Heard v. State

1

Carlos Heard, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. A23-1511

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

June 10, 2024

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-10-34107

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D Schulz, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mary F Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam Petras, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Cleary, Judge. ^[*]

SYLLABUS

Assuming the Teague standard applies to state statutory and substantive law, neither State v. Coleman, 957 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 2021), nor State v. Noor, 964 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. 2021), announced new rules of law concerning the mental-state element of third-degree depraved-mind murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a) (2020) and thus do not apply retroactively to convictions that were final when Coleman and Noor were announced.

OPINION

BRATVOLD, Judge

Over ten years ago, in 2011, the district court convicted appellant Carlos Heard of third-degree depraved-mind murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a) (2004),^[1] after Heard killed his brother as they struggled over a gun. In 2023, Heard petitioned for postconviction relief, arguing that his third-degree murder conviction must be reversed under the Minnesota Supreme Court's 2021 decisions in Coleman and Noor. The district court refused to apply these decisions to Heard's case, reasoning that Coleman and Noor were not new interpretations of law, and denied Heard's petition.

Heard appeals the district court's order denying relief and argues that his petition is not barred by the timing and procedural limitations for bringing a postconviction petition for two reasons. First, he argues that he is entitled to postconviction relief under the exception for new interpretations of law and that Coleman and Noor apply retroactively to his conviction. Second, in the alternative, Heard contends that he is entitled to postconviction relief under the interests-of-justice exceptions. He argues that, even if Coleman and Noor did not announce new rules of law, the district court erred because it did not properly apply the old rules of law that Coleman and Noor discussed. The state contends that Heard's petition is untimely and procedurally barred; the rules of law stated in Coleman and Noor are old, not new; and the interests-of-justice exceptions do not apply. The state alternatively argues that Heard's claim lacks merit.

We begin by considering the timing and procedural limitations for postconviction petitions and conclude, as Heard appears to concede, that his postconviction petition is untimely unless he can prove an exception applies. We then consider whether Heard has met his burden of proof for the new-interpretation-of-law exception. Assuming the Teague standard applies,^[2] we determine that Coleman and Noor did not announce new rules of law. Finally, we consider whether Heard has proved the interests-of-justice exceptions. While Heard is correct that the old rules restated in Coleman and Noor apply to his conviction, we reject the argument that his petition should be heard in the interests of justice. We conclude that Heard's petition is untimely and that no exception applies. Thus, we affirm the district court's decision to deny Heard's postconviction petition.

FACTS

In 2011, following a jury trial, the district court convicted Heard of two counts of murder-(1) the third-degree murder of his brother, Jermaine, under Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a) and (2) the second-degree murder of Leroy Kennedy under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2004). State v. Heard, No. A11-1628, 2012 WL 3263775, at *1 (Minn.App. Aug. 13, 2012), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2012). According to evidence elicited at trial, Heard fatally shot his brother as they struggled over a gun near a Minneapolis alley; Heard then intentionally shot Kennedy. Id. at *1-2. The state's witnesses testified that Kennedy owed money to Jermaine and that the brothers planned to confront Kennedy in the alley, but once in the alley, the brothers disagreed and Heard shot Jermaine and Kennedy. Id. The district court sentenced Heard to consecutive sentences of 180 and 313 months in prison for his third- and second-degree murder convictions, respectively. Id. at *1. Heard filed a direct appeal, this court affirmed both convictions, and the Minnesota Supreme Court denied review on October 24, 2012. Id. at *6. Heard did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, so his convictions became final 90 days after that, on January 22, 2013. See Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (setting the 90-day deadline for petitioning for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court).

We are considering Heard's fifth postconviction appeal. We briefly discuss each of the previous petitions. In 2014, Heard petitioned for postconviction relief. Heard v. State, No. A14-1578, 2015 WL 1758005, at *1 (Minn.App. Apr. 20, 2015). The district court denied his petition, determining that his claims were barred by State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976).^[3] Id. This court affirmed, concluding that Knaffla barred many of his claims and that his ineffective-assistance claim lacked merit. Id. at *1-2.

Heard filed a second petition for postconviction relief. Heard v. State, No. A20-0672, 2020 WL 7490504, at *1 (Minn.App. Dec. 21, 2020). The district court denied his petition, determining that his claims were Knaffla-barred, and Heard did not appeal. Id. Heard then moved to dismiss for lack of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, which the district court treated as a third petition for postconviction relief. Id. The district court denied Heard's third petition as Knaffla-barred, and he did not appeal. Id. Heard filed a fourth petition for postconviction relief. Id. The district court denied his petition, determining that his claims were Knaffla-barred and failed on their merits, and this court affirmed. Id. at *1, *3.

The Minnesota Supreme Court decided Coleman on March 31, 2021, 957 N.W.2d at 72, and it decided Noor on September 15, 2021, 964 N.W.2d at 424. On March 27, 2023, within two years of the Coleman decision, Heard filed a fifth petition for postconviction relief. He argued that Coleman and Noor applied retroactively to his conviction and that, under the rules announced in Coleman and Noor, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for third-degree depraved-mind murder because the state failed to prove the requisite act and mental state and the particular-person exclusion applied. The district court denied Heard's petition after determining that Coleman and Noor did not apply retroactively to Heard's conviction, reasoning that neither decision announced a new rule of law. The district court did not specifically address the parties' arguments on the timing and procedural requirements for Heard's petition.

Heard appeals.

ISSUE

Did the district court err by denying postconviction relief after determining that neither Coleman nor Noor announced or restated a rule of law that applies to Heard's third-degree murder conviction?

ANALYSIS

Appellate courts generally review a district court's denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). "A [district] court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings." Id. (quotation omitted). Legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Id. Whether a rule of law "applies retroactively to convictions that were final when the rule was announced is a legal question that [appellate courts] review de novo." Johnson v. State, 916 N.W.2d 674, 681 (Minn. 2018).

A petition for postconviction relief is subject to timing and procedural limitations, including a two-year statutory time limit for filing a petition, Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd 4(a) (2022), and a procedural bar rejecting claims that were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous postconviction petition, Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775, 787 (Minn. 2013); Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741. The parties appear to agree that exceptions to these rules must apply for Heard's postconviction petition to be considered on its merits. Heard filed this postconviction petition well after the two-year limitations period had expired for filing a postconviction petition, and his other four petitions have challenged his third-degree murder conviction.

Thus, we consider whether Heard's claim satisfies either of the two asserted exceptions to the timing and procedural limitations for postconviction relief. See Gilbert v. State, 2 N.W.3d 483, 488-89 (Minn. 2024) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to determine whether appellant's postconviction petition was procedurally barred under Knaffla, and then determining that the petition was Knaffla-barred).

A. Heard does not overcome the two-year statutory time bar under the new-interpretation-of-law exception.

A district court may consider a petition filed after the two-year statutory time limit if any one of five exceptions applies. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (2022). "Any petition invoking an exception . . . must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises." Id., subd. 4(c) (2022). Heard contends that the exception for new interpretations of law applies because his petition alleged that Coleman and Noor announced "a new interpretation of law that is retroactively applicable to his case." See id. subd. 4(b)(3) (providing that a court may...