Healey v. Carter

109 N.E.3d 1043

Nathan HEALEY, Appellant-Petitioner,

v.Robert CARTER, Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Corrections, et al., Appellees-Respondents.

Court of Appeals Case No. 76A03-1711-MI-2681

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED August 21, 2018

Attorney for Appellant: Michael D. Dean, Gibson Law Office, Lafayette, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee Robert Carter: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Frances Barrow, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Robb, Judge.

Case Summary and Issue

[1] Nathan Healey pleaded guilty to criminal confinement, a Class D felony. Following his release from the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC"), the DOC required Healey to register as a sex offender, even though Healey did not plead to the circumstances in which criminal confinement constitutes a sex offense. Having registered as a sex offender in the years since his release, Healey brought this declaratory judgment action seeking relief from the DOC's determination that he must register as a sex offender. The trial court denied Healey's petition along with a subsequent motion to correct errors. Healey now appeals raising the sole issue of whether the trial court erred in denying his petition for declaratory relief. Concluding the trial court did not err, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 4, 2007, Healey was charged with criminal confinement against a child, a Class C felony, and battery against a child resulting in bodily injury, a Class D felony. Seventeen months later, an additional count was added to the information charging Healey with criminal confinement, a Class D felony. In May 2009, Healey pleaded guilty to criminal confinement, a Class D felony, and, pursuant to the written plea agreement, the remaining charges were dismissed. Healey was sentenced to three years with all but 270 days suspended.

[3] After Healey served his executed sentence, the DOC required him to register as a sex offender for life because the victim of Healey's offense was less than "twelve (12) years of age at the time of the crime." Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(c) (2007) ; see Appellant's Second Amended Appendix, Volume 2 at 16. Healey registered on June 16, 2009.

[4] On May 3, 2017, Healey filed a verified petition for declaratory relief, asking to be relieved of his duty to register as a sex offender because he never pleaded to the age of the victim. Healey named the commissioner of the DOC, Robert Carter; the Steuben County prosecutor; and the Steuben County sheriff as respondents. Carter responded to Healey's petition through counsel, the Indiana Attorney General, seeking dismissal, or in the alternative, denial of relief.¹

[5] The parties waived a formal evidentiary hearing and instead submitted a joint stipulation of facts to the trial court. On September 6, 2017, the trial court issued its Order:

1. On December 30, 2008 Healey was charged with having committed the offense of criminal confinement as set forth at Ind. Code 35-42-3-3(a)(1), a Class D Felony.

2. The crime for which Healey was charged with having committed [sic] occurred on July 4, 2007.

3. On July 4, 2007, Ind. Code 35-42-3-3(a)(1) provided as follows:

"(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) confines another person without the other person's consent; ...commits criminal confinement. Except as provided in subsection (b), the offense of criminal confinement is a Class D Felony."

4. The criminal charge identified the victim as "Z.M." The age of Z.M. was not set forth in the criminal charge.

5. On July 4, 2007, Ind. Code 11-8-8-4.5 set forth those crimes for which if a person should be convicted of having committed [sic] would mandate the person to register as a sex offender.

6. Ind. Code 11-8-8-4.5(12) provided as follows:

"(12) Criminal confinement ( IC 35-42-3-3 ), if the victim is less than eighteen (18) years of age, and the person who confined or removed the victim is not the victim's parent or guardian."

7. On May 9, 2009, Healey entered a plea of guilty to having committed the offense of criminal confinement as charged under the provisions of Ind. Code 35-42-3-3(a)(1), and thereafter was sentenced in accordance with his Plea Agreement.

8. Healey does not contend that he was unaware of the fact that the victim of his crime was under the age of eighteen (18) years. Further, Healey does not contend that he was the parent or guardian of Z.M.

9. Healey argues that requiring him to register as a sex offender is a penalty or punishment that is based upon a fact to which he did not plead guilty.

10. It is true that the State's charging information regarding Count III was silent as to the age of Z.M., and to his relationship to Z.M.

