Hebrard v. Nofziger

90 F.4th 1000

Alexander Thomas HEBRARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeremy M. NOFZIGER; Brandon Kelly;Jason Brown; C. Gove, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-35327

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Argued and Submitted April 17, 2023 Portland, Oregon

Filed January 11, 2024

SUMMARY^*

Prisoner Civil Rights/Heck v. Humphrey

The panel affirmed the district court's sua sponte dismissal of Oregon inmate Alexander Hebrard's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

Hebrard alleged that he was disciplined in prison without due process of law and sought damages for the disciplinary sanctions imposed, but did not seek relief for the revocation of 27 days of his earned-time credits. Three years after Hebrard's complaint was filed, the district court sua sponte requested briefing on whether Heck barred his claim. Under Heck, a section 1983 suit for damages that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the length of an inmate's sentence must be dismissed unless the inmate first challenges his sentence in habeas and obtains relief.

The panel determined that defendant's failure to plead Heck as an affirmative defense constituted a forfeiture rather than a waiver. The district court did not err when it sua sponte resurrected defendant's forfeited Heck defense at the summary judgment stage and dismissed the complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which provides that dismissals for failure to state a claim are obligatory, even when the legal basis for the dismissal is raised sua sponte.

Addressing the merits of the dismissal, the panel held that it was clear from the face of the complaint that Hebrard's claim necessarily implicated the validity of the revocation of his earned-time credits, which extended his stay in prison. Under Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997), Hebrard's decision not to request relief for the loss of his earned-time credits did not mean his claim did not challenge the validity of the duration of his confinement. A successful challenge to the validity of the procedures employed during Hebrard's disciplinary hearing necessarily encompassed a determination that the prison could not validly impose any sanctions—including the revocation of plaintiff's earned-time credits. To comply with Heck, Hebrard had to obtain habeas relief before filing this § 1983 action. Because he did not do so, his claim was barred by Heck.

Dissenting, Judge Sung stated that on this record, it was uncertain whether the restoration of Hebrard's earned-time credits would necessarily lead to his immediate or speedier release from custody. Under Oregon law, it is possible that Hebrard is receiving earned-time credits that cannot lead to his immediate or speedier release. She therefore disagreed with the conclusion that the district court properly dismissed Hebrard's claim as Heck-barred.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Youlee Yim You, Magistrate Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. 6:19-cv-01498-YY

Jeremy A. Carp (argued), Erick J. Haynie, and Craig Streit, Perkins Coie LLP, Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jon Zunkel-Decoursey (argued), Assistant Attorney General; Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General; Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General; Oregon Department of Justice, Salem, Oregon; for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Carlos T. Bea, and Jennifer Sung, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea;

Dissent by Judge Sung

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Alexander Hebrard ("Hebrard"), an Oregon state inmate proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Hebrard claimed that he was disciplined in prison without due process of law because he was prevented from presenting an adequate defense and therefore was found guilty of what he claims are baseless rule violations by Defendant-Appellee Jeremy Nofziger ("Nofziger"), the prison official who presided over his disciplinary hearing. Hebrard sought damages for the sanctions Nofziger imposed, save for the revocation of 27 days of his earned-time credits, as to which he requested no relief in this case.

Three years after Hebrard's complaint was filed, the district court sua sponte requested briefing on whether Heck barred his claim. Under Heck, "a § 1983 suit for damages that would . . . 'necessarily imply' the invalidity of the length of an inmate's sentence" must be dismissed unless the inmate first challenged his sentence in habeas and obtained relief. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004). The district court held that Heck required a dismissal of Hebrard's claim. Hebrard sought to expunge all of his disciplinary convictions, on a basis which would thereby necessarily invalidate all the sanctions imposed—including the revocation of his earned-time credits. And because the revocation of Hebrard's credits lengthened his sentence, the district court held that Hebrard should have first filed his claim in habeas. His failure to do so meant the court was required to dismiss the action as barred by Heck.

We conclude that the district court did not err. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), it was authorized to dismiss Hebrard's in forma pauperis complaint for failure to state a claim, even though it had raised Heck sua sponte. And the court correctly held that were Hebrard's claim successful, it would call into doubt the proper duration of his confinement. As a result, to comply with Heck, Hebrard needed to obtain habeas relief before filing this § 1983 action. Because he did not do so, his claim must be dismissed as Heck-barred. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND¹

A. Factual Background

In 2018, prison officials began to suspect that Hebrard had used his prison account to launder money and had smuggled drugs into prison. As a result, he was charged with violating the prison's rules against racketeering, distribution of a controlled substance, possession of drugs, and possession of contraband. Prior to the disciplinary hearing, Hebrard submitted written requests for the production of evidence related to the charges. He demanded that the prison produce the letters Hebrard purportedly wrote to his confederates discussing illicit activities, the videos of his prison visits with these individuals, and the transcripts of the phone calls he had with them.

Nofziger presided over Hebrard's disciplinary hearing, which was held on November 27, 2018. At the hearing, Nofziger read the charges against Hebrard and denied each of Hebrard's written evidentiary requests—allegedly without "a valid or reasonable reason." The transcript of the disciplinary hearing reveals that Nofziger had informed Hebrard that these requests were denied because they were either moot, or because the requested information was confidential. Nofziger then reviewed the evidence supporting the charges against Hebrard. Nofziger read transcripts of Hebrard's calls that involved Hebrard's conversations with his associates regarding drug smuggling and money his associates deposited into his prison account that was not theirs. And Nofziger stated on the record that several letters in Hebrard's handwriting described how he planned to smuggle drugs into the prison. Hebrard was not permitted to see either the transcripts or the letters.

At the end of the hearing, Nofziger found Hebrard guilty of the drug possession, distribution of a controlled substance, and racketeering charges and was sanctioned. Hebrard was fined $100, had $1,050 confiscated from his prison account, was placed in segregated housing for 120 days, lost 365 days of visitation rights, and had 27 days of his earned-time credits revoked. The final disciplinary report reveals that the sanctions were imposed collectively and that the rule violations had been merged together. The prison denied Hebrard's administrative appeal on February 6, 2019.

B. Procedural History

On September 17, 2019, Hebrard filed this § 1983 action. The complaint named several defendants, but only Nofziger remains.² Hebrard claimed that Nofziger's actions during the disciplinary hearing violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, he claimed that Nofziger lacked an evidentiary basis to find him guilty of the rule violations: Nofziger was alleged not to have called witnesses, produced documentary evidence, or provided an adequate explanation for his denial of Hebrard's request for an investigation into the charges. In his prayer for relief, Hebrard sought damages for the sanctions imposed. He specifically sought to recoup the confiscated money and the fine as well as to recover damages for his placement in segregated housing and for his loss of visitation rights. But Hebrard did not seek damages for the revocation of his earned-time credits.³

Hebrard filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which the district court granted. On May 14, 2020, approximately one year and three months after Hebrard's administrative appeal was denied, Nofziger filed his answer. Nofziger raised qualified immunity and the PLRA's exhaustion requirement as affirmative defenses.

On June 28, 2021, Nofziger moved for summary judgment contending that he had not violated Hebrard's due process rights and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. Following briefing and a hearing on the motion, the district court requested supplemental briefing on whether Heck v. Humphrey barred Hebrard's claim. This was the first time anyone had raised Heck as a potential bar to Hebrard's ability to obtain relief.

After the parties filed supplemental briefing regarding Heck, the district court issued its opinion and order which dismissed Hebrard's suit. The court held that the PLRA authorized its sua sponte dismissal under Heck...