Heard v. Thomas

APRIL HEARD, and DERRICKIA HEARD, Plaintiffs, v. MONIQUE THOMAS, Defendant.

No. 2:20-cv-2335-MSN-cgc

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division

April 5, 2022

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REMOVE APRIL HEARD AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND

MARK S. NORRIS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Before the Court is Defendant Monique Thomas' (“Defendant”) Motion to Remove April Heard as Parent and Next Friend or, in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to Prosecute Under Name of Real Party in Interest, docketed March 25, 2022. (“Motion”) (ECF No. 90.) Plaintiffs responded in opposition on April 8, 2022. (ECF No. 97.) For the reasons below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, whenever a minor has a representative, such as ‘a general guardian,' the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the minor.” J.H. v. Williamson Cnty., No 3:14-2356, 2016 WL 6071892, *3 (M.D. Tenn. 2016); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c). “State law controls the question whether the represented party's disability has ended during the action ....” Kloian v. Simon (In re Kloian), 179 Fed.Appx. 262, 265 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1570, at 507 (1990) (“Wright & Miller, § 1570”)); see, e.g., Grady v. Madison Cnty., No. 1:19-cv-01153-STA-tmp, 2020 WL 3036891, *15 (W.D. Tenn. 2020) (citing Tennessee law for the proposition that minors cannot bring a lawsuit on their own); Davis v. Panda Express, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-728-RGJ, 2021 WL 2903240, *6 (W.D. Ky. 2021) (applying state law to determine whether a minor may disavow a contract); Williamson Cnty. 2016 WL 6071892 at *3 (“Under Tennessee law, a parent may maintain a civil action as next friend on behalf of her minor child.”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)(1) (“law of the individual's domicile” controls that individual's capacity to be sued). Once a court determines that a minor has reached the age of majority under state law, “the fiduciary loses authority to maintain the suit on behalf of the former infant ....” Kloian, 179 Fed.Appx. at 266 (quoting Wright & Miller, § 1570 at 507); see, e.g., M.P.T.C. v. Nelson Cnty. Sch. Dist., 192 F.Supp.3d 798, 811 (W.D. Ky. 2016) (“To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to amend the case caption to substitute his initials with his full name because he has reached the age of majority, the Court grants the relief.”) One district court has even “held that service upon a former minor's [guardian ad litem] was ‘no service' because the minor had reached the age of majority.” Kloian, 179 Fed.Appx. at 266 (citing Mason v. Royal Indem. Co., 35 F.Supp. 477, 48081 (N.D.Ga. 1940)). Others have explained, “[t]he decision to appoint a ‘next friend' . . . rests with the sound discretion of the district court and will be disturbed only for an abuse of discretion.” Scannavino v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 242 F.R.D. 662, 666 (M.D. Fla. 2007).

DISCUSSION

Defendant has moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) to remove Plaintiff April Heard as Parent and Next Friend of D.H. because Derrickia Heard is a real party in interest who attained the age of majority since this litigation began.^[1] Specifically, Defendant references the Sixth Circuit's decision in Wilson v. Webb, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23585, 2000 WL 1359624 (6th Cir. 2000) as authority for her claim that this litigation should continue in Derrickia Heard's name.^[2](ECF No. 90-1 at PageID 1093.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff April Heard should no longer appear as Parent and Next Friend of D.H because Derrickia Heard has reached the age of majority in Tennessee. (Id.) Defendant submits in the alternative that the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to prosecute.^[3] (Id. at PageID 1096.) Plaintiffs respond that April Heard does have a claim against Defendant for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (“NIED”), but that the Court inappropriately denied leave to amend the Complaint to add it. (ECF No. 97 at PageID 1118.) Plaintiffs further argue that “Defendant's Motion should be denied in its entirety for being brought outside the deadlines provided for in the Court's Scheduling Order.” (Id. at PageID 1117.)

