Headley v. Williams

590 S.E.2d 443

162 NC App. 300

Charlene R. HEADLEY, as Administratrix of the Estate of Larry Stephen Headley, Plaintiff v. Jennifer Lynn WILLIAMS, Defendant.

No. COA03-284.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

January 20, 2004.

Horack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, P.A., by Neil C. Williams, Charlotte, for plaintiff-appellant.

Davis & Hamrick, L.L.P., by Kent L. Hamrick, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellant.

HUNTER, Judge.

Charlene R. Headley ("plaintiff"), as Administratrix of the Estate of Larry Stephen Headley ("Headley"), appeals from a directed verdict entered against her on 19 November 2002. Jennifer Lynn Williams ("defendant") cross-appeals from the denial of her motion to be awarded the costs of the action. Because plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to withstand a directed verdict, we reverse and remand.

On 20 June 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging the wrongful death of Headley, plaintiff's husband, caused by defendant's negligence. Prior to beginning the trial of this case on 4 November 2002, the trial court ordered the trial bifurcated into the issues of liability and damages. The trial court also granted defendant's motion in limine and excluded evidence that defendant had been convicted of Driving While Impaired ("DWI") in a matter unrelated to this case.

Plaintiff's evidence presented at trial tends to show that on the evening of 29 November 1999, Headley was riding a motorcycle heading in a southeasterly direction on Castle Ford Road in Watauga County, North Carolina. Defendant was operating a motor vehicle headed in the opposite direction on the same road. At some point as both vehicles negotiated a curve in the road they collided. Headley was thrown from his motorcycle and was later found lying in a ditch on the side of the road. He was taken to Watauga Medical Center where he was pronounced dead as a result of chest and abdominal trauma suffered in the accident. Other than defendant, there were no surviving eyewitnesses to the collision.

Christopher Mason ("Mason") testified that he was driving behind Headley on Castle Fork Road on the night of the accident. He followed Headley through a series of "S" shaped curves, where he would temporarily lose sight of Headley and then regain sight on the other side of the curve. Mason was driving at about 30-35 miles per hour and maintaining a consistent distance between himself and Headley, although he noticed that he was actually gaining ground on Headley. Mason stated that Headley seemed to be driving at a safe speed and operating his motorcycle normally. Mason followed Headley for approximately a mile and a half. As Mason came out of a curve, he saw what appeared to be a flashing light ahead of him and defendant's vehicle stopped directly in front of him in his lane of travel. Mason, upon seeing scrape marks in the road, later realized the flashing light he saw was Headley's motorcycle spinning down the road. Mason testified that he observed debris from the collision in Headley's lane of travel and scrape marks from the spinning motorcycle. Mason also testified that he had occasion to look inside defendant's vehicle as he was asking the State Trooper if he could leave, and witnessed three or four open and empty beer bottles on the floorboard of the passenger side of the vehicle.

Doug Garland, a trooper with the State Highway Patrol ("Trooper Garland"), testified he was called to the scene of the accident. Trooper Garland observed that the front portion of defendant's car was in Headley's lane of travel with the left front portion near the white fog line. He also observed damage to the left front portion of defendant's vehicle. Headley's motorcycle was located seventy feet further up the road from defendant's vehicle in Headley's lane of travel and was laying on its left side. The motorcycle was damaged at the rear. Field sketches made at the scene by Trooper Garland on the night of the accident indicate that defendant crossed the center line leaving skid marks. These field sketches also indicate that Headley's motorcycle skidded past defendant's car and spun around leaving scratch marks in the road. Trooper Garland noted at least two gouge marks in Headley's lane of travel. He testified that these marks can be indicative of where a collision occurred as they are caused by metal from vehicles being forced downward into the road surface from the force of a collision. On the night of the accident, based on his investigation of the crash scene, Trooper Garland was of the opinion that the accident was caused by defendant crossing the center line and striking Headley's motorcycle.

