Henderson v. International Union

263 F.Supp.2d 1245

Madella HENDERSON, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV .A. 00-2575-CM.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

June 6, 2003.

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Ruth M. Benien, Benien Law Offices, Chtd., Kansas City, KS, Sally A. Howard, Sarah A. Brown, Parkinson, Foth, Orrick & Brown LLP, Lenexa, KS, for Madella Henderson.

Bruce C. Jackson, Jr., Mark A. Kistler, Arnold, Newbold, Winter, Jackson, and Jacoby, P.C, Kansas City, MO, for Intern. Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of America, UAW.

David C. Vogel, Rosalee M. McNamara, Patrick M. Gavin, Lathrop & Gage L.C, Kansas City, MO, for General Motors Corp.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MURGUIA, District Judge.

Plaintiff Madella Henderson filed suit against defendants International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), Local No. 31 of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Workers of America (Local 31) (referred to collectively as "the Union"), and General Motors Corporation (GM). Plaintiff alleges that defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her race and sex in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; her race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12001 et seq. This matter is before the court on defendants UAW and Local 31's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 76) and defendant GM's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 78).

I. Facts¹

Plaintiff is a 54 year-old African-American woman who has been employed for more than 25 years at the Fairfax assembly plant operated by GM. Plaintiff alleges she was the victim of pervasive harass merit, discrimination, and retaliation during the course of her employment. Specifically, plaintiff contends she was harassed and treated differently in the terms and conditions of her employment than comparable white co-workers and male co-workers and union members. Plaintiff also asserts she has or is regarded as having disabilities to her neck, shoulders, arms, back, knee, and ankle and that she has been regarded as having or has a record of a mental impairment. Plaintiff claims she was harassed and treated differently in the terms and conditions of her employment than comparable nondisabled co-workers and union members and that defendants failed to assist plaintiff with her requests for reasonable accommodations. Plaintiff also alleges she was harassed and treated differently in the terms and conditions of her employment than younger co-workers and union members.

With respect to plaintiffs claims against the Union, plaintiff claims that the Union harassed, discriminated, and retaliated against her on the basis of her race, sex, age, and disability. Plaintiff also alleges that her complaints of discrimination and harassment against GM were disregarded and that the Union failed to represent or assist her with regard to her complaints. Finally, plaintiff contends that the Union is liable for failure to take any action against GM's alleged discriminatory practices.

The record in this case in voluminous. Moreover, in response to defendants' summary judgment motions, plaintiff has set forth collectively more than six hundred additional facts, some of which are duplicative, which plaintiff claims are evidence of defendants' discriminatory conduct. The court will attempt to categorize the facts of this case. However, in some instances, plaintiffs factual assertions do not make clear on what basis plaintiff claims discrimination. With respect to those factual assertions, the court will include a section setting forth plaintiffs contentions in an effort to consider each and every allegation. The length of this decision is not necessarily an indication of the merits of plaintiffs claims. Rather, the court has attempted to fully consider every contention made by plaintiff.

A. Specific Incidences of Alleged Discrimination

1. The Noose Incidents

In September 1998, Mildred Woody, another African-American employee at the plant, found'what appeared to be a noose at her work station. The noose was made from a piece of flexible rubber and the loop of the noose was six (6) inches in diameter. Supervisor Jim Miraglia came up the line toward the noose and said, "Millie, what's the beef and tried to take the noose apart by pulling, and Woody screamed at him two or three times to put it down. Miraglia then threw the noose on her work station. Woody put in a committeeman call and later filed a grievance over the matter. Plaintiff, who was on a medical leave of absence when the incident occurred, never saw the noose hanging in the plant. Rather, plaintiff saw the noose that Woody had in her hand when Woody was on her way to labor relations. Plaintiff was in the plant in order to visit the medical department when this occurred.