Here, Defendant convincingly argues that the docket should reflect Derrickia Heard as a party plaintiff in her individual capacity. See Walker v. Evans, No. 10-12596, 2011 WL 3593248, *2-3 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (substituting minor plaintiffs' names for next friends because minors reached the age of majority); see, e.g., Erie R. Co. v. Fritsch, 72 F.2d 766, 767 (3d Cir. 1934) (minor plaintiff came of age before entry of judgment and the court properly amended the docket to reflect her name on the judgment); Stephenson v. McClelland, 632 Fed.Appx. 177, 181 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that parents lose standing to bring claims on their child's behalf after the child reaches age of majority). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff Derrickia Heard turned eighteen years old in November 2021, which is the applicable age of majority under Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-102(b). Consequently, Plaintiff April Heard no longer has standing to bring a lawsuit on her daughter's behalf.^[4] See McClelland, 632 Fed.Appx. at 181. Next, the Court turns to whether Plaintiff April Heard would suffer prejudice if removed as Parent and Next Friend to Derrickia Heard. Specifically, Plaintiff April Heard argues that “she sought to add a claim against Defendant asserting negligent infliction of emotional distress.” (ECF No. 97 at PageID 1119.) Plaintiffs insist that “at the time the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Amend, Defendant had not been served or otherwise filed a responsive pleading, ” and therefore Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend should have been granted “as of right.” (ECF No. 97 at PageID 1118.) While it is puzzling why Plaintiffs still filed a motion for leave to amend even though they thought themselves entitled to amend the Complaint “as of right, ” the previously dismissed Defendant School Board did file a responsive pleading, (ECF No. 6), thirty days before Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to amend. (Id.; ECF No. 8.) As the Court explained in an earlier Order, Plaintiffs' claims against the School Board failed as a matter of law and were dismissed; consequently, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend in its entirety on August 14, 2020.^[5] (ECF Nos. 8, 13.) Therefore, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED. The clerk is directed to add Derrickia Heard as a Plaintiff in this matter and April Heard shall remain a party Plaintiff.^[6] April Heard shall no longer be identified as “Parent and Next Friend of D.H.”^[7] (See ECF No. 64 at PageID 525.)

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion, (ECF No. 90), is GRANTED. The clerk is DIRECTED to remove April Heard as Parent and Next Friend of D.H., while retaining April Heard as a party Plaintiff in her individual capacity. Plaintiff “D.H.” should be reflected on the docket as Plaintiff Derrickia Heard, a second Plaintiff, because she has now attained the age of majority in Tennessee.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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^[1] Plaintiffs do not dispute that Derrickia Heard is a real party in interest, (ECF No. 97 at PageID 1118), or that she has in fact reached the age of majority in Tennessee, which is eighteen years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-102(b). Accordingly, the Court concludes for purposes of this litigation that Plaintiff Derrickia Heard has in fact attained eighteen years of age.

^[2] Plaintiff represents to the Court that Defendant intended to cite “Wilson v. Luttrell” at “230 F.3d 1361, ” thus intimating that “Wilson v. Luttrell” is a separate case. (ECF No 97 at PagelD 1117.) However, “Luttrell” was a party in Wilson v. Webb and the parties are referring to the same case; “230 F.3d 1361” references several consolidated matters. The Court notes that it accessed the Wilson v. Webb opinion without difficulty on LexisNexis, where it appears as “Wilson v. Webb” at the citation provided by Defendant, but the same opinion appears on Westlaw under the Wilson v. Luttrell caption-as the Court previously intimated, it is one among several cases that share this citation-at the reference provided by Plaintiffs. While the Court abstains from the (lively) debate on whether LexisNexis or Westlaw is the superior legal research tool, it will (for clarity) refer to the case cited by the parties as: Wilson v. Webb, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23585, 2000 WL 1359624 (6th Cir. 2000) and, subsequently in short form, as Webb, 2000 WL 1359624.

^[3] The Court cannot discern any authority from the pleadings where a court dismissed a matter for failure to prosecute simply because a party had not been properly substituted. Indeed, Defendant's case law suggests the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Webb, 2000 WL 1359624, at * 29 (“Nor does Luttrell appear to have been prejudiced by Price's failure to remove her next friend when she reached the age of majority....”) Either way, as this Order will explain, the Court need not address these grounds for alternative relief because substitution is appropriate.

^[4] Defendant also cites the Sixth Circuit's decision in Wilson v. Webb for this proposition. (ECF No. 90-1 at PageID 1093.) However, as Plaintiffs' counsel aptly points out, Defendant's citation is inexact because it omits the Kentucky Supreme Court decision to which the Sixth Circuit specifically referred. (ECF No. 97 at PageID 1117 n. 1.) The proper citation for the quotation is: Wilson v. Webb, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23585, 2000 WL 1359624 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Cozine v. Bonnick, 245 S.W.2d 935, 937-38 (Ky. 1952)). However, inexact citation notwithstanding, the fact that the Sixth Circuit applied this...