Trooper Garland also testified that he noticed defendant had a restriction on her driver's license requiring her to wear corrective lenses. As part of his investigation, Trooper Garland asked to see if defendant was wearing contact lenses. Defendant replied that she thought she had cried one out. Defendant did not have a contact lens in either eye. On cross-examination, Trooper Garland stated that his opinion of how the accident occurred changed following the night of the accident and he now believed the accident occurred because Headley had crossed the center line. On redirect examination, however, Trooper Headley admitted he was unable to pinpoint the point of impact, but instead could only indicate a general area in which the impact likely occurred.

Plaintiff also read into evidence a deposition taken of defendant prior to trial, in which she admitted telling Trooper Garland that she had cried out her contact lenses. Defendant also stated in her deposition that she had those lost contacts replaced just a week or so after the accident by Dr. Jack Lawrence ("Dr.Lawrence") from Watauga Eye Center. Dr. Lawrence testified that he was an optometrist and that defendant had been a patient of his, but that he had not seen her since 1996 when he had ordered her contact lenses, which she never returned to collect. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the trial court granted a directed verdict for defendant based upon the testimony of Trooper Garland on the ground that the evidence established Headley was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.

The issues are whether the trial court: (I) erred in directing a verdict for defendant on the ground of Headley's contributory negligence; (II) abused its discretion in excluding evidence of defendant's subsequent DWI conviction; and (III) properly bifurcated the trial on the issues of liability and damages. The sole issue on defendant's cross-appeal is (IV) whether the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for costs.

I.

Plaintiff first contends the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict for defendant on the ground that plaintiff was contributorily negligent based upon the changed opinion of Trooper Garland. We agree.

"A motion for directed verdict tests the sufficiency of the evidence to take [a] case to the jury." Abels v. Renfro Corp., 335 N.C. 209, 214, 436 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1993). In ruling on a directed verdict motion, a trial court "must examine all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the nonmoving party must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence." Id. at 214-15, 436 S.E.2d at 825. "`If there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each element of the plaintiff's case, the directed verdict motion should be denied.'" Stamm v. Salomon, 144 N.C.App. 672, 679, 551 S.E.2d 152, 157 (2001) (quoting Little v. Matthewson, 114 N.C.App. 562, 565, 442 S.E.2d 567, 569 (1994)). "`In deciding the motion, the trial court must treat [plaintiff's] evidence as true, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to [plaintiff] and resolving all inconsistencies, contradictions and conflicts for [plaintiff], giving [plaintiff] the benefit of all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence.'" Cobb v. Reitter, 105 N.C.App. 218, 221, 412 S.E.2d 110, 111 (1992) (quoting McFetters v. McFetters, 98 N.C.App. 187, 191, 390 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1990)).

"A directed verdict for defendant on the ground that plaintiff was contributorily negligent is proper only if the evidence establishes the contributory negligence of the plaintiff as a matter of law." Id. at 221, 412 S.E.2d at 112. "In determining whether plaintiff is contributori[ly] negligent as a matter of law, `the question is whether the evidence establishes plaintiff's negligence so clearly that no other reasonable inference or conclusion may be drawn therefrom.'" Id. (quoting Screaming Eagle Air, Ltd. v. Airport Comm. of Forsyth County, 97 N.C.App. 30, 37, 387 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1990)). "A directed verdict based on plaintiff's contributory negligence is not proper `when other reasonable inferences may be drawn or when there are material conflicts in the evidence.'" Id. at 222, 412 S.E.2d at 112 (quoting Stancil v. Blackmon, 8 N.C.App. 499, 502, 174 S.E.2d 880, 882 (1970)).

At the outset, we note that this case was previously before this Court after the trial court granted summary judgment for defendant. See Headley v. Williams, 150 N.C.App. 590, 563 S.E.2d 630 (2002). In reversing the trial court's summary judgment ruling this Court stated:

Based upon our review of the evidentiary materials in the record before us, we conclude there are genuine issues of fact which are material to the questions of whether defendant was negligent and whether such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. There was evidence that decedent had been operating his motorcycle within the speed limit and entirely within his travel lane for some distance before the collision, and there was no evidence of any condition of the roadway which may have caused him to lose control in the vicinity where the collision occurred. Immediately after the collision, defendant's car was found at rest across the center line of the

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