Hayslett v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

636 F.Supp.3d 900

Redina HAYSLETT, Plaintiff, v. TYSON FOODS, INC., and its wholly Owned subsidiary, the Hillshire Brands Company, Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-1123-STA-jay

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division

Signed October 20, 2022

Teresa A. Luna, Spragins Barnett & Cobb, Jackson, TN, for Plaintiff.

J. Gregory Grisham, Fisher & Phillips, LLP, Memphis, TN, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

S. THOMAS ANDERSON, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

For over twenty-five years, Plaintiff Redina Hayslett worked for a series of different employers at a pork processing plant in Newbern, Tennessee. The plant is currently owned and operated by Defendants Tyson Foods, Inc. and The Hillshire Brands Company. On November 1, 2021, Defendants placed Plaintiff on unpaid leave because Plaintiff had not complied with a company policy requiring employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine and furnish proof of vaccination. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have terminated or constructively terminated her employment in violation of Tennessee's recently enacted law protecting employees who object to taking a COVID-19 vaccine. Defendants now seek the dismissal of Plaintiff's claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 11). The parties have fully briefed the issues, and the Motion is now ripe for determination. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an initial Complaint (ECF No. 1) on June 9, 2022.¹ For purposes of deciding Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, the Court accepts as true the following well-pleaded facts from the Complaint. Plaintiff had worked on a production line in Defendants' Newbern pork processing plant since 1996. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Other than taking a few days off as she recovered from surgery in 2019, Plaintiff had a perfect attendance record over nearly 26 years of service. (Id. ¶ 9.) On August 3, 2021, Defendants announced to all employees that as a condition of continued employment and in the absence of documented and approved reasonable accommodations for disability or sincerely held religious beliefs, practices, or observances, all U.S.-based Tyson employees would be required to be vaccinated against COVID-19 and to provide proof of vaccination. (Id. ¶ 10.) Employees, including Plaintiff, had to submit proof of vaccination no later than November 1, 2021. (Id. ¶ 11.)

When Plaintiff requested a religious accommodation, Defendants offered her up to one year of absence without pay that would commence November 1, 2021. (Id. ¶ 15.) Defendants explained to Plaintiff that her other options were taking the vaccine or termination. (Id. ¶ 16.) After Defendants refused Plaintiff's request for an alternative accommodation (Id. ¶ 17), Plaintiff elected to take the unpaid leave of absence, effective November 1, 2021. (Id. ¶ 18.) In May 2022, Plaintiff notified Defendants she no longer wanted to remain on unpaid leave and requested a return to work. (Id. ¶ 20.) Defendants refused her request to come back without first receiving the vaccine. (Id. ¶ 21.)

Based on these factual premises, the Complaint alleges that Defendants have terminated or constructively terminated Plaintiff's employment in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 14-2-102(a), Tennessee's statutory protection for individuals who harbor an objection to taking a COVID-19 vaccine. In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Tennessee law. Title 14 of the Tennessee Code Annotated took effect on November 12, 2021. Defendants placed Plaintiff on administrative leave on November 1, 2021, before the Tennessee's law effective date. As a result, Plaintiff cannot state a claim based on her unpaid administrative leave. Plaintiff responds that her unpaid administrative leave is an ongoing act of discrimination. While the act may have begun before Title 14's effective date, Defendants' discrimination continued beyond that date. Plaintiff argues then that she has a plausible claim for relief under Title 14. In their reply, Defendants counter that their decision to place Plaintiff on unpaid administrative leave is a discrete act of the sort that would typically trigger a cause of action under anti-discrimination law. Plaintiff cannot create a fresh claim of discrimination based on a discrete act that occurred before the Tennessee law took effect.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A defendant may move to dismiss a claim "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must treat all of the well-pleaded allegations of the pleadings as true and construe all of the allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Saylor v. Parker Seal Co., 975 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir. 1992). However, legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences need not be accepted as true. Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). "To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations with respect to all material elements of the claim." Wittstock v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 2003).

Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although this standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," it does require more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 622 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

In this case the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction by virtue of the parties' diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A federal court sitting in diversity applies the law of the forum state, including the forum's choice-of-law rules. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582, 187 L.Ed.2d 487 (2013); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 723 F.3d 690, 692 (6th Cir. 2013). As in any case where the Court has jurisdiction based on the parties' diversity of citizenship and Tennessee law applies, the Court has as its task to anticipate or predict how the Tennessee Supreme Court would decide the issues based on all of the available data. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415, 422 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Berrington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 696 F.3d 604, 607 (6th Cir. 2012)). This includes the published opinions of the Tennessee Court of Appeals. Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 912 F.3d 348, 358 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4(G)(2) for the proposition that a published opinion of the Tennessee Court of Appeals is "controlling authority for all purposes unless and until such opinion is reversed or modified by a court of competent jurisdiction").

ANALYSIS

The issue presented is whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief under Tennessee statutory law based on Plaintiff's refusal to take the COVID-19 vaccine. The Tennessee General Assembly enacted Title 14 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, effective November 12, 2021, to create a number of protections related to COVID-19. Tenn. Code Ann. § 14-1-103 ("The purpose of this title is to safeguard the constitutional rights and liberty interests of persons during the COVID-19 pandemic."). Plaintiff alleges her claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 14-2-102(a), the Title 14 provision addressed to COVID-19 vaccination status. That section prohibits a "private business, governmental entity, school, or local education agency" from "compel[ling] or otherwise tak[ing] an adverse action against a person to compel the person to provide proof of vaccination if the person objects to receiving a COVID-19 vaccine for any reason." § 14-2-102(a). Tenn. Code Ann. § 14-2-102(a) requires a person injured under the section to prove the following elements: (1) that a "private business" or other covered entity (2) compelled the person to provide "proof of vaccination" or, in the alternative, took an "adverse action" against the person to compel the person to provide "proof of vaccination" (3) over the person's objection to receiving a COVID-19 vaccine for any reason. Sadler v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-2203, 2022 WL 1721058, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. May 27, 2022); see also Edward G. Phillips & Brandon L. Morrow, Not-So-Conscientious Objections: Tennessee's New Law to Combat Vaccine Mandates, 58 Tenn. Bar J. 44, 45 (Feb. 2022) ("Speaking of objections, on what grounds can employees object to the vaccine? The answer: on any ground they want."). Title 14 grants a person injured as a result of such a violation a private right of action to seek "injunctive relief and to recover compensatory damages and reasonable attorneys' fees against an alleged violator." § 14-6-103.

Defendants do not specifically contest the Complaint's failure to allege any of the elements of a Title 14 claim. The question in this case is whether the Complaint has plausibly alleged that Defendants took "adverse action" against Pla...