Hellmuth v. Hood, Case No. 1:18-cv-340

DANIEL L. HELLMUTH, Plaintiff, v. LEANNE HOOD, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:18-cv-340

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

November 27, 2018

Barrett, J.

Litkovitz, M.J.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a resident of Texas proceeding pro se, brings this action against defendants Leanne and Herbert Hood in relation to an alleged property ownership dispute. (Doc. 1). This matter is before the Court on several of plaintiff's pretrial motions, including his motion to dismiss defendants' answers to the complaint (Doc. 11), motion to allow plaintiff to use the ECF filing system (Doc. 3), "motion to estoppel" (Doc. 15), "Motion to Rule on Rule 52" (Doc. 23), and motion for a "suppression order" (Doc. 28). This matter is also before the Court on defendants' memorandum in opposition to these motions and motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docs. 16, 24).

I. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. 11)

Plaintiff moves to dismiss defendants' answers to the complaint, including defendants' Exhibit A attached to the answer. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff argues that the Butler County Common Pleas Court "issued a Summons for the Defendants to answer an amended complaint dated June 6. 2018. . . . They failed to file their answer in the required time." (Id.). The Court construes plaintiff's motion as a motion to strike.

Motions to strike are governed by Rule 12(f), which provides that a court "may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). However, motions to strike are generally disfavored and should be used sparingly and only in cases where the material at issue has "no possible relation to the controversy." Anderson v. U.S., 39 F. App'x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Brown v. Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. U.S., 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953)).

Here, plaintiff has provided no valid argument in support of his motion to strike. Rather, from what the Court can discern, plaintiff purports to allege that defendants' answer was untimely in state court. Plaintiff's argument has no bearing on this federal lawsuit. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants' answer (Doc. 11) is DENIED.

II. Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 16)

A. The Complaint

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on May 18, 2018, which includes the caption "wrongful death complaint." (Doc. 1 at 1). Plaintiff alleges that he agreed to allow his daughter and her husband, Leanne and Herbert Hood, ("defendants") to move into his home in Trenton, Ohio while he and his wife resided in their new townhouse in Round Rock, Texas during the summer of 2014. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that defendants agreed to pay all expenses on the home, including electric, water, taxes, and insurance. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that he planned bestowing the Ohio home to his daughter in his will. (Id.).

In May 2015, plaintiff and his wife returned to the Ohio home. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that defendants informed him that they could not pay the utilities, taxes, and insurance on the home because the home was not listed in their name. (Id.). As a result, plaintiff alleges that his attorney drafted a quitclaim deed in September 2015 giving defendants one-half ownership of the house at that time and the other half after his eventual death. (Id., Ex. A).

In spring 2016, plaintiff alleges that defendants requested sole ownership of the home,but defendants agreed to allow plaintiff and his wife to live in the upstairs portion of the home until their deaths. (Id.). After several arguments with his wife, plaintiff agreed to sell the entire property to defendants. (Id. at 1-2). On May 31, 2016, an attorney drafted paperwork for the transfer of property. (Id. at 2, Ex. B). Although the signatures of plaintiff and his wife appear on the deed transferring the property to defendants, plaintiff alleges that he and his wife did not sign the documents before a notary public. Rather, he alleges his daughter "took the deed transfer to her co-worker who was a Notary to get her stamp and signature." (Complaint, Doc. 1 at 2).

Plaintiff alleges that his wife continually expressed her dissatisfaction with the sale of the home. (Id.). On March 13. 2017, plaintiff's wife died from a severe heart attack. (Id.). On September 3, 2017, upon returning to Texas for the winter, plaintiff alleges that defendants sent him an email "telling [him] not to return to Ohio, the house was theirs and if [he] did return, they would have [him] arrested and prosecuted." (Id.).

In October 2017, plaintiff filed a pro se civil action in the Butler County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas seeking to have the home returned to him "because the deed transfers were within Ohio's 2-year-rule allowing the executor (me) of my wife's will to void them." (Id.). Soon thereafter, plaintiff alleges that defendants informed him of their intent to sell the home. (Id.). As such, in December 2017, plaintiff "filed with the Butler County Probate Court for [his wife's] will to be read and a motion to void the property transfer." (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that the Probate Court "put [his] wife's will on hold until there was a determination of the Common Pleas court was settled." (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that in January 2018 a magistrate arranged a visitation for him to collect belongings from the home. (Id.). Defendants blocked plaintiff from parking in the driveway and Trenton police cars surrounded the home. (Id.). Plaintiff's daughter handed him a box of hisbelongings and he left the home. (Id.).

Based on these facts, plaintiff alleges:

Causing the death of my wife just to get ownership of our house and sell it for cash was greed and a premeditated plan on [defendants]' part. I'm 71 years old, my wife was 72 and probably together wouldn't have had many more years to live. They would have gained ownership of my house at that time without killing my wife.

(Id. at 3).

Plaintiff has also filed several supplemental memoranda and an amended pleading, which purport to clarify that he brings claims of wrongful death, breach of contract, and adverse possession. (See Docs. 4, 5, 6, 7, 19).¹ In one supplemental memorandum, plaintiff repeats many of the same facts from his complaint and alleges that the deed transfer executed in the spring of 2016 was fraudulent because the attorney who drafted the deed "failed to add into the deed transfer that [the home] wouldn't be transferred until the death of BOTH of us [plaintiff and his wife]." (Doc. 4 at 1). Plaintiff again alleges that the deed transfer caused his wife "tremendous and unrelenting" stress, which was "too much for her heart to handle" and resulted in an eventual heart attack. (Id. at 2). In a second supplemental memorandum, entitled "statement of claim," plaintiff clarifies that he brings a claim under Ohio Rev. Code § 2125.01 for wrongful death. (Doc. 5 at 1). In a third supplemental memorandum, plaintiff alleges that he seeks damages in the amount of $5,000,000. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff also alleges that defendantsintentionally caused him to be subjected to a "possible police shooting" and caused his wife's "untimely death by heart attack." (Id.). In a fourth supplemental memorandum, plaintiff states that he brings claims for breach of contract and adverse possession. (Doc. 7 at 1). Plaintiff states that his claim is "for the possession of [his] home and its contents. . . ." (Id. at 2).

B. Rule 12(c) Standard

Courts apply the same analysis to motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) as they apply to motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 623 F.3d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 2010). "For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). However, the Court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. Id. (citing Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999)).

To withstand a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, "a complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under some viable legal theory." Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). "The factual allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead 'sufficient factual matter' to render the legal claim plausible, i.e., more than merely possible." Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009)). A "legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation" need not be accepted as true, nor are recitations of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc.,579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

It is well-settled that a document filed pro se is "to be liberally construed" and that a pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers [.]" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that the Supreme Court's liberal construction case law has not had the effect of "abrogat[ing] basic pleading essentials" in pro se suits. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

C. Resolution

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). (Doc. 16 at 7-8). Defendants argue that plaintiff's wrongful death and "breach of...