Headen v. Clarke

MALCOLM HEADEN Plaintiff v. OFFICER THOMAS CLARKE, LT. JOHN MCCROREY and OFFICER GREGORY HOLMAN Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-CV-3016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

April 2, 2019

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOYNER, J.

This civil rights action is now before the Court on motion of the defendants for summary judgment. For the reasons which follow, the motion shall be granted and judgment entered in favor of Defendants as a matter of law.

History of the Case

According to the averments set forth in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, at approximately 10 p.m. on February 17, 2016 Defendants, all of whom are Philadelphia police officers, came to his residence at 1705 Georges Lane in Philadelphia to execute a search warrant. The warrant had been obtained based upon a February 12, 2016 report from a civilian complainant¹ that hiscousin, Alanshaun Headen with whom Plaintiff resided, had slashed the tires of his car, broken the drivers' side window and stolen a firearm along with two 7-shot magazines from his vehicle. The search warrant authorized the search of Plaintiff's residence at 1705 Georges Lane for the weapon and magazines.

At the time of the search, Plaintiff was the only person at home. Although the weapon that had been designated on the warrant was not discovered, during the search Defendants found a large quantity of marijuana, crack cocaine and over $2,000 in cash in one of the bedrooms, some 348 grams of marijuana and a digital scale in the kitchen and additional marijuana, a firearm with an obliterated serial number and over $1,000 in cash in the basement of the house. Although nothing was discovered in Plaintiff's bedroom, he was nevertheless arrested and charged with Manufacture/Delivery/Possession with Intent to Manufacture or Deliver narcotics in violation of 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(16), (30) and Possession of a Firearm with Altered Manufacturer's number in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. §6110.2. Plaintiff remained incarcerated until March 4, 2016 when he was finally able to post bail. The charges against him were eventually dismissed one year later on February 23, 2017 when a motion to suppress evidence was granted.

Plaintiff instituted suit on February 20, 2018 by filing a Writ of Summons in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Following the filing of a Complaint, Defendants removed this matter to this Court on July 19, 2018. An Amended Complaint was filed on August 15, 2018 and following the filing of a second Motion to Dismiss, Count I of the Amended Complaint purporting to assert a cause of action against the City of Philadelphia was dismissed. Discovery has since closed and the remaining defendants (the individual police officers) now move for the entry of judgment in their favor on the two counts left standing - for malicious prosecution and arrest without probable cause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and arrest without probable cause under Pennsylvania common law.

Standards for Adjudicating Summary Judgment Motions

The general principles underscoring motions for summary judgment are outlined broadly in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Under subsection (a),

A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense - or the part of each claim or defense - on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, a reviewing court must view the facts in the light most favorable to thenon-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Burton v. Teleflex, Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013); Roth v. Norfalco, LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2011). "The moving party 'bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'" El v. SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2007)(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed.2d 265 (1986)). An issue of fact is material and genuine if it "affects the outcome of the suit under the governing law and could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party." Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2016)(quoting Willis v. UPMC Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 2015)).

Further, inferences must flow directly from admissible evidence. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014). In order to survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence - there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. Burton, supra,(quoting Jakimas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Discussion

As stated above, in Count II of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff raises claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution against the three individual Philadelphia police officers who executed the search warrant and arrested him pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Count III of the Amended Complaint appears to aver a cause of action for false arrest under Pennsylvania state law.

Turning first to Plaintiff's federal claims, we note that Section 1983 reads as follows in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. ...

Section 1983 thereby "creates a cause of action against every person who under color of any state law ... subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within [its] jurisdiction to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution" and "provides a remedy for violations of federal law by personsacting pursuant to state law." See, Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 1998); Harvey v. Renewal, Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:15-133, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4737 at *17 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2016). It has therefore been said that "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution that it describes." Pearson v. Prison Health Service, 850 F.3d 526, 534, n.2 (3d Cir. 2017)(quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144,, n.3, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 61 L. Ed.2d 433 (1979)). Thus, to establish a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) there was a violation of a right under the Constitution and (2) the violation was caused by a person acting under color of State law. Diaz v. Bullock, 268 F. Supp. 3d 640, 647 (D. N.J. 2017)(citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 101 L. Ed.2d 40 (1988)).

"[T]he threshold inquiry in a §1983 suit ... requires courts to 'identify the specific constitutional right' at issue" and, "[a]fter pinpointing that right, courts still must determine the elements of, and rules associated with, an action seeking damages for its violation." Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920, 197 L. Ed.2d 312 (2017)(citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S. Ct. 807, 127 L. Ed.2d 114 (1994) andCarey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-258, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed.2d 252 (1978)).

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff identifies the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as the sources of the Constitutional rights which he alleges were violated by Defendants insofar as he was entitled "to be free from arrests without probable cause and/or legal justification and from malicious prosecution, and to due process." (Pl's Am. Compl., ¶37). It is of course axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures of people and property and guarantees that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The Fourteenth Amendment, in turn, provides the following in pertinent part:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, §1.

Thus, "[b]y virtue of its 'incorporation' into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment requires the States to provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142-143, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2694, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1979). Accordingly, the proper inquiry in a Section 1983 claim based on false arrest is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the...