Haynes v. City of Jr.

ROBYN HAYNES and ERIC JACKSON, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF DURHAM, N.C., MARK WENDELL BROWN, JR.;DANNY REAVES; TIMOTHY STANHOPE; LAWRENCE VAN DEWATER;VINCENT PEARSALL; and JERRY YOUNT, Defendants.

1:12cv1090

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

February 5, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Robyn Haynes and Eric Jackson bring this action against six Durham Police Department officers ("the Officer Defendants") and the City of Durham ("the City") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for various alleged violations of Plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights. Plaintiffs also allege several causes of action under the common law and Constitution of North Carolina. Before the court are the Officer Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 45) and the City's motion for summary judgment on all claims against it (Doc. 53). For the reasons set forth below, both motions will be granted. In addition, Plaintiffs move to exclude testimony from an expert witness. (Doc. 39.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of the case, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the nonmoving parties, are as follows:

On the morning of October 8, 2009, Jackson borrowed Haynes' car and drove it from a convenience store to his nearby home in Durham, North Carolina. (Doc. 51 at 24:10-15, 36:9-14, 37:11-23, 38:24-39:9.) After Jackson parked the car and began walking toward his home, Officer Mark Wendell Brown approached in his patrol car and ordered Jackson back into Haynes' car. (Id. at 39:2-11.) Jackson complied and produced his driver's license and Haynes' registration. (Id. at 40:11-20.) Brown refused to tell Jackson why he was being detained.¹ (Id. at 40:11-41:6.) Brown returned to his patrol car to write a citation, leaving Officer Lawrence Van Dewater with Jackson. (Doc. 48 at 13:20-14:3.)

While Brown was writing the citation, he called a K-9 unit to search for illegal drugs. (Id. at 14:6-13, 19:2-9.) The unit arrived and a dog was deployed, but the dog did not alert to the presence of illegal narcotics. (Id. at 22:5-6.) Brown then gaveJackson a citation for failing to maintain lane control and terminated the encounter. (Id. at 24:15-25:4.) Jackson went inside his home (Doc. 51 at 48:9-24)² while the officers retreated to a nearby side street and continued to monitor Jackson's home (Doc. 48 at 23:4-15).

Sometime later, Jackson emerged from his home and rolled a trash can to the street. (Doc. 51 at 48:9-24.) Brown inspected the contents of the trash can, finding loose tobacco shavings.³ (Id. at 53:1-11.) Believing this to be evidence of drug paraphernalia, Brown left to get a search warrant. (Doc. 51 at 53:1-11.) Corporal Vincent Pearsall approached Jackson's home and stood in the front doorway, preventing Jackson from closing the door. (Id. at 26:4-10.) Van Dewater and several other unidentified officers congregated on the front steps and in the street in front of Jackson's driveway. (Id. at 58:6-13.)

Jackson eventually tried to close the front door to his home. (Id. at 18-19:3.) This prompted Pearsall to yell, "Lock it down." (Id.) Pearsall and Van Dewater entered Jackson's living room,another officer used his cruiser to block Haynes' car in the driveway, and several other officers took up positions on Jackson's front porch. (Id. at 59:4-60:9, 64:2-14.) Feeling threatened, Jackson went outside and called 911 from his cell phone. (Id. at 61:3-9.) The officers then placed Jackson in handcuffs. (Id. at 61:10-12.)

At some point,⁴ Officer Jerry Yount arrived in response to Jackson's 911 call and observed the other officers surrounding Jackson's house. (Doc. 47 at 11:24-12:5.) Pearsall informed him that the officers were holding the house while they applied for a search warrant. (Id. at 17:6-12.) Pearsall then stepped away so that Jackson could speak freely with Yount. (Id. at 12:16-13:14.) Jackson told Yount that the officers were harassing him. (Id. at 19:2-5.) Yount responded that he would take Jackson's complaint, but that any report would need to be passed on to the district commander.⁵ (Id. at 12:16-13:14.) Jackson replied that he did not need to speak with Yount, and Yount left the scene.⁶ (Id.)