11. Ind. Code 35-42-3-3(a)(1) does not set forth the age of the victim as an element of the offense which must be proven by the State by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

12. Ind. Code 35-42-3-3(a)(1) does not set forth the relationship of the Defendant to the victim as being an element of the offense of criminal confinement which must be proven by the State by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

13. In the case of Nichols v. State , 947 N.E.2d 1011 (Ind. [Ct.] App. 2011) the Court at page 1017 held:

"The Sex Offender Registration Act requires that the DOC maintain a registry of sex offenders, and requires that offenders register with the Department. Placement on the Registry is mandatory, and the Act affords neither the trial court nor the DOC any discretion in the matter of the registration requirement....Plea agreements have no effect on operation of the Act..." (Citations omitted) (Quotation marks omitted)

14. In accordance with existing Indiana Law the moment the trial court entered judgment upon Healey's plea of guilty to the crime of criminal confinement his fate was sealed regarding whether he was or was not required to register as a sex offender all in accordance with law barring any constitutional infirmities with the enacted legislation.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1. [Carter's] Motion to Dismiss shall be denied.

2. Healey's Petition for Declaratory Relief shall be denied.

Appellant's Second Amended App., Vol, 2 at 39-42. Healey filed a motion to correct error which was similarly denied. Healey now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Healey contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his petition for declaratory judgment because the trial court may review the constitutionality of agency decisions and because the DOC's registration requirement violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.

I. Standard of Review

[7] We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. Kashman v. Haas , 766 N.E.2d 417, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). And where, as here, the issues involve matters of law, we review the trial court's decision de novo. City of Indianapolis v. Hicks , 932 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

II. Judicial Review

[8] Healey claims the trial court erred in concluding "that it did not have authority to rule on the constitutionality of a sex offender registration decision made by the [DOC]." Appellant's Brief at 11. Specifically, the trial court concluded:

14. In accordance with existing Indiana Law the moment the trial court entered judgment upon Healey's plea of guilty to the crime of criminal confinement his fate was sealed regarding whether he was or was not required to register as a sex offender all in accordance with law barring any constitutional infirmities with the enacted legislation.

Appellant's Second Amended App., Vol. 2 at 42. Viewed in the context of Healey's Sixth Amendment claim, the trial court's order could be read as concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review a DOC action, "barring any constitutional infirmities with the enacted legislation." Id.

[9] In 1994, Congress adopted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration Act to encourage individual states to adopt sex offender registration statutes. Wallace v. State , 905 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind. 2009). Soon thereafter, the Indiana General Assembly adopted the Sex Offender Registration Act ("SORA"), also known as "Zachary's Law," which required persons convicted of certain sex crimes to register as "sex offender[s]." Id. at 375 (citing Act of March 2, 1994, Pub.L. No. 11-1994, § 7). SORA originally applied to eight crimes and included both registration and notification provisions. Id. Since then, SORA has been amended several times, and actively expanded "in both breadth and scope." Id.

[10] The General Assembly delegated administrative authority over SORA to the DOC. See Ind. Code § 11-8-2-12.4.

As an administrative agency, the DOC is governed generally by the Indiana Administrative Orders and Procedures Act ("IAOPA"). Pierce v. State Dep't of Correction , 885 N.E.2d 77, 88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). IAOPA provides the "exclusive means for judicial review of an agency action." Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-1. The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the party asserting its invalidity. Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(a). And, a reviewing court shall grant relief only if it determines that a person seeking judicial relief has been prejudiced by an agency action that is:

(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;

(2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;

(4) without observance of procedure required by law; or

(5) unsupported by substantial evidence.

Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(d).

[11] The IAOPA expressly exempts "certain agency actions" of the DOC from administrative judicial review. Ind. Code § 4-21.5-2-5(6) (exempting "[a]n agency action related to an offender within the jurisdiction of the department of correction."). However, nothing in this provision prevents judicial review over alleged violations of constitutional protections and...