37.09(a), (c). The case related to the second indictment was assigned to the 400th District Court of Fort Bend County.

On August 13, 2018, before appellant's trial commenced, the State re-indicted appellant, in cause number 14-DCR-065915B (the "third indictment"). The third indictment tracked the second indictment, but included the following tolling language:

And it is further presented that during a period from April 7, 2014 until August 13, 2018, an indictment charging the above offense was pending in a court of competent jurisdiction, namely cause number 14DCR65915 in the 400th District Court of Fort Bend County, Texas[.]

The third indictment was also assigned to the 400th District Court.

Appellant filed a motion to quash the second and third indictments. She sought to dismiss her prosecution pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 27.09(2) because the second and third indictments were not presented within the applicable limitations period for the felony offense of tampering with evidence and, appellant continued, the original indictment did not toll limitations. After a hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion to quash.

The State proceeded to trial under the third indictment. A jury convicted appellant of the second-degree felony offense of tampering with a human corpse as charged. The trial court sentenced appellant to twenty years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, to run after she completes her North Carolina sentence.

Appellant timely appealed.

Analysis

In one issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to quash the indictment because her prosecution under section 37.09 was barred by limitations. Specifically, appellant contends that (1) she was not charged with a felony offense until the second and third indictments, which were not presented untilafter limitations for such an offense expired, and (2) the original indictment charged only a misdemeanor and did not toll limitations because it was not filed in a court of competent jurisdiction.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to quash an indictment under a de novo standard because resolution generally does not turn on evaluation of witness testimony. See Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing State v. Moff, 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)); Brown v. State, 468 S.W.3d 158, 167-68 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd). A defendant must be given sufficient notice before trial of the "nature and cause" of the accusation against her to enable the defendant to anticipate the State's evidence and prepare a proper defense. Kfouri v. State, 312 S.W.3d 89, 91 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). An indictment must also satisfy the constitutional requirement of subject-matter jurisdiction over "an offense." Teal v. State, 230 S.W.3d 172, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

The statute of limitations for the felony offense of tampering with evidence falls within the general three-year limitations period for felonies. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 12.01(8). The offense at issue was alleged to have occurred on July 19, 2011. The limitations period therefore ended at midnight July 19, 2014. The original indictment was presented on April 7, 2014. The second and third indictments were not presented until June and August 2018, respectively. Thus, prosecution under the second and third indictments is barred unless the limitations period was tolled by the original indictment.

Article 12.05 tolls the limitations period "during the pendency...