Eventually, Brown returned with a search warrant for Jackson's home and vehicle. (Doc. 51 at 64:21—65:5.) Jackson was placed in the backseat of a police car with the heat turned all the way up and the radio at full volume. (Id. at 65:11—66:3.) The officers then searched Jackson's home, finding a "tannish powdery substance" on a shelf in an upstairs bedroom.⁷ (Doc. 60 at 22:21—23:12.) Meanwhile, other officers searched Haynes' car, disassembling the vehicle as needed to search for hidden compartments. (Doc. 49 at 21:13—24:6.) Noticing a white powdery substance in the air ducts and vents behind a door panel, the officers removed the vents from the car for further testing.⁸ (Id. at 23:16—25:11.)

Jackson was arrested and transported to the Durham County Jail. (Doc. 51 at 76:23—77:2.) He was ultimately charged with possession of heroin and cocaine. (Id. 78:1—3.) Confirmatory testing at the North Carolina State Crime Laboratory revealed that the substances found in Haynes' car was sugar, and that the substance found in Jackson's home was tergitol, a chemical used in some detergents. (Doc. 59 at 29:18—32:7.) On January 12, 2010, the State dropped the criminal charges against Jackson. (Doc. 51at 90:3—9.) This action followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine dispute of material fact remains. Where the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if it demonstrates that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of her claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). But summary judgment will not be granted where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). For the purposes of these motions, the court regards statements of the nonmoving party as true and draws all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Id. at 255. But a nonmoving party must establish more than the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support his position." Id. at 252. If the evidence is "merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted). Ultimately, summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party fails to offer "evidence on which thejury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 252.

B. Unopposed Motions

Plaintiffs do not oppose summary judgment in favor of Defendants on many of the counts in this case. For example, Plaintiffs indicate that they do not intend to pursue claims against the City with regard to Counts I through IV.⁹ (Doc. 57 at 5.)¹⁰ Similarly, Plaintiffs do not dispute that their claims against the City in Counts VII through X are derivative of claims against the Officer Defendants that were dismissed by a prior order of this court. (Id. at 4.) Finally, Plaintiffs concede that their claims against the City for common law malicious prosecution and negligent supervision (Counts XI and XII) are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. (Id. at 11—12.) Accordingly, the court will enter summary judgment in favor of the City on Counts I through IV and VII through XII.

Plaintiffs also do not oppose the Officer Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim for concealment of evidence (Count III). (Id. at 8—9.) Although Plaintiffs disagree with the characterization of this claim as duplicative ofthe other § 1983 claims, they do not oppose a grant of summary judgment in favor of the Officer Defendants on Count III so long as they are permitted to present evidence regarding the Officer Defendants' alleged concealment. (Id.) Accordingly, the court will enter summary judgment in favor of the Officer Defendants on the concealment claim in Count III,¹¹ with the condition that doing so does not preclude Plaintiffs from presenting otherwise admissible and relevant evidence of the Officer Defendants' alleged concealment of evidence or any damages flowing therefrom.

C. Section 1983 Claims Against Yount

The Officer Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' remaining claims against Yount. In a prior order, the court dismissed most of the claims against Yount because the complaint did not allege that he searched Jackson's home or Haynes' car or otherwise contributed directly to Plaintiffs' alleged injuries. (Doc. 30 at 7—9.) As a result, the court concluded that Yount could only be liable on indirect theories, such as civil conspiracy or bystander liability under § 1983. (Id.) After discovery, the Officer Defendants now argue that Plaintiffs have failed to produce sufficient evidence from which to infer that Yount could be liable as a conspirator or bystander.

An officer is liable for § 1983 violations committed by other individuals if the officer conspired to do so. See Hafner v. Brown, 983 F.2d 570, 578 (4th Cir. 1992). "To establish a civil conspiracy under § 1983, [plaintiffs] must present evidence that [the defendants] acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy." Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996). Although plaintiffs "need not produce direct evidence of a meeting of the minds," they "must come forward with specific circumstantial evidence that each member of the alleged conspiracy shared the same conspiratorial objective." Id.

Absent evidence that a defendant...