GM investigated the concerns raised by Woody and other employees, including plaintiff, regarding the noose, and determined that it had been made by Miraglia. Miraglia, who is originally from the east coast, explained that he was merely tying knots in a piece of material, and was unaware of the racial connotation associated with a noose. Despite GM's conclusion that Miraglia's action was not discriminatory, GM counseled Miraglia regarding the incident.

In March 1999, employees discovered another apparent noose in the plant. GM investigated the incident, and the hourly employee who hung the item asserted that he did so in response to the "Y2K" crisis, and also to express concerns that the union "ought to be hung" for failing to accomplish certain measures with regard to profit sharing. The employee who hung the noose was suspended for one week. Plaintiff did not see the second noose, and only heard about it from co-workers.

Several days later, GM discovered a length of rope in a material crib that had been detached from a spool and tied into a loop which appeared "noose-like." Plaintiff did not see this third item, and again only heard about it from co-workers. GM investigated the incident but was unable to determine who had produced the rope or what its purpose was. Other individuals complained of the multiple nooses found at General Motors in 1998 or 1999. In the summer of 1999, GM received six EEOC civil rights complaints.

Other than the noose incidents, plaintiff has never heard any member of GM management use a racial slur or make any other racially derogatory statement.

2. Allegations of Sexual Harassment Regarding Steve Clark

During 1996 and 1997, plaintiff worked in the plant's reliability department. Steve Clark was plaintiff's supervisor. During that time frame, plaintiff alleges that Clark made several comments to her that plaintiff contends constituted sexual harassment:

1. While plaintiff was jumping rope outside the plant during a break, Clark looked at her breasts and told her that he "love[d] to see [her] jump rope."

2. Following plaintiff's request to leave early from her scheduled shift, Clark said to plaintiff. "You are looking in my eyes and I can tell by your eyes that you want me."

3. During a power failure at the plant, Clark told plaintiff, "You know, you are becoming a real pain in my ass, that's a good pain."

4. During a discussion regarding plaintiff's assignment to a light duty position due to a medical restriction that precluded her from working overtime, Clark told plaintiff that he would "rather have [her] work eight hours [per day] than not at all."

Plaintiff reported the statements to Joelle Thomas, an African-American female who worked as the plant's Equal Employment Opportunity coordinator. GM management investigated plaintiff's complaint and was unable to establish that discriminatory conduct had occurred.

Approximately six months after the last of the four allegedly harassing comments, plaintiff observed Clark, without comment, place a styrofoam container with a piece of cake inside on her work station. At the same time, Clark gave a piece of the same cake to one of plaintiff's male co-workers who was standing nearby. Plaintiff reported the incident to plant manager Paul Marr, labor relations representative Pam Goodwin, and her union representative. In response to plaintiff's report, Marr met with Clark, and plaintiff had no problems with Clark thereafter.

3. The Security Incident

As set forth in more detail below, an incident, referred to herein as the "security incident," occurred on January 25, 1999. Plaintiff contends that the security incident was discriminatory. The incident involved primarily Cecil Oldham, who at the time was the plant's supervisor of hourly employment. Plaintiff asserts numerous facts which plaintiff sets forth under the heading "Additional Facts Leading up to and Concerning the `Security Incident.'" With respect to many of these facts alleged by plaintiff, the court is not clear how they are related to the security incident or how they are otherwise relevant to plaintiff's claims of discriminatory conduct. However, the court considers plaintiff's factual contentions in ruling on this motion.

July 27, 1998—While the plant was closed because of a strike, plaintiff broke her ankle. Dr. F.M. Gilhausen treated plaintiff and completed attending physician statements for plaintiff to remain on disability.

October 16, 1998—Dr. Gilhausen provided a note that stated plaintiff could return to work on October 19, 1998, to light duty if possible-no climbing stairs, excessive standing, or walking.

October 19, 1998—Plaintiff reported to work to the plant medical department with her restrictions. Plaintiff was wearing open-toed sandals. Earlene Webb, R.N., told plaintiff to go home and that she could not release plaintiff to return to work...